PRIVATIZATION AND THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF POLITICAL ADVOCACY
Alexander Volokh*
A common argument against privatization is that private providers, motivated by self-interest, will advocate changes in substantive
policy. In this Article, Professor Volokh evaluates this argument, using, as a case study, the argument against prison privatization based
on the possibility that the private prison industry will distort the criminal law by advocating incarceration.
This “political influence” argument applies at least as well to public provision: Government agencies, too, lobby for changes in substantive law. In the prison industry, for instance, it is unclear whether private firms advocate incarceration to any significant extent, but public
guard unions are known to do so actively.
Moreover, adding the “extra voice” of the private sector will not
necessarily increase either the amount of pro-incarceration advocacy
or its effectiveness. Prison privatization may well reduce the political
power of the pro-incarceration forces: Because advocacy is a “public
good” for the industry, as the number of independent actors increases,
the largest actor’s advocacy decreases (since it no longer captures the
full benefit of its advocacy) and the smaller actors free-ride off the
largest actor’s contribution. Under some plausible assumptions, privatization decreases advocacy, and under different plausible assumptions, the net effect of privatization on advocacy is ambiguous.
The argument that prison privatization distorts criminal law by
fostering pro-incarceration advocacy is thus unconvincing without a
fuller explanation of the mechanics of advocacy. The use of the political influence argument in other privatization contexts may also be
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theoretically unsound, to the extent it does not consider whether privatization reduces preexisting levels of public sector advocacy.
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INTRODUCTION

Over 90 years ago, opponents of World War I alleged that “munitions manufacturers frighten the popular mind with the fear of imaginary
external enemies and inflame it with murderous patriotism.”1 According
1

In re Billings, 298 P. 1071, 1094 (Cal. 1930) (quoting a 1916 article by an “odious anarchist”); see also, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 141 (2004) (“Socialists maintained that war was
a capitalist tool contrived by industrialists to boost armament sales”); id. at 180 & 598 n.80 (Postmaster General announced in 1917 that newspapers could not say “that this Government is the tool
of . . . munitions makers”); NIALL FERGUSON, THE PITY OF WAR 32–33 (1999) (arms industry would
benefit from war, and Alfred Hugenberg, director of the Krupp armaments company, made a prowar statement).
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to Stefan Zweig, the war began only when “newspapers in the pay of the
arms manufacturers began to whip up sentiment against Serbia.”2 After
the war, that accusation morphed into the charge that arms makers were
self-interestedly obstructing peace efforts.3 Today, an opponent of U.S.
military policy characterizes defense contractor CACI International Inc,4
whose chairman speaks publicly of the “heinous[ness],” “fanatical horror,” and “barbarism” of terrorism,5 as “one of the most unabashed corporate backers of Bush’s foreign policy and a key supporter of the military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.”6
This theme—that private contractors use their influence to advocate
not just privatization but also, insidiously, changes in the substantive
law—sweeps more broadly than defense contractors.
• Private prison firms are often accused of lobbying for incarceration because, like a hotel, they have “a strong economic incentive to book every available room and encourage every guest to
stay as long as possible.”7
• Business improvement districts—coalitions of business and
property owners, many of which have their own private security
forces—have lobbied municipalities for, among other things, aggressive panhandling ordinances.8

2
Andrew Cockburn, The Great War, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2000. But see FERGUSON,
supra note 1, at 215–16 (European press opinion, in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Britain, was
not particularly pro-war when the war began).
3
See Report of the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry, Senate, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 4–10 (Feb. 24, 1936) (the Nye Commission report, charging that the munitions
industry opposes peace and disarmament efforts); cf. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and
Television Address to the American People, in 1960–1961 PUB. PAPERS ¶421, at 1035, 1038 (Jan.
17, 1961) (“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the
disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”).
4
See CACI Int’l Inc, CACI: Ever Vigilant, http://www.caci.com (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
5
Speech by Dr. J.P. (Jack) London, Chairman, President, and CEO of CACI International Inc,
on accepting the AUSA John W. Dixon Medal, Washington, D.C., Oct. 8, 2003, http://www.caci.
com/speeches/jpl_AUSA_10-8-03_speech.shtml (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
6
Tim Shorrock, CACI and Its Friends, NATION, June 21, 2004, at 6; see also ROBERT
MANDEL, ARMIES WITHOUT STATES: THE PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY 86–88 (2002) (“private
military companies could have an interest in seeing violence and turmoil perpetuated to drum up
business for their services”); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 952 (2004); NORMAN SOLOMON,
WAR MADE EASY: HOW PRESIDENTS AND PUNDITS KEEP SPINNING US TO DEATH 113–15 (2005)
(linking government-friendly coverage of Iraq war with media ownership by weapons manufacturers). For a view from the very far left, see Anthony Arnove, Pro-War Propaganda Machine, SOCIALIST WORKER, Mar. 21, 2003, at 6.
7
Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATL. MONTHLY, Dec. 1998, at 51, 64; see
also text accompanying notes 16–24 infra and sources cited in note 23 infra.
8
See Franck Vindevogel, Private Security and Urban Crime Mitigation: A Bid for BIDs, 5
CRIM. JUST. 233, 244–45 (2005).
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A toll road developer in Colorado has lobbied for statutory
changes to preempt county authority to set toll rates,9 and a private road construction firm has been accused of contributing to
Texas Supreme Court justices’ campaign chests to influence a
potential eminent domain suit related to a toll road in the state.10
• Private redevelopment corporations, which have the power to
condemn private property for purposes of “urban renewal,” have
opposed reform of eminent domain laws in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. New London.11
• And some environmental groups,12 which benefit from fines
available under environmental citizen suit provisions,13 fight for
the continued vitality of those same statutes.14
In this Article, I examine this “political influence” argument against
privatization using the case study of private prisons. I conclude that, in
the prison context, there is at present no particular reason to credit the
argument. At worst, the political influence argument is exactly backwards, by which I mean that privatization will decrease prison providers’
pro-incarceration influence; and at best, it is dubious, by which I mean
that whether it is true or false depends on facts that proponents of the
argument have not developed.
Private prisons are a useful case study: First, because they are a
growth industry, having progressed from humble beginnings in the late
’70s and early ’80s to now house about one in sixteen inmates nationwide;15 and second, because the political influence argument against
prison privatization is fairly common.16
9
See Colleen Slevin, Senate Panel Kills Bill for “Super Slab” Toll Road, AP ALERT—
POLITICAL, Mar. 23, 2005.
10
See Dan Genz, Texas Court Nominee Challenges Possible TTC Builder’s Campaign Contributions, WACO TRIB., Oct. 3, 2006.
11
545 U.S. 469 (2005); New London Dev. Corp., A Review and Analysis of Eminent Domain,
http://www.nldc.org/documents/NLDC-EMINENTDOMAINWP.pdf (July 28, 2005) (last visited
Oct. 21, 2006) (justifying the practice of eminent domain, post-Kelo, to the Connecticut General
Assembly’s Planning and Development Committee, see http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/PDdata/chr/
2005PD-00728-R001400-CHR.htm).
12
See, e.g., As You Sow, As You Sow: Planting Seeds for Social Change, http://www.
asyousow.org/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2006).
13
See Off. of the Att’y Gen., State of Cal., Dep’t of Just., Proposition 65 Settlement Report
2005, http://caag.state.ca.us/prop65/pdfs/Alpert_Report2005a.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2006) (listing
As You Sow as a major recipient of Prop. 65 settlement monies); see generally Michael S. Greve,
The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339, 351–54 (1990); id. at 356
(describing typical settlements of citizen suits, which include “above-cost attorneys’ fees” and payment for environmental projects by the defendant).
14
See As You Sow, Proposition 65 and State Rights Under Attack, SEEDS OF CHANGE—ENEWS, Summer 2006, http://www.asyousow.org/news/AYS_enews06Q3.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2006).
15
On the humble beginnings, see DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., ABT ASSOCS. INC., PRIVATE
PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE 4–5 (1998). On the cur(continued next page)
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Sharon Dolovich writes, in a recent Duke Law Journal article, that
“the legitimacy of punishment” is threatened “whenever parties with a
financial interest in increased incarceration are in a position to exert influence over the nature and extent of criminal sentencing. If this concern
is real”17—and she suggests that it may well be18—prisons should not be
privatized because “the state ought not to foster yet another potentially
influential industry that could seek to compromise further the possibility
of legitimate punishment to promote that industry’s own financial interests.”19
David Shichor, a prominent contributor to the prison privatization
literature, opposes prison privatization20 in part because:
Through political lobbying, PACs, campaign contributions, and the provision of perks to politicians (as industrial and business corporations do), corporations are likely to continue to support and even accelerate incapacitation-oriented legislation and policies by which more people will spend
longer periods of time in correctional institutions. Conversely, this trend
may diminish the emphasis on alternative programs and will result in the
pursuance of the “Hilton Inn mentality,” that is, trying to maintain high occupancy rates for profit purposes.21

And Brigette Sarabi and Edwin Bender’s thesis is clear from the title
of their report, The Prison Payoff: The Role of Politics and Private Prisons in the Incarceration Boom, in which they argue that prison privatization should be resisted in part because private prison firms have a “vested

rent extent, see BUR. OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2004, at 6
tbl.7.
16
In focusing on this argument, I do not cover arguments based on cost and quality comparisons, arguments based on accountability concerns, or any other arguments in the debate. For arguments about cost and quality, see, e.g., BUR. OF JUST. ASSIST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EMERGING ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 38 (2001) (“no data” or “definitive research evidence” supports the
hypotheses of significant cost and quality differences between public and private prisons); Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1875–79 (2002) (private prisons
do well in cost and quality comparisons); Judith Greene, Bailing Out Private Jails, AM. PROSPECT,
Sept. 10, 2001, at 23 (sharply criticizing the performance of private prisons); Oliver Hart et al., The
Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127, 1147–54
(1997) (private prisons may perform poorly). For arguments about accountability, see, e.g., Alfred
C. Aman, Jr., Privatization, Prisons, Democracy, and Human Rights: The Need to Extend the Province of Administrative Law, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 511, 533–41 (2005); Developments,
supra note 16, at 1879–86; Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1319, 1343 (2003); Nicole B. Cásarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle
in Privatized Federal Corrections: The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 249 (1995); Note, David N. Wecht, Breaking the Code of Deference: Judicial Review of
Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 815 (1987).
17
Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 542 (2005).
18
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 523–30.
19
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 542–43.
20
DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS 256
(1995).
21
SHICHOR, supra note 20, at 236.
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financial interest[] in increasing rates of imprisonment.”22 This is only a
small sample of the literature.23 For a sample of the art, see Figure 1.24
I assume, for purposes of this Article, that the foundation of this critique is correct, and that economically self-interested pro-incarceration
advocacy is undesirable.25 However, it is unclear how this critique supports an argument against privatization.
First, the public sector—chiefly in the form of public prison guards’
unions—is already a major self-interested pro-incarceration political
force. The most active prison guards’ union, the California Correctional
Peace Officers Association, has contributed massively in support of
tough-on-crime positions on voter initiatives and has given money to
crime victims’ groups, and public prison guards’ unions in other states
have endorsed candidates for their tough-on-crime positions. Private
firms would thus enter, and partly displace some of the actors in, a heavily populated field.26
22

BRIGETTE SARABI & EDWIN BENDER, THE PRISON PAYOFF: THE ROLE OF POLITICS AND PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE INCARCERATION BOOM vii, 21 (W. States Ctr. & W. Prison Project, 2000).
23
In addition to the sources cited in notes 7, 17, 20, and 22 supra, see MICHAEL A. HALLETT,
PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA 141 (2006); BYRON EUGENE PRICE, MERCHANDIZING PRISONERS:
WHO REALLY PAYS FOR PRISON PRIVATIZATION? 74–75, 131–36 (2006); DAVID GARLAND, THE
CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 204 (2001);
KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 101 (1997) (referring to influence on policy abroad); THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION 87–88, 92–93 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996);
MARTIN P. SELLERS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
51 (1993); CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS 159 (1990); CHARLES R. RING,
CONTRACTING FOR THE OPERATION OF PRIVATE PRISONS: PROS AND CONS 12 (1987); Gilbert Geis,
The Privatization of Prisons: Panacea or Placebo?, in PRIVATE MEANS—PUBLIC ENDS: PRIVATE
BUSINESS IN SOCIAL SERVICE DELIVERY 76, 94 (Barry J. Carroll et al. eds., 1987), cited in SELLERS,
supra, at 51 & 116 n.5; REPORT RELATIVE TO PRISONS FOR PROFIT 9, 56–58 (Comm. of Mass., Leg.
Res. Council, House No. 6225, July 31, 1986); Rachel E. Barkow, Our Federal System of Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 119, 125 (2005); Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV.
715, 729 (2005); Geiza Vargas-Vargas, White Investment in Black Bondage, 27 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 41, 75 n.209 (2005); Freeman, supra note 16, at 1349 n.249; Daniel L. Low, Nonprofit Private
Prisons: The Next Generation of Prison Management, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 45 (2003); Michael Janus, Bars on the Iron Triangle: Public Policy Issues in the Privatization of Corrections, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 73, 83 (Gary W. Bowman,
Simon Hakim & Paul Seidenstat eds., 1993); Amanda George, The State Tries an Escape, LEGAL
SERV. BULL., Apr. 1989, at 53, 54, 57 (Australia); E.S. Savas, Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 889, 898 (1987); Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 69 JUDICATURE 325, 331 (1986); Harmon L. Wray, Jr., Cells for Sale, S. CHANGES, Sept. 8, 1986, at 3, 6;
Edward Sagarin & Jess Maghan, Should States Opt for Private Prisons?: No, HARTFORD COURANT,
Jan. 12, 1986, at E1; Patrick Anderson et al., Private Corrections: Feast or Fiasco?, PRISON J.,
Autumn-Winter 1985, at 35; Kenneth F. Schoen, Private Prison Operators, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
1985, at A31.
24
Matt Wuerker, in Prisons and Sentencing (by Group One Artists), http://www.newsart.com/
zz/zz16.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006); Dolovich, supra note 17, at 529 n.363.
25
But see text accompanying notes 122–131 infra.
26
There are actors other than public or private prisons that could be in favor of incarceration
for self-interested motives. Prosecutors are known to be a strong pro-incarceration lobby, but other
conceivable actors include rural communities that could be sites for prisons, see Dolovich, supra
note 17, at 536–42; Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 23, at 729; Drake Bennett & Robert
(continued next page)
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FIGURE 1

Second, there is little reason to believe that reducing privatization, or
eliminating it altogether, would reduce the amount of self-interested proincarceration advocacy. In fact, it is even possible that reducing privatization would increase such advocacy. The intuition for this perhaps surprising result27 comes from the economic theory of public goods and collective action.

Kuttner, Crime and Redemption, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 2003, at 36 (“reverse NIMBY-ism” of communities surrounding prisons), and providers of goods and services to prisons, see J. Robert Lilly &
Paul Knepper, An International Perspective on the Privatisation of Corrections, 31 HOW. J. 174,
174, 177 (1992). I focus mostly on prison system actors because privatization potentially displaces
public sector prison provision, while its effect, if any, on prosecutors or rural communities is unclear.
27
As far as I can tell, this argument has never been made before in the privatization literature,
except for two instances of speculation that, in the prison context, “[c]ompetition within the industry
can serve to dilute, rather than concentrate, this political power.” LOGAN, supra note 23, at 158; see
also Developments, supra note 16, at 1873.
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The political benefits that flow from prison providers’ proincarceration advocacy are what economists call a “public good,” because any prison provider’s advocacy, to the extent it is effective, helps
every other prison provider.28 When individual actors capture less of the
benefit of their expenditures on a public good, they spend less on that
good; and the “smaller” actors, who benefit the least from the public
good, free-ride off the expenditures of the “largest” actor.
In today’s world, the largest actor—that is, the actor that profits the
most from the system—tends to be the public sector union, which still
provides the lion’s share of prison services and whose members benefit
from wages significantly higher than those of their private-sector counterparts; the smaller actors are the private prison firms, which not only
have small shares of the industry but also do not make abnormally high
profits.
Privatization, by breaking up the government’s monopoly of prison
provision and awarding part of the industry to private firms, can thus reduce the industry’s advocacy by exacerbating its collective action problem. The public sector unions will spend less because under privatization they experience less of the benefits of their advocacy, while the private firms will tend to free-ride off the public sector’s advocacy. This
collective action problem is unfortunate for the prison industry, but fortunate for the critics of self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy—a
happy, usually unintended side effect of privatization. To coin a phrase,
prison providers under privatization are led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of their intention.
Of course, there is more than one type of advocacy: Prison providers
are interested not only in incarceration policy but also in privatization
policy (the private sector wants more, the public sector wants less), and
privatization-related expenditures are not pure public goods. Some
forms of advocacy may be precisely targeted—a contribution to the
Three Strikes initiative is unambiguously pro-incarceration. But other
forms are ambiguous—a contribution to a legislator’s reelection campaign does not come with reasons attached. Contributors may thus be
28
It may seem funny to use the term “public good” in this context, since I have just assumed
that such advocacy is bad for the public. Nonetheless, that’s the terminology. The universe of
prison providers, while fairly narrow, is the relevant “public” for purposes of public goods analysis.
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 15 (1965) (“[T]he achievement of any common goal or the satisfaction of any common
interest means that a public or collective good has been provided for that group. The very fact that
a goal or purpose is common to a group means that no one in the group is excluded from the benefit
or satisfaction brought about by its achievement.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 15 n.22 (“There is no
necessity that a public good to one group in a society is necessarily in the interest of the society as a
whole.”). A private prison firm’s pro-incarceration advocacy helps every other private prison firm;
private firms’ pro-incarceration advocacy helps the public prison guard unions; and the unions’ proincarceration advocacy helps the private firms.
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paying for access, which, once their candidate is elected, they use to advocate the policies of their choice. This story I tell here is consistent
with that framework: The collective action problem is merely delayed
until after the election, when favors are demanded. Once the candidate is
elected and his contributors can come into his office and ask for favors,
why should they spend any political capital asking for a vote on Three
Strikes (a public good) when they can spend it instead trying to get (or
kill) a prison contract?
The net effect of privatization on political advocacy doesn’t have to
be negative. I present a model below where privatization does decrease
political advocacy; but I also present other models where the effect is
ambiguous—for instance, where privatization might increase private sector advocacy but decrease public sector advocacy. If those models are
closer to the truth, then total advocacy may rise—but it may also fall,
depending on which effect dominates. We cannot determine the net effect a priori.
There is thus no reason to believe an argument against prison privatization based on the possibility of self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy—unless the argument takes a position on how lobbying, political
contributions, and advocacy work, and why (for instance) increases in
private sector advocacy would outweigh the decrease in public sector
advocacy. Either this argument against prison privatization is false, or it
is correct but under-theorized.
The analysis here provides a roadmap for analyzing the military and
other contexts: Because privatization can affect the incentives of both
the private and public sectors to wield political influence, one shouldn’t
conclude that privatization distorts substantive policy unless one can tell
a story, based on a plausible view of government agents’ behavior, that
privatization doesn’t decrease public sector advocacy in an offsetting
way. In the end each industry has its own somewhat idiosyncratic twists,
so I do not make a strong claim about the use of the argument outside of
prisons. But, at the very least, the use of the political influence argument
is often theoretically unsound to the extent it ignores this comparative
analysis.
Part II gives a factual overview of pro-incarceration advocacy among
prison providers. Part III sets forth a public goods model where privatization decreases pro-incarceration advocacy. Part IV discusses how privatization may have an ambiguous effect on pro-incarceration advocacy.
Part V concludes. The casual reader may skip sections II.A to II.B and
III.D to III.F.
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II. POLITICAL ADVOCACY IN THE PRISON INDUSTRY
I use the term “advocate” broadly to include any use of political influence, licit or illicit, including endorsements, political contributions,
lobbying, and bribes. And I use the term “incarceration” as a shorthand
to include the criminalization of a greater range of behavior, more active
enforcement, greater reliance on imprisonment, longer sentences, and
less parole; thus, endorsing a politician for being “tough on crime,” donating money to a “Three Strikes” initiative,29 or testifying in favor of a
“truth in sentencing” law30 all count as advocating incarceration.
This Part summarizes what we know about prison industry advocacy.
In brief, there is hard evidence of public prison guard union proincarceration advocacy (though a small part of prison guard union advocacy also cuts the other way). There is also hard evidence that most Departments of Corrections advocate the other way—in favor of alternatives to incarceration. But there is virtually no hard evidence of private
sector pro-incarceration advocacy—maybe they do it, maybe they don’t.
To sort out whether they do or not, we need to know whether we should
expect such behavior of the private sector; and for that, we need theory.
That theory comes in the next Part. The reader who is familiar with the
empirics may skip sections A and B of this Part.
A. The Public Sector
1. Employees: The Corrections Officers’ Unions
In 1987, E.S. Savas, a supporter of privatization, dismissed the claim
that private firms advocate incarceration by noting that “[i]f this argument was sound . . . prison officials, guards, and their unions presumably
would act in the same manner for the same reasons. This, however, is
not the case.”31
Whether this was true even back then is questionable. At one time,
corrections officials were politically aligned with liberal groups,32 but by
the 1970s correctional unions were already advocating incarceration:
29

Three Strikes laws are types of sentence-enhancing laws. California’s, for instance, mandates life imprisonment for convicted felons who were twice previously convicted of two or more
“serious” or “violent” felonies. California’s scheme is described in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.
11, 14–17 (2003).
30
“Truth in sentencing laws” require that persons convicted of violent crimes serve at least
85% of their sentence. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 §20102, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
31
Savas, supra note 23, at 898.
32
See RICHARD BERK ET AL., A MEASURE OF JUSTICE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CHANGES IN
THE CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE, 1955–1971, at 158 (1977) (“[C]orrections officials (prison personnel,
administrators, and the Adult Authority) are difficult to place in a single camp. In the 1950s, the
(continued next page)
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In Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and other jurisdictions, employee organization lobbying, publicity, lawsuits, and job actions
pertaining to safety and security have often been attempts to counteract progressive correctional programs such as community-based facilities and to
reestablish an emphasis on custody. Another feature of this campaign is
that correctional unions have advocated longer prison terms and more stringent parole policies—for example, an increase in the minimum term an inmate must serve before he can become eligible for parole.33

This activism continues today. The most active public prison
guards’ union in advocating incarceration is the California Correctional
Peace Officers Association (CCPOA).34 It gives twice as much in political contributions as the California Teachers Association, though it’s only
one-tenth the size;35 only the California Medical Association gives more
in the state.36 CCPOA spends over $7.5 million per year on political activities.37 It contributes to political parties, political events, and debates;
it gives money directly to candidates; it hires lobbyists, public relations
firms, and polling groups.38 Through its PACs, it contributed at least
$100,000 to the California Democratic Party in 1998, $175,000 to the
California Republican Party in 1998, and $946,400 to Gray Davis’s 1998
gubernatorial campaign.39 These contributions are impossible to trace
back to any particular agenda item: Since the union also opposes privatization, favors higher wages, and has positions on other issues, it’s just as
plausible that the contributions were made for those other purposes.
But many of its contributions are directly pro-incarceration. It gave
over $100,000 to California’s Three Strikes initiative, Proposition 184 in
California correctional system was the darling of liberal reformers. By the late 1960s it had become
a favorite whipping boy. Further, when in the late 1960s corrections officials tried to align with the
law enforcement lobby, their earlier liberal ties caused uneasiness among potential allies. Even
many conservative legislators could not be effectively recruited, since the corrections system appalled the fiscally orthodox by combining enormous budgets with demonstrated ineffectiveness.”).
33
JOHN M. WYNNE, JR., PRISON EMPLOYEE UNIONISM: THE IMPACT ON CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND PROGRAMS 217 (Nat’l Inst. of Law Enforcement & Crim. Just., Jan. 1978).
34
See ADRIAN T. MOORE, PRIVATE PRISONS: QUALITY CORRECTIONS AT A LOWER COST 33–
34 (Reason Pub. Pol’y Inst., Pol’y Study No. 240, 1998) (comparing correctional officers’ $1.5
million donations to Pete Wilson alone during his 1990 and 1994 California gubernatorial bids with
private prison companies’ $150,000 total political contributions nationwide in 1995–96); James
Bovard, Pork Barrel Prisons: Who Profits from the War on Drugs?, PLAYBOY, Feb. 1, 2002, at 48;
Marx Arax & Mark Gladstone, State Thwarted Brutality Probe at Corcoran Prison, Investigators
Say, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 1998, at A1 (“[State investigators] had watched the [prison guard] union
under president Novey ride the prison construction wave, growing from a kind of social club into
one of the more powerful forces in the state, with a rank-and-file 27,000 strong.”).
35
See Dan Pens, The California Prison Guards’ Union: A Potent Political Interest Group, in
THE CELLING OF AMERICA: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE U.S. PRISON INDUSTRY 134, 135 (Daniel Burton-Rose with Dan Pens & Paul Wright eds., 1998).
36
See Pens, supra note 35, at 135.
37
See Ctr. on Juv. & Crim. Just., Political Power of the CCPOA, http://www.cjcj.org/cpp/
political_power.php (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
38
See CJCJ, supra note 35.
39
See CJCJ, supra note 35.
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1994, making it the second-largest contributor.40 It gave at least $75,000
to the opponents of Proposition 36, the 2000 initiative that replaced incarceration with substance abuse treatment for certain nonviolent offenders.41 From 1998 to 2000 it gave over $120,000 to crime victims’
groups, who present a more sympathetic face to the public in their proincarceration advocacy.42 And it spent over $1 million to help defeat
Proposition 66, the 2004 initiative that would have limited the crimes the
triggered a life sentence under the Three Strikes law.43 And in 2005, it
killed Gov. Schwarzenegger’s plan to “reduce the prison population by
as much as 20,000, mainly through a program that diverted parole violators into rehabilitation efforts: drug programs, halfway houses and home
detention.”44
Some union members explicitly recognize their self-interested motives. Dan Pens quoted CCPOA member Lt. Kevin Peters as saying:
You can get a job anywhere. This is a career. And with the upward mobility and rapid expansion of the department, there are opportunities for the
people who are [already] correction staff, and opportunities for the general
public to become correctional officers. We’ve gone from 12 institutions to
28 in 12 years, and with “Three Strikes” and the overcrowding we’re going
to experience with that, we’re going to need to build at least three prisons a
year for the next five years. Each one of those institutions will take approximately 1,000 employees.45

Note, though, that the CCPOA is not uniformly pro-incarceration in
all cases. In May 2006, to “‘give the system a breather’” in the face of
severe overcrowding, it endorsed a plan to allow “a select group of inmates convicted of nonviolent crimes who had behaved while behind
bars” to get out of prison 30 days early.46
This isn’t just a story about California. Though corrections officers’
unions outside of California are nowhere near as active as the CCPOA,47

40

See Pens, supra note 35, at 137; CJCJ, supra note 37.
CJCJ, supra note 37; Drug Pol’y Alliance, California Proposition 36: The Substance Abuse
and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, http://www.prop36.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
42
See CJCJ, supra note 37; Crime Victims United of Cal., CVUC, http://www.crimevictims
united.com/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2006); Doris Tate Crime Victims Bur., http://www.doristate.com
(last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
43
See Jenifer Warren, Guards Union Is Giving Prisons Chief Hard Time, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2004, at 1; Inst. of Govt’l Stud., Proposition 36: Limitation on “Three-Strikes” Law, http://www.igs.
berkeley.edu/library/htThreeStrikesProp66.htm (Dec. 2004) (last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
44
Ed Mendel, Governor May Act on Crisis in Prisons, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 2, 2006,
at A1 (ads against this initiative funded by prison guard union).
45
Pens, supra note 35, at 137.
46
Mark Martin, Call for New Prisons, Shorter Sentences to Ease Crowding, S.F. CHRON., May
24, 2006, at A1 (“give the system a breather” is a quote from CCPOA executive Chuck Alexander).
47
Cf. Schlosser, supra note 7, at 55 (“in California . . . the correctional trends of the past two
decades have converged and reached extremes”).
41
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many of them do advocate incarceration.48 (As I note below, private
prison firms spend money on advocacy nationwide, though they also
spend more in California.49) The correctional wing of Florida’s policeand-corrections union, the Police Benevolent Association,50 has endorsed
gubernatorial candidates for being tough on crime.51 The Michigan corrections officers’ union has opposed boot camp proposals.52 The New
York City corrections officers’ union endorsed Gov. Pataki because he
ended parole for violent felons.53 The New York State corrections officers’ union is said to have stymied efforts to overhaul mandatory minimum sentences.54 And the Rhode Island corrections officers’ union endorsed a senatorial candidate for his prosecutorial record and position in
favor of tougher criminal penalties.55 (I am not considering the more
usual demands for tougher penalties for criminals who commit crimes
while in prison—a particularly salient issue for prison guards, who are
often victims of such crimes.56)
Some correctional officers’ unions are combined with police unions,
for instance in Florida57 or New Jersey.58 So except where (as in Flor48
See LOGAN, supra note 23, at 157; WYNNE, supra note 33, at 186, 195, 227; Bennett &
Kuttner, supra note 26, at 36.
49
Cf. text accompanying note 93 infra (private prison contributions also much higher in California).
50
See Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc., Florida PBA Chapters: State Correctional Officers,
http://www.flpba.org/chapters/sco.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
51
See Aaron Deslatte, Crist Courts Voters with Positive Focus, FLA. TODAY, Aug. 16, 2006, at
A1 (“The Florida PBA endorsed [attorney general and gubernatorial candidate Charlie] Crist last
year, and the attorney general has been specific about one proposal they like: Crist’s ‘anti-murder’
bill that would put violent criminals who violate probation back in jail until a judge determines
whether they pose a threat.”); Letter from Charlie Crist to Jim Baiardi, President, State Correctional
Officers Chapter, Mar. 15, 2006, reprinted in Letters, FLA. PBA CORRECTIONS REV., Apr. 2006, at
7, http://www.flpba.org/pdf/corrections%20review/Corrections%20Review%2004-2006.pdf (“As
you are well aware, it . . . has been a priority during my term to keep violent offenders off our streets
and to support legislation to get tough on probation violators in order to protect and defend our
communities.”); David Wasson, Bush Lands Police Union Support, TAMPA TRIB., July 12, 2002, at
9 (PBA endorsed Gov. Jeb Bush, crediting him “with spearheading legislative efforts to crack down
on violent crime with tough new laws requiring enhanced prison sentences for repeat offenders”).
52
See Rob Gurwitt, The Growing Clout of Prison Guards, GOVERNING, Dec. 1991, at 37.
53
Kathleen Murphy, Labor Helps Patakis Re-election Battle, STATELINE.ORG, May 20, 2002,
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&contentId=14817 (last visited Sept.
21, 2006).
54
See Julie Falk, Fiscal Lockdown Part II: Will State Budget Cuts Weaken the PrisonIndustrial Complex—Or Strengthen It?, DOLLARS & SENSE, Nov. 1, 2003, at 32.
55
Whitehouse ’06, Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers Endorses Whitehouse,
press release, Aug. 25, 2006 (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
56
See, e.g., Gregg M. Miliote, Correction Officers Back Sutter, HERALD NEWS (Fall River,
Mass.), Aug. 23, 2006, http://www.heraldnews.com/site/index.cfm?newsid=17097791 (last visited
Sept. 21, 2006).
57
See Fla. PBA, supra note 51.
58
See N.J. State Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n, We Walk NJ’s Toughest Beat!: New Jersey
State P.B.A. Corrections Officers’ Committee, http://www.njspba.com/co.htm (last visited Sept. 20,
2006); Michael Pollak, New Jersey Daily Briefing: Police Back Whitman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997
(president of NJSPBA praised Gov. Whitman for, among other things, signing a Three Strikes law).
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ida59) the corrections officers’ wing of the union has been politically involved in its own right, any of these unions’ pro-incarceration advocacy
can’t be traced directly to public prison guards.
In some states, corrections officers are also affiliated with AFSCME,
the general public employees’ union;60 AFSCME Corrections United
represents 60,000 corrections officers and 23,000 corrections employees
nationwide.61 The evidence that AFSCME has advocated incarceration
is weak;62 in fact, it has advocated alternatives to incarceration,63 and the
national organization recently came out in favor of legalizing medical
marijuana.64 The Oklahoma union has also advocated alternatives to incarceration.65
59

See note 51 supra.
These states include Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. AFSCME also represents Corrections Health Services medical personnel in Florida. See Am. Fed. of State, County & Muni. Employees, Jobs We Do: ACU Local
Web Sites, http://www.afscme.org/workers/5846.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
61
See Am. Fed. of State, County & Muni. Employees, Jobs We Do: Corrections, http://www.
afscme.org/workers/67.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
62
Wynne argues that AFSCME has explicitly opposed deinstitutionalization and communitybased programs in the past, see WYNNE, supra note 33, at 228, but the evidence for this is an argument against deinstitutionalization of patients from mental hospitals, not regular criminals from
prisons, see HENRY SANTIESTEVAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: OUT OF THEIR BEDS AND INTO THE
STREETS 5–12 (AFSCME, Feb. 1975). More recently, AFSCME lobbied in favor of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. See Am.
Fed. of State, County & Muni. Employees, AFSCME Corrections United: 10 Years of Federal Legislative Advocacy, http://www.afscme.org/workers/6590.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2006). The Act
includes new bans on the manufacture, possession, and transfer of certain guns and by certain categories of people, e.g., §§ 110102–110103, 110201, 110401; new white-collar crime categories, including telemarketing fraud, e.g., § 250002; enhanced penalties for certain drug crimes, e.g.,
§ 90102, sex crimes, e.g., §§ 40111, 160001, gun crimes, e.g., §§ 110501, immigration crimes,
§ 130001, violent and drug trafficking crimes committed by gang members, § 150001, and other
crimes, e.g., §§ 320101–320106; a federal Three Strikes provision, § 70001; victims’ rights provisions, § 230101; and grants for states that adopt “truth-in-sentencing” laws, § 20102. Though civil
libertarians at the time opposed it because of its emphasis on incarceration, see, e.g., Laura Murphy
Lee, The Senate’s Misconceived Crime Bill, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1994, at A19 (position of
ACLU), the Act is so wide-ranging that AFSCME’s support is not a clean case of union proincarceration lobbying. AFSCME attributes its support in part to the Act’s grants for correctional
facilities, § 20101, correctional officer training provisions, § 20418, and enhanced penalties for
offenses against correctional officers, e.g., § 60015. See AFSCME, supra.
63
See Connecticut Hires Firm to Teach Nonviolent Offenders, CORRECTIONAL EDUC. BULL.,
Jan. 19, 2004 (“Officials with the union that represents the state’s corrections officers said they agree
with the need for more alternative-to-incarceration, drug treatment and vocational training programs
for inmates, but they believe the centers should be in the communities where offenders live. ‘When
you’re trying to help people make the transition to a more stable life, it’s probably best not to put
them on prison grounds,’ said [an AFSCME spokesman].”); Dwight F. Blint, Union Faults Sending
More Inmates out of State, HARTFORD COURANT, May 31, 2003, at B5 (Connecticut prison guard
union advocates drug treatment, mental health programs, and alternative incarceration for minor
offenders).
64
See Am. Fed. of State, County & Muni. Employees, Supporting the Legalization of Medical
Marijuana, Res. No. 93, 37th Annual Int’l Convention, Aug. 7–11, 2006, http://www.afscme.org/
members/11367.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2006). AFSCME is also involved with the National Council of State Legislatures, see Nat’l Council of State Legis., NCSL Foundation for State Legislatures:
Board of Directors 2006–2007, http://www.ncsl.org/public/FSL/FSLBoard.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
(continued next page)
60
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2. Employers: The Departments of Corrections
The interests of Departments of Corrections are not always aligned
with those of corrections officers and their unions.66 DOCs advocate
incarceration a lot less than corrections officers’ unions (Florida is one
exception67), and in fact it’s common to see Departments of Corrections
officials advocate alternatives to incarceration.68
The Alabama DOC commissioner has advocated sentencing reform,
community correction programs, and other measures to “reverse the
prison population growth trend.”69 The head of the Illinois DOC advocates reentry programs that would lower the prison population by countering “the awful, vicious cycle” by which recidivist parolees are reincarcerated “before the ink is dry on their parole papers.”70 The Michigan DOC director concerns herself with measures to reduce the prison
population and thus delay the day the state runs out of funded capacity
for prison beds.71 The Montana DOC director candidly tells crowds that
“[p]rison isn’t working,” and his department considers measures to re2006), which does not take a notably pro-incarceration line. See, e.g., Nat’l Council of State Legis.,
2006–2007 Policies for the Jurisdiction of the: Law and Criminal Justice Committee,
http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/LAWANDJ.HTM (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) (critiquing the “competition to escalate punishments and build more prisons” resulting from “Federal jurisdiction over
crimes also covered under state law”).
65
Ray Carter, Union Leader Says State Prisons Understaffed, J. RECORD LEGIS. REPORT, Aug.
7, 2003 (executive director of public employees union in Oklahoma called for reductions in inmate
population if additional funding couldn’t be provided to prisons).
66
See, e.g., Richard Ferruccio, Presidents Message, http://www.ri-brotherhood.com/pdfs/
MessageFromThePresident.pdf (n.d.) (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (Rhode Island union president calls
the DOC and the State “our enemies” in the context of labor-related disputes); Richard Ferruccio,
Presidents Message, http://www.ri-brotherhood.com/pdfs/MessageFromThePresident2.pdf (n.d.)
(last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (same).
67
Florida is one exception. See Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, Governor’s Budget Recommendations Help Department of Corrections Fight Crime, press release, Jan. 16, 2001, http://www.dc.state.
fl.us/secretary/press/2001/budget5.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006) (praising Gov. Jeb Bush for
“support[ing] Florida’s tough-on-crime public protection initiatives” like the “10-20-Life” law and
the “Three Strikes Felony Offender Act”).
68
See, e.g., WYNNE, supra note 33, at 194–95 (“While the administration is likely to lobby for
increased funding for community programs, employee organizations are likely to lobby against
community programs . . . .”); Bennett & Kuttner, supra note 26, at 36 (many states are exploring
alternatives to incarceration due to budget problems, and Marc Mauer of The Sentencing Project
says “corrections people” aren’t “advocating dramatically stepped-up punishment policy”); see also
Jeanne S. Woodford, Hard Time: Why I Quit the Prison System, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, at M1
(former acting head of California corrections department advocates rehabilitation, criticizes “toughon-crime bromides,” and accuses prison guards’ union of stymieing reform).
69
Richard F. Allen, Inflow of Inmates Must Be Slowed, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, July 17,
2006, at 5.
70
Rex W. Huppke, Rehabilitation or Recycling?, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 2006, at 1.
71
See Memo from Patricia L. Caruso, director of the Michigan DOC, to Sen. Alan L. Cropsey
& Rep. Jack Brandenberg, Feb. 1, 2006, http://www.michigan.gov/documents/02-01-06_-_Section_
401_149197_7.pdf, at 2.
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duce the prison population and increase community corrections.72 The
New Mexico Corrections Department is focusing on using early parole to
control its prison population.73 The North Carolina DOC advocates redirecting non-trafficking drug users from prison to “intermediate programs.”74 Ohio corrections officials complain about the high costs of
mandatory minimum sentences.75 The Pennsylvania DOC is implementing programs “aimed at diverting less serious offenders from prison” to
“free-up prison space needed for more serious offenders.”76 The Washington DOC secretary “is a big believer in work-release programs.”77
And the Wisconsin DOC secretary advocates focusing on “prevention
and treatment in addition to effective law enforcement.”78
B. The Private Sector
Private firms are generally thought to act in their self-interest.79 Private prison firms depend, for their livelihood, on two policies: privatization and incarceration. Indeed, they admit as much to the world, in their
annual reports filed with the SEC. As to privatization, The GEO Group,
the second largest private prison firm, sensibly explains, under the heading “Risks related to our business and industry,” that “[p]ublic resistance
72

Ted Sullivan, Bozeman’s Re-Entry Center Dedicated, BOZEMAN CHRON., reprinted in CORSIGNPOST (Mont. Dep’t of Corrections), Spring 2006, http://www.cor.state.mt.us/News/
Newsletters/Spring2006.pdf, at 3 (last visited Sept. 27, 2006) (“[‘]Prison isn’t working,’ [Montana
DOC director Bill] Slaughter told the crowd. ‘This re-entry program is what we’re all about.’”); see
Bob Anez, Advisory Council Studies Array of Offender Services, CORRECTIONAL SIGNPOST, supra,
at 9 (Montana DOC Communications Director writes that “[t]he goal of the study [of community
services available for offenders] is to affect the prison population by reducing the number of offenders entering prison and the number of offenders returning to prison by providing more individualized
community-based programs and services for offenders.”); Kelly Speer, Community Corrections
Grows to Meet Demand, CORRECTIONAL SIGNPOST, Winter 2006, http://www.cor.state.mt.us/News/
Newsletters/Winter2006Signpost.pdf, at 7 (last visited Sept. 27, 2006) (Corrections Manager discusses how, “[i]n response to the increase of offenders over the past two years and to help relieve
prison overcrowding, the Community Corrections Division will increase program capacity by 278
beds over the next biennium”).
73
N.M. Legis. Council Serv., Information Bulletin No. 6, http://legis.state.nm.us/LCS/lcsdocs/
148229.pdf (Aug. 25, 2003) (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
74
Robert Lee Guy, N.C. Dep’t of Correction, Evolution of Community Corrections (2d ed. Oct.
2003), a PowerPoint presentation available at http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dcc/index.htm (last visited
Nov. 3, 2006) (“Fact: Re-directing non-violent (property offenders) and high need (non-trafficking
drug users) to intermediate programs reserves expensive prison beds for violent non-conforming
offenders!” (gratuitous capitalization and emphasis removed)).
75
See Debra Jasper, Prison Expenses Straining Budget, CINC. ENQ., May 28, 2001, at 1A.
76
Jeffrey A. Beard, Admissions, Population, & Releases, http://www.cor.state.pa.us/stats/lib/
stats/population.pdf, at 5 (Pa. Dep’t of Corrections, Feb. 2006).
77
Prison Officials Want to Expand Work-Release, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 8, 2006.
78
Gov. Doyle Announces $616,000 for Alcohol and Drug Treatment, Diversion, US STATE
NEWS, Sept. 19, 2006; see also Falk, supra note 54, at 32 (Bill Clausius of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections attributes focus on alternative sentencing to budget pressure on state agencies).
79
I apologize below for my sloppy treatment of firms. See note 156 infra.
RECTIONAL
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to privatization of correctional and detention facilities could result in our
inability to obtain new contracts or the loss of existing contracts, which
could have a material adverse effect on our business.”80 As to incarceration, GEO candidly remarks:
[A]ny changes with respect to the decriminalization of drugs and controlled
substances or a loosening of immigration laws could affect the number of
persons arrested, convicted, sentenced and incarcerated, thereby potentially
reducing demand for correctional facilities to house them. Similarly, reductions in crime rates could lead to reductions in arrests, convictions and sentences requiring incarceration at correctional facilities.81

Or, in the words of the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the
largest private prison firm:
Further [revenue] growth is expected to come from increased focus and resources by the Department of Homeland Security dedicated to illegal immigration, stricter sentencing guidelines, longer prison sentences and prison
terms for juvenile offenders, as well as the growing demographic of the 18
to 24 year-old at-risk population. Males between 18 and 24 years of age
have demonstrated the highest propensity for criminal behavior and the
highest rates of arrest, conviction, and incarceration.82

Similarly, from GEO:
The demand for our facilities and services could be adversely affected by
the relaxation of criminal enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction and
sentencing practices, or through the decriminalization of certain activities
that are currently proscribed by criminal laws.83

Since private prison firms recognize the value to them of privatization and incarceration, it is natural to suspect that they may advocate
these policies in the public square. No one denies that private prison
firms engage in active political advocacy.84 Their advocacy mainly takes
the forms of contributions to politicians and participation in the Ameri-

80

GEO Group, Inc., Form 10-K at 23 (Mar. 10, 2004).
GEO Group, supra note 80, at 22.
Vargas-Vargas, supra note 23, at 76 (quoting Corrections Corp. of Am., Form 10-K at 16
(Mar. 12, 2004)).
83
GEO Group, Inc., Form S-4 at 28 (Nov. 10, 2003); see also Vargas-Vargas, supra note 23, at
76 n.210 (citing Wackenhut Corrections Corp., Form S-3 at 12 (Jan. 20, 2004)). A CCA executive
also said the 1994 federal crime bill was “very favorable to us,” see Paulette Thomas, Making Crime
Pay: Triangle of Interests Creates Infrastructure to Fight Lawlessness, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1994,
at A1 (CCA’s CFO said the federal crime bill is “very favorable to us”), but this is ambiguous evidence that private prison firms support incarceration—AFSCME, which represents prison guards in
many states, actually lobbied in favor of that crime bill, but it attributed its support to the bill’s
grants for correctional facilities, correctional officer training provisions, and enhanced penalties for
offenses against correctional officers. See note 60 infra.
84
See, e.g., SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 7–18 (giving examples of private firms’ expenditures on lobbyists, and counting 645 campaign contributions to 361 candidates (both Democratic and Republican) in 25 states totaling over $540,000 in 1998 (comparable to NRA state-level
giving), mostly in California).
81
82
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can Legislative Exchange Council,85 though they also testify before Congress and present arguments in the popular press. And no one denies that
they advocate privatization.86 That they advocate incarceration to any
significant extent, though, is less clear.
Most of the evidence of advocacy specifically in favor of incarceration has been fairly speculative.87 Some writers state that it doesn’t happen,88 while others who are concerned about the prospect hedge their
statements with terms like “may” or “are likely to.”89 (Several authors
draw a connection between supposed private prison pro-incarceration
advocacy today and manipulation of incarceration to provide a steady
supply of workers under the convict leasing system in the 19th century.90
85

See Am. Legis. Exch. Council, American Legislative Exchange Council, http://www.alec.

org.

86
See, e.g., JOEL DYER, THE PERPETUAL PRISON MACHINE: HOW AMERICA PROFITS FROM
CRIME 147–48 (2000) (Tennessee); SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 7 (Tennessee); id. at 13–14
(Alaska); Greene, supra note 16, at 23 (warden of CCA’s Tulsa Jail directed addiction-treatment
manager “to make a ‘sales pitch’ to local judges, urging them to sentence offenders to a treatment
program in the jail even though the program had been eviscerated in order to cut operating expenses”); Shaheen Borna, Free Enterprise Goes to Prison, 26 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 321, 332
(1986).
87
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 524, 529; Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 142 (2001).
88
See RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 94–97 (1997);
Aman, supra note 16, at 544; Douglas C. McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private Means, 34
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 29, 43 (1994).
89
See, e.g., HALLETT, supra note 23, at 141 (“some fear that this new incentive for incarceration puts the traditional criminological goal of reducing crime in danger”); SHICHOR, supra note 20,
at 235–36 (“[i]t is feasible” that private prison firms will lobby, and these firms “are likely to” support greater imprisonment); Dolovich, supra note 17, at 525 (analogy of U.S. defense industry suggests that “even if private prison providers have had no need as yet to pressure state legislators . . .
these conditions are subject to change”); Low, supra note 23, at 45 (“Detractors fear that the next
logical step for private prison firms is to lobby for harsher laws and longer sentences.”); White,
supra note 87, at 142 (“there is certainly structural potential for this type of conduct—but given
current rates of growth in incarceration, such lobbying is for the moment quite unnecessary anyway”); Savas, supra note 23, at 898 (“opponents . . . claim that private prison firms will be inclined
to lobby for more and longer prison sentences”); Schoen, supra note 23, at A31 (“Private operators
whose growth depends upon an expanding prison population may push for ever harsher sentences.”).
But not all commentators hedge their statements. See Barkow, Our Federal System, supra note 23,
at 125 (“[P]rivate prison companies . . . often lobby for longer terms because they stand to benefit
from the construction of additional prisons.”); Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 23, at 729
(similar); Vargas-Vargas, supra note 23, at 75 n.209 (“[t]he private prison lobby is . . . powerful . . .
in influencing draconian social policies”); George, supra note 23, at 54, 57 (“Th[e] company’s
vested financial interest in law and order issues will make them a lobby group for increased sentences as both ‘victims’ and a profit-seeking business. . . . Private prisons will and have tried to
impact on government policy through lobbying just as any business concern does.”). Freeman,
supra note 16, at 1349 n.249, cites Developments, supra note 16, at 1872, for the proposition that
“the private prison industry . . . lobb[ies] for stiffer criminal penalties,” but in fact Developments
only states that private prisons “may” do so and that the claim that they do is “plausible.”
90
See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 11; Beverly A. Smith & Frank T. Morn, The History of Privatization in Criminal Justice, in PRIVATIZATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE 3, 17 (David Shichor & Michael J. Gilbert eds., 2001); White, supra note 87, at 128–
29; Wray, supra note 23, at 5. For the 19th-century history, see DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE
THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 40 (1996); MATTHEW
(continued next page)
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But this colorful historical example is no substitute for actual evidence of
contemporary pro-incarceration advocacy.91)
As with the corrections officers’ unions’ contributions above,92 some
commentators note private prison firms’ advocacy but don’t distinguish
between pro-privatization and pro-incarceration advocacy. For instance,
a key piece of evidence in Sarabi and Bender’s argument that private
prison firms fuel the “incarceration boom” is the total amount of their
contributions to state candidates: In 1998, these totaled $285,996 in
California, between $10,000 and $50,275 in eight other states, between
$1000 and $10,000 in 11 other states, and under $1000 in five other
states.93
This blanket approach is a mistake, unless one is attacking all political involvement by private prison firms. Generalized contributions to
candidates, unlike contributions to single-issue voter initiative campaigns
(or contributions to single-issue groups, or public statements in support
of particular targeted policies or bills, or endorsements of public officials
that explain why that official is worth supporting), are mute. Some of
the industry’s contributions to politicians may be multi-purpose, for privatization as well as for incarceration. Merely advocating increased privatization raises quite different concerns than advocating changes in the
criminal law itself,94 and certainly does not implicate the same sorts of
“legitimacy” values.95
MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER 24, 41 (1996); ALRUTHEUS AMBUSH TAYLOR, THE NEGRO IN
TENNESSEE, 1865–1880, at 43 (1941); 2 GEORGE WASHINGTON WILLIAMS, HISTORY OF THE NEGRO
RACE IN AMERICA 415–16 (photo. reprint 1968) (1883); William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865–1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J. S. HIST. 31, 50–51 (1976).
91
How much 19th-century convict leasing tells us about present-day privatization is disputed.
See LOGAN, supra note 23, at 216 (“most of this took place at a time when corruption was also much
more prevalent in government-run prisons and in the criminal justice system generally”); id. at 217–
18 (most historical comparisons fail to compare private prisons to public prisons of the same period,
and even if they did, “it is questionable whether such differences would still apply in the socially,
politically, and (most important) legally different world that exists today”); Dolovich, supra note 17,
at 454 (historical experience, predating modern protections, isn’t directly applicable, but “introduce[s] certain themes . . . that are still relevant today”); Rosky, supra note 6, at 912–13 (analogies
to convict leasing ignore “the rise of modern, liberal administrative states”); Alexis M. Durham III,
The Future of Correctional Privatization: Lessons from the Past, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 23, at 33, 45–48 (“some of the problems experienced in nineteenthcentury initiatives were the product of unique historical circumstances” and “most of the important
court cases establishing inmate rights were decided only in the last thirty years,” but nonetheless “it
seems likely that at least some of the errors committed [then] will recur in modern efforts”); see also
LOGAN, supra, at 215 (state-run prisons also leased convicts, so the association of convict leasing
abuses with privatization is erroneous).
92
See notes 35–39 supra.
93
See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 10.
94
Even mere pro-privatization advocacy may raise some concerns. See Hart et al., supra note
16, at 1144–47 (corruption and patronage may skew the decision whether to privatize in a pro- or
anti-privatization direction).
95
See Rosky, supra note 6, at 955 (decisions to use government force “are some of the most
elemental decisions of equality, freedom, and justice”); Dolovich, supra note 17, at 523–24 (“The
(continued next page)
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Since the industry’s public statements virtually all relate to favoring
privatization, there is little hard evidence on the basis of which to attribute part of their political contributions to a pro-incarceration motive.
Indeed, the Association of Private Correctional and Treatment Organizations (APCTO), the industry’s trade group, speaking for its member
firms, denies that the industry lobbies for increased penalties:
Individually and as an Association, we do not lobby in favor of longer sentences, so-called “three-strikes” laws, or other legislation which could result
in an increase in the jail or prison population. To the contrary, the Association and its member companies encourage the use of appropriate alternatives to incarceration; provide inmates with treatment, education and rehabilitative services designed to positively impact and reduce recidivism rates;
and encourage effective transitional programs for offenders upon release.96

APCTO frequently endorses alternatives to incarceration, treatment
programs, and other measures to reduce recidivism. Its executive director recently suggested in the Denver Post that to alleviate prison overcrowding, Colorado should “[l]ook to alternatives to incarceration that
can provide treatment and rehabilitative programs to first-time, nonviolent drug and alcohol offenders,” “[r]educe recidivism by investing in the
treatment, education and rehabilitation that offenders need to be successful when they leave prison,” and “[i]ncrease the likelihood that released
inmates will not re-offend by providing substantive transitional programs
to help released inmates adjust to the community outside the walls of
prison.”97 (He made similar recommendations to Ohio in the Cincinnati
Post.98) He also suggested in the Fort Pierce Tribune and the Palm
Beach Post that Florida should invest more in juvenile justice services in
order to reduce the adult prison population in the long run.99 (He noted
private prison industry, to increase the demand for its services, exerts whatever pressure it can to
encourage state legislators to privatize state prisons. This effort does not necessarily suggest a parsimony concern, for the fact of privatization alone need not affect the number of individuals who are
actually incarcerated or the length of prison sentences.”). The “parsimony” reference is to the “principle of parsimony,” a basic condition of “liberal legitimacy” according to Dolovich, supra note 17,
at 465–69. Some commentators’ failure to draw the distinction that Dolovich draws between proprivatization and pro-incarceration advocacy (and to draw the similar distinction between profunding and pro-incarceration lobbying) leads to some interesting blindnesses. See note 121 infra.
96
Personal communication, Paul Doucette, Executive Director, Ass’n of Private Correctional
& Treatment Orgs., Oct. 13, 2006. Doucette continues: “Our members’ financial success is driven
not by the number of detainees or inmates they confine, but rather by the superior service and savings they provide to their contracted clients.” See also Paul Doucette, More Reader Views: On Illegals, Aviation Fees, Private Prisons, WSU Gesture, WICHITA EAGLE, Apr. 1, 2006, at A2 (letter to
the editor).
97
The Open Forum—Letters to the Editor, DENVER POST, Oct. 2, 2006, at B7 (letter of Paul
Doucette).
98
See Paul Doucette, Ohio Prisons Are Full, CINC. POST, Aug. 8, 2006, at A9.
99
See Letters to the Editor, FT. PIERCE TRIB., May 10, 2006, at A6 (letter to the editor) (“Our
organization believes that most juvenile offenders are best served in the juvenile justice system, and
that it is essential for Florida to invest the funds necessary to ensure that these young people receive
the treatment, education, and rehabilitative services needed to get them off the road to adult
(continued next page)
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that APCTO’s member companies mostly provide adult incarceration
services, though some would like to expand their juvenile programs.100)
Even if one ignores the industry association’s official statement as
self-serving and dismisses their anti-incarceration positions as PR, at
most political contributions are “soft evidence” of pro-incarceration advocacy. The most we can say empirically based on such evidence is that
maybe pro-incarceration lobbying happens and maybe it doesn’t. Perhaps the hard evidence is missing because the industry covers its tracks;
or perhaps the hard evidence is missing because there is no there there.
To decide which of these scenarios is more plausible, we need a theory
that would explain whether or not we would expect the industry to lobby
for incarceration.
In addition to contributing to politicians, private prison firms participate in the American Legislative Exchange Council, an influential conservative organization that drafts model legislation.101 Both CCA and the
former Wackenhut Corp. (now called the GEO Group102) have been
members of ALEC (and they and Sodexho Marriott, a major CCA stockholder, are prominent corporate funders of ALEC103), and, over the years,
at least CCA has participated in (and two of its executives have chaired)
ALEC’s Criminal Justice Task Force,104 which drafted, among other
things, a “Truth in Sentencing Act” and a “Habitual Violent Offender
Incarceration Act.”105
prison.”); Paul Doucette, Private Providers Agree: Bolster Juvenile Spending, PALM BEACH POST,
Apr. 25, 2006, at 15A (same); Paul Doucette, In Juvenile Justice, Florida Gets Just What It Pays for,
PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 1, 2006, at 4E (“if Florida doesn't invest in trying to help these youngsters,
it soon will need to build more adult prisons”).
100
See Letters to the Editor, supra note 99, at A6 (“The bulk of our membership is made up of
companies that provide adult incarceration services”); Doucette, In Juvenile Justice, supra note 99,
at 4E (“Several members of the Association of Private Correctional and Treatment Organizations
provide juvenile justice services in Florida, and several more would like to, but the state's budget for
juvenile justice discourages additional competitors.”).
101
See PRICE, supra note 23, at 74–75, 131–36; Dolovich, supra note 17, at 526–29; Silja J.A.
Talvi, Follow the Prison Money Trail, IN THESE TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006.
102
Wackenhut Corrections Corp. changed its name to The GEO Group, Inc. in November 2003
under the terms of a share purchase agreement with another company. See GEO Group, Inc., Milestones, http://www.thegeogroupinc.com/milestones.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
103
See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 4 (citing Inside ALEC newsletter, vol. 1, no. 5,
Sept. 1999).
104
See Am. Legis. Exch. Council, Criminal Justice Task Force, http://www.alec.org/taskforces/criminal-justice (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) (Brad Wiggins of CCA presented at the Dec. 14,
2002 Task Force meeting); SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 4; Karen Olsson, Ghostwriting the
Law, MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct. 2002, at 17. Dolovich cites Olsson as stating that CCA participated
in “that session which produced ALEC’s model truth-in-sentencing bill,” see Dolovich, supra note
17, at 528 & n.360. But Olsson states only that CCA was “[o]ne of the members of the task force
that drafted the bill.” (The task force that drafted the bill is the Criminal Justice Task Force. See
ALEC, supra; Am. Legis. Exch. Council, Criminal Justice Model Legislation, http://www.alec.org/
6/criminal-justice.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2006).) This can be read as merely stating that CCA
was a participant in that Task Force, not that it had any role in that particular bill.
105
See ALEC, Criminal Justice Model Legislation, supra note 104.
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The inner workings of ALEC are hazy,106 and indeed, some commentators argue that the private prison industry expressly seeks out
channels that are “conveniently out of public view” and “behind closed
doors” to promote its pro-incarceration agenda.107 One presumes that
private prison firms work within ALEC on privatization issues: ALEC’s
Criminal Justice Task Force reports that prison privatization is one of its
“major issues,”108 the Task Force has a Subcommittee on Private Prisons109 and has a model “Housing Out-of-State Prisoners in a Private
Prison Act,”110 and CCA is known to have talked to the Task Force on
the subject.111 But here, too, there is no hard evidence that they also
work on sentencing or incarceration issues—participation in a multipurpose organization is as “soft” evidence as generalized contributions to
politicians. Indeed, CCA asserts that it has not participated in, voted on,
or endorsed any stand on model legislation for sentencing or crime policies within ALEC.112 According to CCA,113 the only CCA official to
have ever publicly taken a stand on sentencing policies is J. Michael
Quinlan, formerly Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and now a
Senior Vice President of CCA,114 who, after he joined CCA in 1993,115
told a House subcommittee that mandatory minimum sentences “are unnecessary for non-violent, non-serious offenses” and “pose[] a severe
threat to prison discipline and management.”116
So far, I have found a single piece of evidence of arguable proincarceration advocacy by a private firm. In 1995, Wackenhut chairman
Timothy P. Cole testified in favor of certain amendments to the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.117 The main point of
his testimony was to propose additional provisions (1) making clear that
106
For instance, ALEC doesn’t disclose the current membership of its Task Forces. See Scott
Blake, CCA Dominates Prison Privatization, FLA. TODAY, June 13, 2004, at 8.
107
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 529; see also Olsson, supra note 104.
108
See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 4.
109
See ALEC, Criminal Justice Task Force, supra note 104 (Dec. 11, 2003 Task Force meeting).
110
See ALEC, Criminal Justice Model Legislation, supra note 104.
111
See ALEC, Criminal Justice Task Force, supra note 104 (Brad Wiggins of CCA presented
Developments, supra note 16, at the Dec. 14, 2002 Task Force meeting).
112
Personal communication, Louise Gilchrist, Vice President of Marketing and Communications, Corrections Corp. of Am., Sept. 15, 2006 (see Corrections Corp. of Am., About CCA, http://
www.correctionscorp.com/officers.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2006)); see also Corrections Corp. of
Am., The Corrections Industry: Myths vs. Reality in Private Corrections: The Truth Behind the
Criticism, http://www.correctionscorp.com/myths.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).
113
Gilchrist interview, supra note 112.
114
See Corrections Corp. of Am., Why Do Business with CCA, http://www.correctionscorp.com
/salesteam.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
115
See CCA, supra note 114.
116
Testimony of Michael Quinlan before the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice,
House Judiciary Committee, Feb. 22, 1994, 1994 WL 214215 (F.D.C.H.).
117
Testimony of Timothy P. Cole, Chairman, Wackenhut Corrections Corp., before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1995, 1995 WL 449225 (F.D.C.H.).
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prison grants under the 1994 Act would “help pay for the entire range of
correctional services states can provide in-house or under contract” (not
merely for “alternative correctional facilities”), (2) requiring states to
“show that they have all the necessary legislative authority to embark
upon a comprehensive, integrated program and that they will employ the
best technology at the lowest cost” (presumably to boost privatization),
(3) directing the Attorney General to “give top priority to the construction of larger, ‘harder’ [i.e., higher-level security] facilities,” and (4) directing the Attorney General to give priority to states with “an executive
body dedicated to the review and consideration of privatization.”118 During this testimony, he said the following:
• “Our proposed amendment . . . would help to assure that these
grants will help the states incarcerate more violent criminals and
not make the state governments more dependent on federal tax
dollars in the long term.”
• “By passing ‘truth-in-sentencing’ laws, states have begun to restore a fundamental sense of justice and fairness to our system of
crime and punishment.”
• “The new grant program [under the 1994 Act, without the proposed amendments] is available for ‘alternative correctional facilities’ and does not recognize the urgent need for more cells in
secure facilities.”119
• “Current law encourages billions to be spent on new or retrofitted facilities that are not large enough, secure enough or efficient
enough to keep the maximum number of violent criminals in
prison for the least cost.”120
This isn’t great evidence—Cole was really only advocating funding
priorities and privatization-friendly decisionmaking. Cole’s request to
divert money from alternative facilities, his kind words for truth-insentencing laws, and his positive attitude toward locking up violent
criminals are hardly a pro-incarceration smoking gun. But this is the best
I’ve found. Private prison firms may have made other statements and
taken other public positions that are arguably pro-incarceration, but I haven’t found any, and to my knowledge, privatization critics have not
brought them to light.121

118

Cole testimony, supra note 117.
Cole testimony, supra note 117.
Cole testimony, supra note 117, at Attachment 1.
121
Interestingly, the source from which I learned about the Cole testimony characterized it
fairly innocuously, as testimony in favor of amendments “that authorized the expenditure of $10
billion to construct and repair state prisons”—only focusing on the generalized desire for funding.
Ken Silverstein, America’s Private Gulag, in THE CELLING OF AMERICA, supra note 40, at 156, 159.
119
120

DRAFT—DO NOT CITE

24

VOLOKH

[11/9/2006

In short, based on the evidence we have, the most we can say about
whether private prison firms advocate increased incarceration to any significant extent is that maybe they do and maybe they don’t.
C. Is Pro-Incarceration Advocacy Bad?
Of course, members of an industry, whether public or private, who
advocate a policy that benefits them are not necessarily motivated by
self-interest, even unconsciously. When Don Novey, the president of the
CCPOA, says he just wants to lock up scumbags,122 perhaps we should
take him at his word. The same goes when a Department of Justice official speaks of the need to fight “the scourge of child pornography,”123
when CACI says terrorism is “heinous,”124 when a leading environmental
citizen-suit litigator argues against weakening the environmental laws
whose monetary penalties fund its operations,125 or when doctors who
perform abortions oppose abortion restrictions.126
People who advocate a policy that benefits them or their industry
may be acting out of naked self-interest; they may be deluded into believing their particular interest is the general interest; their participation
in an industry may lead them to rightly appreciate the overlap between
their industry’s interest and the public interest; they may have joined the
industry because they were sympathetic to its interests; or maybe they
just coincidentally believe that the policy is right.127
122
See Dan Morain, California’s Profusion of Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1994, at 1
(“Novey said his organization donates money ‘to change the system’ so career criminals are locked
up for life, not to increase the number of guards. ‘There are scumbags out there,’ Novey said.”);
Jenifer Warren, When He Speaks, They Listen, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2000, at 1 (similar).
123
Testimony of Daniel P. Collins, Associate Deputy Attorney General, before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, House Judiciary Committee, Mar. 11, 2003, 2003
WL 1079511 (F.D.C.H.).
124
See text accompanying notes 4–6 supra.
125
See text accompanying notes 12–14 supra.
126
See Nat’l Abortion Fed., About NAF, http://www.prochoice.org/about_naf/index.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2006) (“The National Abortion Federation (NAF) is the professional association of
abortion providers in the United States and Canada. We believe that women should be trusted to
make private medical decisions in consultation with their health care providers.”). For an accusation
of self-interestedness, see Paul M. Weyrich, Memos Might Reveal Profit Motive in Senate, INSIGHT
ON THE NEWS, Mar. 15, 2004, at 52 (“The abortion-rights lobby is just a front for something worse,
which is the abortion-clinic lobby, represented by the National Abortion Federation. . . . [O]n average abortion clinics make $1,000 for every abortion they perform.”).
127
On affiliation bias, see PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 311–13 (2000). The question of how to interpret behavior that serves the interests of a class is featured, for instance, in historians’ debates over the social influences of the early 19th-century British antislavery movement.
Each of the above rationales for why British elites opposed slavery (except for the self-selection
hypothesis) has its defenders. For an argument that abolitionism served the naked self-interest of
British capitalists, see ERIC WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY 169 (reprint 1994) (1944) (abolitionism served to destroy the West Indian monopoly). For an argument that British capitalists were
deluded into thinking that their abolitionism was moral, when in fact it served to legitimize “wage
slavery,” see David Brion Davis, AHR Forum: Reflections on Abolitionism and Ideological Hegem(continued next page)
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Nor is even nakedly self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy an
obvious evil: From a procedural perspective, some argue that optimal
criminal law should reflect all interests, including the benefit to the
criminal of committing the crime;128 and if this is right, prison providers’
self-interest is also relevant. Moreover, some see lobbying as a means by
which groups provide their views to decisionmakers and the public and
thus enrich democratic debate.129 Others may find it illegitimate, on democratic grounds, to even consider the substance of people’s future political advocacy in deciding whether to privatize.130
ony, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 797, 802 (1987) (British capitalists were deceiving themselves); see also
John Ashworth, AHR Forum: The Relationship Between Capitalism and Humanitarianism, 92 AM.
HIST. REV. 813, 815 (1987) (“false consciousness” is a better theory than “self-deception,” since the
capitalists may have been deceived by society, not by themselves). For an argument that the market
discipline imposed by capitalism nurtured humanitarianism and abolitionism, see Thomas L. Haskell, AHR Forum: Convention and Hegemonic Interest in the Debate over Antislavery: A Reply to
Davis and Ashworth, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 829, 852–53 (1987). And for an argument that British
capitalists’ self-interest and their interest in abolitionism were coincidental—that is, that the middle
classes were really just motivated by humanitarianism—see G.M. TREVELYAN, ENGLISH SOCIAL
HISTORY 495–97 (1942); Ashworth, supra, at 813 (Whig historians believed “waves of humanitarian
sentiment came lapping onto the shores of Britain . . . as part of the divinely ordained scheme of
things”); Howard Temperley, Capitalism, Slavery and Ideology, 75 PAST & PRESENT 94, 98 (1977)
(citing REGINALD COUPLAND, THE BRITISH ANTI-SLAVERY MOVEMENT 111, 250–51 (1933).
Or take a somewhat different context: There is a class of strategic games (similar to that in the
model presented later in this Article) where, according to standard economic theory, the “best” strategy is to free-ride off other players. Though several laboratory experiments suggest that people
consistently act more cooperatively than predicted by economic theory, see sources cited infra note
135, one set of researchers finds that economists are an exception to this pattern. Perhaps economists are the only group to act according to naked self-interest. Or, the researchers suggest, selfselection or false consciousness may play a role: “Economists may be selected for their work by
virtue of their preoccupation with the ‘rational’ allocation of money and goods. Or they may start
behaving according to the general tenets of the theories they study.” Gerald Marwell & Ruth E.
Ames, Economists Free-Ride, Does Anyone Else?: Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods,
15 J. PUB. ECON. 295, 309 (1981).
128
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1661, 1748 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002); A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45, 48 &
n.12 (2000) (it is “conventional in the literature on enforcement” to include all people’s utility in
social welfare, including the criminal’s). But see George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of
Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970) (illicit utility shouldn’t count); Dolovich, supra note 17, at
515–16 (profit-making shouldn’t count in determining optimal criminal law).
129
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19–23 (1976) (importance of political expenditures
for free expression); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 411 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting); E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961); LOGAN,
supra note 23, at 159 (“We cannot prevent ‘lobbying’ (though it may not always be called that) by
nonprofit organizations, government agencies, public employee unions, or commercial companies,
any of whose agenda may or may not coincide with the public interest. However, allowing these
groups to compete, both in the provision of a service and in the public formulation of policy for the
provision of that service, is a better method of protecting the public interest than is granting a monopoly to one particular service provider. ‘Pluralism’ is what we call the condition in which the
‘public interest’ must be sorted out from among competing definitions and claims.”); REPORT RELATIVE TO PRISONS FOR PROFIT, supra note 23, at 57 (lobbying is legitimate and “often promotes better
informed decisions”).
130
I have defined “advocacy” broadly, so that it even includes, at one extreme, bribery. See
text accompanying notes 29–30 supra. The arguments in the paragraph above, of course, may apply
(continued next page)
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And from a substantive perspective, if criminal policy should be
judged by a substantive external standard—for instance, whether sentences are too long in an objective sense—one cannot object to proincarceration advocacy on criminal-law-specific grounds without first
establishing that such advocacy would move criminal law in a substantively undesirable direction.131
Nonetheless, I will assume, for purposes of this Article, that economically self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy is undesirable. The
interesting question, therefore, is what policies would reduce the amount,
or effectiveness, of such advocacy.
III. ADVOCACY AS A PUBLIC GOOD: ONE MODEL
In this Part and the next, I present a few models of how different actors in the prison system may react to privatization. (The technical version of these stories appears in Appendix A and the other appendices
referenced there.) These models share the following features:
• First, pro-incarceration advocacy is a public good. Privatizing
part of the prison industry therefore introduces a collective action problem: Unless everyone in the industry cooperates with
each other, they will spend less on pro-incarceration advocacy
because part of their expenditures will benefit their competitors.
• Second, I argue, private prison firms extract less benefit from the
system than public prison guards’ unions; therefore, even if all
actors cooperate with each other, the total profit in the system is
less than it would be under monopoly government provision.
For these two reasons, the total amount of pro-incarceration advocacy may well decrease with privatization.
My models differ, though, in the following ways:
• In this Part, I also assume that the effectiveness of advocacy only
depends on its total amount, regardless of who contributed the
money. This assumption implies, as I will show, that the largest
actor does all the advocacy and the smaller actors do none at all,
instead free-riding totally off the largest actor’s contributions.

more naturally to the more licit, non-bribery, forms of advocacy. Even bribery has its defenders,
though it is unclear how much relevance the arguments for bribery have for incarceration policy.
See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 69 (1968) (“In terms
of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest
bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized, honest bureaucracy.”); Francis T. Lui, An Equilibrium Queueing Model of Bribery, 93 J. POL. ECON. 760, 761 (1985) (“It is often argued that bribes
serve as ‘lubricants’ in an otherwise sluggishi economy and improve its efficiency.”).
131
See, e.g., LOGAN, supra note 23, at 154 (industry lobbying for longer sentences isn’t necessarily negative because the public favors stiffer penalties).
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•

In the next Part, I present a model where I relax that assumption
and allow the different sectors to have independent effects on the
probability that pro-incarceration reforms are adopted. Under
this more relaxed assumption, privatization does increase the
private sector’s pro-incarceration advocacy, but it also decreases
the public sector’s pro-incarceration advocacy. Whether the
former effect outweighs the latter is unknown unless we can say
something empirical about how effective at advocacy the different sectors are. I also discuss the effect of privatization when
one takes into account that states that privatize are likely to have
weaker unions; here, too, the effect of privatization is ambiguous. I dub these the “anything goes” models.
In these models, the common assumption that prison privatization
will actually increase pro-incarceration advocacy turns out to be either
false, or true but under-theorized.
In section A, I describe intuitively, with a few easy graphs, the collective action problem as it applies to the funding of public goods. In
section B, I explore how the model might apply to the prison industry,
with the help of a bit of data and some back-of-the-envelope calculations.
Then I make some ancillary points: In section C, I discuss whether the
model is realistic. In section D, I explain why I am focusing on private
prison firms and public prison guards’ unions—rather than private
guards or public agencies—as the players in this game. In section E—
since the precise effect of privatization depends on whether different actors in the prison system are acting independently or cooperating with
each other—I discuss which form of cooperation is the most plausible.
In section F, I explain how the model applies not only to advocacy that
influences the probability that a given change in the law will occur but
also to lobbying that affects the substance of the change in the law. In
the next Part, I present the “anything goes” models.
A. An Illustration of Free Riding
When a good is private, everyone pays for, and enjoys, only his own
consumption of the good. By contrast, in the classic model of public
goods, everyone benefits from the total amount of the public good,132 and

132

Compare William H. Oakland, Theory of Public Goods, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECO487 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987) (inequality 1a, expressing that, for a
private good, the sum of all consumptions must not exceed total production), with id. at 486 (inequality 1, expressing that for a public good, no individual’s consumption may exceed total production).

NOMICS
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this amount is determined by the total amount of contribution.133 If we
benefit from our national defense, we benefit from the full amount, not
from any chunk we may have paid for; we cannot be excluded from that
full benefit, no matter how little we paid; and the total amount of national
defense is just determined by how much money Congress allocated to
national defense from the Treasury. A tax-funded program that improves
air quality benefits everyone who breathes the relevant air, whether or
not they contributed to the program; and the total improvement is just
determined by the amount of resources directed toward that goal. Similarly, contributing to a candidate’s campaign benefits everyone who
wants that candidate to win; and it is not too implausible to say, as an
approximation, that his probability of winning just depends on how much
money he raises and spends.
Suppose you are, as economists say, a rational, risk-neutral expected
utility maximizer.134 The validity of this assumption is disputed,135 but
suppose it is a reasonably good approximation of your behavior. You are
faced with the choice of whether or not to spend a dollar on political advocacy—donating to the campaign of a politician or voter initiative, contributing to your trade association’s lobbying expenses, or running an
ad—in favor of some reform that could increase the size of your market.
We may assume that this dollar has some influence in the world, whether
appropriate or inappropriate—it could corrupt a legislator, raise the
chance of his election, contribute to the passage of the initiative, or
change popular opinion.136
The benefit of this dollar is the value of the increased probability of
getting your desired policy change.137 It is reasonable to think that
133
See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 361 (1995); HAL R.
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 418 (3d ed. 1992); Oakland, supra note 132, at 488; Paul A.
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387 (1954).
134
See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 168–94; VARIAN, supra note 133, at 172–81.
135
The stylized assumptions of expected utility theory do not always hold. See MAS-COLELL
ET AL., supra note 133, at 179–81 (discussing the Allais and Machina’s paradoxes, examples of reallife behavior that violate expected utility theory); VARIAN, supra note 133, at 192–94 (discussing the
Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, which violate expected utility theory); Mark J. Machina, Choice
Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1987, at 121. The
assumption of (materialistic) rational utility maximization has also come in for some criticism, in
particular as it relates to the prediction below that actors will free-ride. See James Andreoni, Why
Free-Ride?: Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments, 37 J. PUB. ECON. 291 (1988);
Robert Sugden, On the Economics of Philanthropy, 92 ECON. J. 341 (1982); Marwell & Ames, supra
note 127 (the title says it all: Economists Free-Ride, Does Anyone Else?).
136
Some have questioned the assumption in the public choice literature that political choices
are self-interested. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Democracy and Disgust: Reflections on Public
Choice, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161, 162 (1989); Abner J. Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167,
167 (1988). This model, however, only assumes that self-interested lobbying has some effect on
outcomes.
137
I assume here that the incarceration-policy game is the only game these actors are playing.
This is not entirely realistic. For instance, the California prison guards’ union gave massively to
Proposition 184, the Three Strikes initiative in 1994, even though the proponents outspent the oppo(continued next page)
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spending money on advocacy is subject to decreasing marginal returns,
so each additional dollar gets you less and less benefit.138 The cost of a
dollar, on the other hand, is and remains $1, no matter how many of them
you spend. As long as the benefit of an advocacy dollar is greater than
$1, you continue spending; and you stop as soon as that benefit reaches
$1. You have now settled on the optimal139 total amount of advocacy
spending—say $1 million.140
Figure 2 below illustrates the situation graphically. The expected
benefit—that is, the probability of success times the benefit—is represented by the curved line below: The more you spend, the greater the
probability of success, but the less you get for each extra dollar; and because a probability can’t get any higher than 1, the curve is bounded
above by the dashed line representing the total benefit of the policy. The
nents by a factor of 48 and won with 72% of the vote. See Mike Davis, Hell Factories in the Field:
A Prison-Industrial Complex, NATION, Feb. 20, 1995, at 229; Tobacco Industry Power May Go Up
in Smoke, Foes Say, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at 3. The union may have been trying not merely to
secure the passage of the initiative but also to flex its political muscle for other political battles, like
fighting against privatization or in favor of wage increases. Similarly, private prison firms may shy
away from advocacy in favor of incarceration for fear of a public backlash that could endanger
prison privatization itself. (Public sector unions may not fear such a backlash because public provision is still considered the default mode of provision.)
138
It is possible that the benefit of the extra dollar is not always decreasing. Specifically, the
first dollar might be totally useless; there could be a threshold below which extra dollars are more
and more beneficial and above which the benefit of an extra dollar tapers off. Then, instead of having a concave graph as in Figure 2 (which corresponds to a decreasing marginal graph in Figure 3),
we would have an S-shaped graph (which would correspond to a hump-shaped marginal graph in
Figure 4). See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 483 fig.20.1 (2003); cf. OLSON, supra
note 28, at 22 (average cost curves have a U shape, which is another way of saying the same thing).
This would not change the results significantly. The technical model, see text accompanying note
296 infra, allows for such a threshold. However, an assumption of decreasing marginal returns
everywhere is also common in the literature. See Pecorino, supra note 178, at 654 (defining the
level of a tariff as t(S), where S is the sum of lobbying contributions from the industry, and assuming
t]>0 and t_<0); David P. Baron, Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium, 104 Q.J. ECON. 45, 54 (1989) (assuming P(X1,X2), the probability that candidate 1 wins the
election as a function of campaign expenditures (which equal contributions) X1 by candidate 1 and
X2 by candidate 2, to be continuously differentiable and strictly increasing and concave in X1 and
strictly decreasing and convex in X2); David Austen-Smith, Interest Groups, Campaign Contributions, and Probabilistic Voting, 54 PUB. CHOICE 123, 128, 130, 135 (1987) (defining a function
r(t,c), the probability that a candidate wins the election given policy announcements t and campaign
expenditures c=(cA,cB), and noting, in the proof of Lemma 2, that “r(t,c) is strictly concave and increasing in cA, and convex and decreasing in cB”)
139
That is, optimal to yourself. I have already assumed for the purpose of this Article that the
expenditure is not socially optimal. See text accompanying notes 25, 131 supra.
140
This number and the other thresholds presented in this example are purely illustrative, but
they happen to be approximately what you get if the effectiveness of advocacy expenditures is determined by a function p(e)—the probability that expenditures of $e get you the desired policy
change—equal to the square root of e/(e+10,000), and the value of the policy change is $200 million.
Verifying that this function satisfies the technical assumptions below, see notes 282–285 infra, is left
as an exercise to the reader. The numbers in the text are rounded to the nearest $100,000; the more
exact numbers are $992,509.41 for a monopolist, $699,620.10 for a 50% duopolist, $308,757.73 for
a 10% duopolist, and $941,193.21 for a 90% duopolist. Thanks to Scientific WorkPlace for crunching the numbers for me.
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cost of advocacy is represented by the straight line below: Each dollar of
advocacy costs $1. Your problem is to maximize the vertical distance
between the expected benefit curve and the cost line. In the figure, that
maximum distance occurs at a spending level of $1 million.
FIGURE 2
total benefit of the policy
c
expe

co

t
enefi
ted b

o
st

d
fa

c
ca
vo

y

total spending

$1m

Figure 3 is an equivalent way of seeing the same problem. The
curve below represents the marginal expected benefit—that is, the benefit of an extra dollar of spending, which is just equal to the total benefit
times the extra probability that a dollar buys you. As noted above, the
marginal benefit is decreasing. The straight line is the marginal cost of
advocacy: An extra dollar of advocacy always costs $1. If the marginal
expected benefit is above $1, you’re not spending enough; if it’s below
$1, you should cut back. At a spending level of $1 million, an additional
dollar of spending gives you exactly $1 of expected benefit.
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FIGURE 3
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Now suppose the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division comes
in and splits you up, so that you are now two identical firms, each with
half the market share. Your previous optimal amount, $1 million, is no
longer optimal for you: The cost of that last dollar was $1, and while the
benefit of the dollar is $1 for the whole industry, you, who now represent
only half the industry, only see 50¢ of that benefit. All your benefits are
now halved because you have to share them with your competitor; for
our purposes, the split-up thus has the same effect as a 50% tax on revenues. Because your spending on advocacy—an investment in the growth
of your industry—is only half as productive, you do less of it. You start
cutting back on your spending, because a dollar saved puts $1 back in
your pocket and only reduces your benefits by 50¢. As you cut back
more, the benefit of the last dollar rises; you stop cutting back as soon as
the benefit of your last dollar to the industry reaches $2. Call the new
amount $700,000.
This new situation is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. In Figure 4, the
lower curve is your reduced expected benefit, now that you only have
half the industry.141 The maximum vertical distance between that curve
and the cost line now occurs at $700,000.

141

The figures are not drawn to scale.
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FIGURE 4
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On Figure 5, the equivalent graph that shows marginal quantities
instead of total quantities, we want to find the point where the marginal
expected benefit to the industry is $2. This is, of course, equivalent to
finding the point where half the marginal expected benefit (i.e., the benefit to you) is $1. That point is again $700,000.
This story is incomplete. You don’t want the amount spent to be
exactly $700,000; obviously, you would be thrilled if other people happened to contribute more. It’s just that you’re not personally willing to
put any dollar into the pot after the 700,000th. You want the total
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amount spent to be at least $700,000, and are willing to contribute money
until that point is reached, but you stop being willing to personally contribute once you’re holding the 700,001st dollar. This is because the
benefit of a dollar only depends on the total amount of money spent, and
if the 700,000th dollar had a benefit to the industry worth $2 (and thus a
benefit to you worth $1), then the 700,001st dollar has a benefit worth
slightly less than $2.
Your new competitor, who represents the other half of the industry,
and who is equally interested in this reform that will increase the size of
the pie, also wants the total amount spent to be at least $700,000, and
won’t put a 700,001st dollar into the pot. Any belief about how the contributions are divided, provided they add up to $700,000, is an equilibrium of sorts.142 If you believe that your competitor will spend $350,000
and your competitor believes you will also spend $350,000, neither of
you has any incentive to deviate from that shared understanding. If your
shared beliefs are that your competitor will spend $100,000 and you’ll
spend $600,000, there’s likewise no reason to deviate from that plan.
Any division of contributions adding up to less than $700,000 is unstable
because someone will want to contribute more; and any division adding
up to more than $700,000 is likewise unstable because someone will
want to withdraw an insufficiently productive 700,001st dollar.
Suppose, though, that the Antitrust Division split the baby unevenly,
so that your share is 10% and your competitor’s is 90%. You are unwilling to spend beyond the point where the marginal dollar has a benefit to
the industry of $10 (because 10% of that is $1), while your competitor is
unwilling to spend beyond the point where the marginal dollar has a
benefit to the industry of $1.11 (because 90% of that is $1). Recall that
the returns to spending on advocacy are decreasing, so your threshold is
fairly small—say $300,000—while his is quite a bit larger—say
$900,000. This is illustrated in Figures 6 and 7, where the lowest curve
is your expected benefit (or marginal expected benefit), 10% of the total,
and the middle curve is your competitor’s expected benefit (or marginal
expected benefit), 90% of the total.

IAN,

142
A Nash equilibrium, to be exact. See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 246–53; VARsupra note 133, at 265–68.
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FIGURE 6
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Your competitor is willing to spend up to the $900,000 point. Since
this is above $300,000, there’s no reason for you to spend anything:
You’re unwilling to spend any dollar beyond the 300,000th, since its
marginal benefit to the industry is under $10, and so its marginal benefit
to you is under $1.
Suppose your shared beliefs were that your competitor would spend
$600,000 and you would spend $300,000. These beliefs would not be an
equilibrium, since you would prefer to keep your $300,000. Why spend
any extra dollar beyond your competitor’s $600,000, if the 300,001st
dollar already isn’t worthwhile to you? The only equilibrium is where
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your competitor gives $900,000 and you give $0. Because you’re the
smaller actor, you totally free-ride off your competitor.143 The result is
what Mancur Olson calls the “systematic tendency for ‘exploitation’ of
the great by the small.”144
If one accepts the fundamental assumption of this Part—that the
probability of success only depends on the total amount of money in the
pot—this simple model is flexible enough to accommodate many institutional details of privatization. The total free-riding result happens whenever one sector has a lower threshold than the other, for whatever reason.
In this story, you and your competitor are identical except that you’ve
got 10% of the industry and he’s got 90%. But you could have a lower
threshold for other reasons.
For instance, you might in addition be subject to a higher tax rate—if
half your revenues are taxed away, then you will act like your share is
5% instead of 10%. Or, to flip the tables, suppose your competitor’s
revenues are subject to a 90% tax rate. Then, though his industry share is
90%, he acts as though his share is 9%. You, with your 10% share, are
now the larger actor, and he free-rides off of you. So your “real” share—
the share of total profits—is a function not just of the nominal industry
share, but also of the rate of profit.
Similarly, you might be better at advocacy. Perhaps, for whatever
reason, each dollar of yours is worth twice your competitor’s dollars, and
twice what a dollar was worth before the breakup. (Perhaps you are now
a slicker lobbyist.) Then, you act as though your share is 20%, and your
threshold goes up accordingly. This, too, affects your “real” share for
purposes of choosing how much to spend on advocacy. In this example,
you still won’t do anything because your competitor still has a 90%
share; but this is an important point that I will return to below.145

143
See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 361–63; VARIAN, supra note 133, at 420–23;
Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics, 63
REV. ECON. STUD. 265, 282, 284 (1996); see also Oakland, supra note 132, at 485, 486–91, 514–15.
This stark free-riding result occurs when utility is quasi-linear in income—that is, when the public
good doesn’t affect the marginal utility of income. See MUELLER, supra note 138, at 23 (explaining
the “kangaroo problem,” a mathematically equivalent problem where there is not complete freeriding because utilities are not assumed quasi-linear). Quasi-linearity is a reasonable assumption
with business firms, though not with individuals, whose marginal utility of consumption may be
enhanced by higher levels of, say, environmental protection or national defense. Quasi-linearity
certainly seems defensible here, since prison providers are unlikely to enjoy their consumption more
because of a more beneficial incarceration policy.
144
See OLSON, supra note 28, at 29 (italics and footnote omitted); TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS 24–26 (1980) (similar diagrammatic exposition).
145
See text accompanying note 247 infra.
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B. Applying This Model to Prisons
That’s the intuition behind the story of lobbying after privatization.
Consider the main political actors in the private prison industry: the private prison firms and the public prison guards’ union. (On why these are
the two relevant actors, and on what might motivate them, see below.146)
Before privatization, the public sector is the monopoly provider of
prison services, and the prison guards’ union enjoys the benefits that
flow from serving the whole system. Now suppose that part of the system is privatized. Because the larger sector only controls part of its market, it is less willing than the previous monopoly provider to spend
money on reforms that would increase the size of the prison pie. The
effect is the same as that of a tax on revenues: If its share is 90%, then
instead of spending until the benefit of the last dollar is $1, it now only
spends until the benefit of the last dollar is $1.11 (that’s 1 divided by
0.9).
So which is the larger sector? I argue that it is the public sector. As
the next subsection suggest, the public sector has a larger industry share
and extracts more benefit from the system than does the private sector.
1. Industry Shares
In the first place, the private sector has a smaller share of the industry. Of the 1.5 million prisoners under the jurisdiction of federal or state
adult correctional authorities at the end of 2004,147 6.6% were held in
private facilities; this includes 13.7% of federal prisoners and 5.6% of
state prisoners.148 Of the 34 states with at least some prisoners in private
facilities, the percentages ranged from near 0.0% (seven states had percentages below 1.0%)149 to 42.1% (five states had percentages above
25.0%).150 Among these 34 states, the median percentage in private facilities was between 7.9% (Louisiana) and 9.2% (Georgia).151
So—flipping these percentages—the share of the public sector is
between 57.9% and 100% in every state, is over 92% in two-thirds of the
146

See text accompanying notes 187–209 infra.
See PRISONERS IN 2004, supra note 15, at 1. The total number of incarcerated people, including in federal and state prisons, territorial prisons, local jails, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement facilities, military facilities, jails in Indian country, and juvenile facilities, was 2.3
million at the end of 2004. Id.
148
See PRISONERS IN 2004, supra note 15, at 6 tbl.7.
149
South Carolina (0.0%), South Dakota (0.2%), Wisconsin (0.4%), Maryland (0.5%), North
Carolina (0.6%), Alabama (0.9%), and Pennsylvania (0.9%). See PRISONERS IN 2004, supra note
147, at 6 tbl.7.
150
New Mexico (42.1%), Alaska (30.6%), Montana (30.1%), Wyoming (28.1%), Hawaii
(28.0%), and Oklahoma (25.3%). See PRISONERS IN 2004, supra note 147, at 6 tbl.7.
151
See PRISONERS IN 2004, supra note 147, at 6 tbl.7.
147
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states (including half of the states with at least some prisoners in private
facilities), and is 93.4% nationwide.
I am assuming here that a 10% share means that the private sector
gets 10% of all benefits resulting from the reform. This is of course a
vast oversimplification. Imagine, for instance, that “the era of public
prisons is over,” and all new capacity is built in the private sector. If
that’s so, then the private sector knows that it will obtain the entire benefit of any pro-incarceration reform, so it acts as though it has a 100%
share in the flow of marginal prisoners, even though a snapshot of the
system might show that it only has a 10% share of the existing stock of
prisoners.152 The challenge is to determine the private sector’s share of
marginal prisoners.
One first attempt to determine marginal shares would be, instead of
dividing private prisoners by total prisoners, dividing change in private
prisoners over some period by change in total prisoners over the same
period. Unfortunately, this approach yields widely varying numbers because of small state-by-state numbers and temporary blips in prison
populations.153 As my best stab at this problem, I offer the following:
Over the period from June 30, 2000 to June 30, 2005, the state system
added 88,500 total prisoners and 5703 private prisoners, for a marginal
private share of 6.4%.154 Similarly, over this same five-year period, the
federal system added 41,954 total prisoners and 22,615 private prisoners,
for a marginal private share of 53.9%.155 Adding this all up, total prison152
See, e.g., Meredith Kolodner, Private Prisons Smiling over Illegal Immigration, INT’L HERTRIB., July 20, 2006, at 12 (“With all the federal centers filled and the U.S. government not
planning to build more, most of the new money is expected to go to private companies or to county
governments. Even some of the money paid to counties, which hold 57 percent of the immigrants in
detention, will end up in the pockets of the private companies, since they manage a number of the
county jails.”).
153
For instance, Wyoming added 4 total prisoners from Dec. 31, 2000 to Dec. 31, 2001, but the
private prison population increased by 191. This yields a marginal private share of 4775% for
Wyoming over that period. On the other hand, North Dakota’s prison population stayed constant at
1168 between June 30, 2002 and June 30, 2003, but its private prison population dropped from 40 to
1 during this period, which seems to yield a negative infinite marginal private share for North Dakota over that period. Taking longer periods doesn’t help much: Mississippi added 184 total prisoners between June 30, 2001 and June 30, 2005, but added 1394 private prisoners, for a marginal private share of 758%. All numbers here and in this portion of the text are taken from the spreadsheets
associated with the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Prisoners in 2004 report, supra note 147, and its
predecessors, and the Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2005 report and its predecessors. The endof-year reports and spreadsheets are available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm#
Prisoners (last visited Oct. 18, 2006), and the midyear reports and spreadsheets are available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm#pjmidyear (last visited Oct. 18, 2006). Where numbers
differ between reports, I have used the numbers from the latest report.
154
It makes sense that the marginal private share in state prisoners is about the same as the total
private share in state prisoners, since the total private share has stayed about constant over the last
five years.
155
It likewise makes sense that the marginal private share in federal prisoners is so much larger
than the total private share in federal prisoners, since the total private share has increased substantially over the last five years, from 2.8% at the end of 1999 to 14.4% in mid-year 2005.

ALD
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ers increased by 130,454, and private prisoners increased by 28,318, for
a marginal private share of 21.7%.
The bottom line is that, if we care about the private sector’s share of
total prisoners, roughly 6–10% is a reasonable estimate, with 0–42% as
the outer range. If we care about the private sector’s share of marginal
prisoners, my best estimate for the marginal share over the last five years
would be about 22%, with 0–54% as the outer range.
2. The Benefits to Each Sector
In the second place, the profits of the private sector are relatively
low.156 If the industry is perfectly competitive—like in textbook models
of perfect competition—every firm makes zero economic profits;157
therefore, they don’t care whether the market gets bigger or smaller, because they’re indifferent between running prisons and putting their
money into the stock market. This is, of course, an unrealistic view of
the world—the prison industry is oligopolistic, so the prison firms do
make some profit. But not that much:158 CCA’s net profit margin159 is
156
My conventional assumption that firms maximize profits is admittedly sloppy. “The firm is
not an individual. It is a legal fiction that serves as a focus for a complex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may ‘represent’ other organizations) are brought
into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations. In this sense the ‘behavior’ of the firm
is like the behavior of a market: the outcome of a complex equilibrium process. We seldom fall into
the trap of characterizing the wheat or stock market as an individual, but we often make this error by
thinking about organizations as if they were persons with motivations and intentions.” Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976), reprinted in MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE
FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 83, 89 (2000). Nonetheless, in this paper I do not consider any agency costs internal to the firm—with apologies to corporations scholars—and assume, in accordance with primitive microeconomics, that the firm is a profitmaximizing “black box.” My only defense is that, for certain purposes, (managers of) firms often
act more or less as though they were profit-maximizing individuals, and this is sufficient for my
purposes here. More importantly, the lobbying critique that I address here generally rests on the
ground that firms lobby for incarceration because such lobbying is a profit-maximizing activity,
which of course assumes that, at least in this instance, firms do act to maximize their utility.
157
See, e.g., MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 335 (“active firms must earn exactly zero
profits in any long-run competitive equilibrium”); VARIAN, supra note 133, at 221 (“firms earn zero
profits in equilibrium”).
158
JOSEPH L. HALLINAN, GOING UP THE RIVER: TRAVELS IN A PRISON NATION 177–78 (2001)
(“The [private] prison business is intensely competitive. Winning bids for prison contracts are often
separated by pennies per day. Those pennies mean the difference between a profitable prison and a
money-loser.”); Dolovich, supra note 17, at 493; Sam Howe Verhovek, Operators Are Not Worried
by Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1997, at B10 (“Even a small increase in their costs could be enough
to eliminate the price advantage that many companies can now offer . . . which is almost uniformly
the factor that leads governments to privatize.”).
159
Net profit margin is net income after taxes divided by revenue. See Net Profit Margin: Investing Lesson 4—Analyzing an Income Statement, http://beginnersinvest.about.com/cs/
investinglessons/l/blnetprofitmarg.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2006). One may well be interested in
net income after taxes divided by cost, not revenue; if so, that number is 1 / (1–NPM), where NPM is
the net profit margin. This is approximately the same as NPM if NPM is small. Thus, NPMs of
7.23%, 1.08%, 2.60%, and 4.66% translate to profit-over-cost of 7.79%, 1.09%, 2.67%, and 4.89%.
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7.23%, the GEO Group’s is 1.08%, Cornell’s is 2.60%, and Avalon’s is
4.66%. By way of comparison, Microsoft’s net profit margin is 28.45%,
IBM’s is 9.56%, Coca-Cola’s is 21.85%, Ford’s is –0.66%, and WalMart’s is 3.61%.160 I will take 0–8% as a reasonable range for industry
profit.
Compare this to the public sector. I abstract away from any agency
problems within the union and tentatively assume that a union is a faithful representative of workers’ interests;161 and the benefit of a policy is
measured by the “union rents,” that is, the difference between publicsector and private-sector wages times the size of the public sector.162
This is admittedly an oversimplification of how unions work, but it will
have to do for a preliminary survey.163
160

These numbers were obtained by entering the following symbols at MSN Money’s website,
http://moneycentral.msn.com/investor/invsub/results/hilite.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2006): CXW (for
CCA), GEO, CRN (for Cornell Companies), CITY (for Avalon Correctional Services), MSFT (for
Microsoft), IBM, KO (for Coca-Cola), F (for Ford), and WMT (for Wal-Mart).
161
This is also not exactly true. The idea that unions faithfully represent their members has
been forcefully critiqued. See, e.g., Representative Joe Knollenberg, The Changing of the Guard:
Republicans Take on Labor and the Use of Mandatory Dues or Fees for Political Purposes, 35
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 347 (1998); Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market
for Union Control, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 367. But see Alison Booth, A Public Choice Model of
Trade Union Behaviour and Membership, 94 ECON. J. 883, 883 (1984) (modeling unions as democracies maximizing the welfare of the median union member).
162
This “rent maximization” approach to unions’ objectives can be found in, e.g., K.C. Fung,
Rent Shifting and Rent Sharing: A Re-Examination of the Strategic Industrial Policy Problem, 28
CAN. J. ECON. 450, 452 (1995); Barry T. Hirsch & Kislaya Prasad, Wage-Employment Determination and a Union Tax on Capital: Can Theory and Evidence Be Reconciled?, 48 ECON. LETTERS 61,
64 & n.5 (1995); Steve Dowrick & Barbara J. Spencer, Union Attitudes to Labor-Saving Innovation:
When Are Unions Luddites?, 12 J. LABOR ECON. 316, 329 (1994); Giovanni de Fraja, Unions and
Wages in Public and Private Firms: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, 45 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 457,
459–60 (1993); John T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and
Growth: Has the Long Run Arrived?, 7 J. LABOR ECON. 72, 84 (1989); Andrew J. Oswald, The
Economic Theory of Trade Unions: An Introductory Survey, 87 SCAND. J. ECON. 160, 162 (1985);
John Pencavel, Wages and Employment Under Trade Unionism: Microeconomic Models and Macroeconomic Applications, 87 SCAND. J. ECON. 197, 201–02 (1985); Guillermo A. Calvo, Urban
Unemployment and Wage Determination in LDC’s: Trade Unions in the Harris-Todaro Model, 19
INT’L ECON. REV. 65, 68 (1978); GEORGE DE MENIL, BARGAINING: MONOPOLY POWER VERSUS
UNION POWER 22 (1971); Sherwin Rosen, Unionism and the Occupational Wage Structure in the
United States, 11 INT’L ECON. REV. 269, 269–70 (1970); JOHN T. DUNLOP, WAGE DETERMINATION
UNDER TRADE UNIONS 41 (1950) (calling this objective “analytical[ly] interest[ing]” but questioning
its empirical relevance). Pencavel, supra, argues that the rent maximization approach is appropriate
if the union redistributes income from employed to unemployed workers so as to equalize incomes.
163
My specification of unions’ benefit is a special case of certain other “utilitarian” or “democratic” objective functions. See, e.g., Alan A. Carruth & Andrew J. Oswald, On Union Preferences
and Labour Market Models: Insiders and Outsiders, 97 ECON. J. 431, 433 (1987) (utilitarian union);
Oswald, supra note 162, at 163–64 (same); Pencavel, supra note 162, at 200 (same); Andrew J.
Oswald, The Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union, 92 ECON. J. 576, 584 (1982) (same);
Booth, supra note 161, at 888 (democratic union). Those specifications reduce to the one I use here
when the utility of money function is linear. See HENRY S. FARBER, THE ANALYSIS OF UNION BEHAVIOR 31 (NBER Working Paper No. 1502, Nov. 1984); Oswald, supra note 162, at 165.
My specification is also a special case of ones in Dowrick & Spencer, supra note 162, at 335;
Alan Manning, How Robust Is the Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union?, 12 J. LABOR. ECON.
430, 436 (1994); Denise J. Doiron, Bargaining Power and Wage-Employment Contracts in a Union(continued next page)
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Public prison guards’ wages are substantially higher than those of
their private counterparts.164 The 2000 Corrections Yearbook reported
that, at private prisons responding to their survey, correctional officers
faced an average entry-level salary of $17,628 and an average maximum
salary of $22,082.165 By contrast, correctional officers at public prisons
faced an average entry-level salary of $23,002 (30% more than at private
prisons) and an average maximum salary of $36,328 (65% more).166 So
public-private salary differences span quite a big range, and these national averages conceal significant state-level variation. In Pennsylvania,
the differences were somewhat higher—entry-level salaries were 39%
higher in public prisons and maximum salaries were 125% higher—
while in Texas, the differences were somewhat lower—entry-level salaries were 9% higher in public prisons and maximum salaries were 21%
higher.167
ized Industry, 33 INT’L ECON. REV. 583, 590 (1992); FARBER, supra, at 32; JOHN H. PENCAVEL, THE
TRADE-OFF BETWEEN WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT IN TRADE UNION OBJECTIVES 13 (NBER Working Paper No. 870, Mar. 1982); Dertouzos & Pencavel, supra, at 1169.
But see FARBER, supra, at 3 (“While the union members and their leaders may be maximizers,
it does not necessarily follow that the union, as an organization, has a well defined objective function.”). (Farber nonetheless concludes that “it is fruitful to analyze labor unions as maximizing a
well defined objective function.” Id.)
164
See Fraja, supra note 162, at 466 (public wages usually higher than those of private counterparts, in part because government employers may be fulfilling social objectives through public
employment). I take no view on whether the difference in wages is due to being unionized or being
in the public sector; all that matters here is that the public and private wages are different empirically. Compare Chris Robinson & Nigel Tomes, Union Wage Differentials in the Public and Private Sectors: A Simultaneous Equations Specification, 2 J. LABOR ECON. 106, 107–08 (1984) (public
employment wage premium appears to be due to union status, not public sector status), with Richard
B. Freeman, Unionism Comes to the Public Sector, 24 J. ECON. LIT. 41, 53 (1986) (unionization
effects on public sector wages are small).
Some have claimed that, in particular cases, private wages have been competitive with public
wages. See RING, supra note 23, at 29; Dana C. Joel, The Privatization of Secure Adult Prisons:
Issues and Evidence, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 23, at 51, 65. But
this isn’t the rule. Several sources indicate that private wages are competitive with market wages,
which makes sense. See, e.g., Brian David, Firm Offers Savings Running Jail: Beaver County Officials Hope Success in Ohio Can Be Duplicated, PITTS. POST-GAZ., July 14, 2005, at W6; Robert
Nelson, Big House Inc., PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Apr. 3, 2003.
165
THE 2000 CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK: PRIVATE PRISONS 98 (Crim. Just. Inst. 2000).
166
THE 2000 CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK: ADULT CORRECTIONS 150–51 (Crim. Just. Inst.
2000). This is apparently the same data cited in Am. Fed. of State, County & Muni. Employees,
Jobs We Do: Public and Private Prisons Compared—2000, http://www.afscme.org/workers/6493.
cfm (last visited Sept. 18, 2006); Nelson, supra note 164 (citing hourly salaries).
167
Compare YEARBOOK: PRIVATE PRISONS, supra note 165, at 98 with YEARBOOK: ADULT
CORRECTIONS, supra note 166, at 150–51. Other states are harder to compare: Three private prisons in California responded to the survey, but the public system didn’t submit its numbers. Nonetheless, we can get an idea for the differences by consulting a different source. A 2001 survey by the
Corrections Compendium reports the annual starting salary for correctional officers in California as
“$33,708/$38,988.” Staff Hiring/Retention—Part 1: Correctional Officer Recruitment, CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, Mar. 2001, at 8. Even the lower one of these numbers is more than twice the
average starting salary for correctional officers at the three reporting private prisons in California,
which is $16,310. (But keep in mind that the numbers may have been gathered differently in the
Yearbook and in the Compendium surveys. Promisingly, the two sources overlap for starting salaries
(continued next page)
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One limitation of the Corrections Yearbook numbers is that only
some private prisons responded to their survey.168 However, we can
supplement this source with others, which give qualitatively similar results. For instance, an AFSCME chart comparing public to private
hourly salaries in selected cities in the occupational category of “Guard
I,” using 1993 data, shows that public sector hourly salaries ranged from
26% higher in Kansas City to 87% higher in San Francisco. In Chicago,
the median city included on AFSCME’s chart, salaries were 57% higher
in the public than in the private sector.169
Based on the Corrections Yearbook numbers, I will take 30–65% as
a reasonable range for the public wage premium, with (somewhat arbitrarily) 9–125% as an outer range.
3. Comparing the Sectors
Let’s try to put these numbers in comparable terms. The model presented above requires us to determine who is the “largest” actor, and the
“size” of the industry for that purpose is not its per-prison benefit but the
absolute total benefit. This means that the total benefit is the industry

in Arizona and Oklahoma. They’re different for other states, but then again, salaries may also have
changed between 2000 and 2001.) See YEARBOOK: PRIVATE PRISONS, supra, at 98. Another source
reports that California public guards’ average base salary was boosted to $65,000 a year in 2002
from about $50,000. See Prison Guard Clout Endures, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2002, California Metro
section, at 10. This $50,000 number is presumably less than the average maximum salary, but even
that is more than twice the average maximum salary for correctional officers at the three reporting
private prisons in California, which is $22,174. See YEARBOOK: PRIVATE PRISONS, supra, at 98.
168
For a few states, only one private prison responded to the survey (but the public numbers
are reported for the entire system). With this caveat in mind, the corresponding differences in Arizona were 33% and 73%, the differences in Georgia were 16% and 90%, the differences in Oklahoma were 9% and 110%, the differences in Ohio were 22% and 48%, and the differences in Utah
were –6% and 43%. Compare YEARBOOK: PRIVATE PRISONS, supra note 165, at 98 with YEARBOOK: ADULT CORRECTIONS, supra note 166, at 150–51. Yes, the Utah public average of startinglevel salaries was 6% lower than at the reporting private prison; this probably indicates, more than
anything else, the pitfalls of relying on a single data point. The Arizona numbers may also not be
representative, since one source (admittedly from the popular press) reports that the public-private
divide in Arizona is on the low side. See Nelson, supra note 164. For other impressionistic reports,
see Kit Miniclier, Trinidad Leery of Prison Plan, DENVER POST, Jan. 28, 1999, at B4 (differences of
$5000 to $6000 between entry-level state prison guard positions in public and private in Colorado);
Steven Harmon, New Prison Sparks Privatization Debate, LANSING STATE J., July 13, 1999, at 1A
(difference of $23,500 at one Michigan private prison vs. $32,000 public average); Schlosser, supra
note 7, at 58 (average New York State correctional salary is $36,000, about 50% higher than typical
salary in the North Country; correctional officers have to queue to get a job there).
169
See Am. Fed. of State, County & Muni. Employees, Getting It Right: Comparing State and
Local Government Workers’ Salaries with the Private Sector, http://afscme.org/publications/1221.
cfm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). The chart of “Guard I” salaries is available at http://afscme.org/
publications/1221.cfm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). The data was collected for the 1993 National
Summary of Average Pay by Type. See AFSCME, supra, at http://www.afscme.org/publications/
2382.cfm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006) (“Location, Location, Location”).
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share times the per-unit benefit. I will express the final numbers as percentages of the total cost of the system.
First, take the private sector. Taking 0–8% as a reasonable range of
industry-wide profits, and a private-sector industry share ranging from
0% to 54% in each state:
Total benefit of the
private sector

=

0% to
8%

×

0% to
54%

=

0% to 4.32%
of the total cost
of the system.

Now take the public sector. I’ve expressed public employees’ benefit as a percentage of private sector wages: To recap, perhaps 30–65% is
a reasonable range for the public-over-private wage premium, with 9–
125% as an outer range. We can put this in terms of total cost by observing that salaries are about 60–80% of most prisons’ operating expenses.170 So an estimate of the wage premium’s reasonable range is:
Total per-prison
benefit for the
private sector

=

30% to
65%

×

60% to
80%

=

18% to 52%
of total
per-prison cost.

(Doing the same for the 9–125% outer range, we get 5.4–100%.)
Now, combining this range of per-prison costs with an industry share
of 46–100% in each state:
Total benefit of the
public sector

=

18% to
52%

×

46% to
100%

=

8.28% to 52%
of the total cost
of the system.

(The same calculation for the outer range yields a range of 2.48% to
100%.)
170
See SHICHOR, supra note 20, at 149 (citing J.D. DONAHUE, PRISONS FOR PROFIT: PUBLIC
JUSTICE, PRIVATE INTERESTS (1988); D.C. McDonald, The Costs of Operating Public and Private
Correctional Facilities, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 179 (D.C. McDonald ed.
1990)) (60–80%); LOGAN, supra note 23, at 81 (citing GEORGE CAMP & CAMILLE CAMP, THE REAL
COST OF CORRECTIONS: A RESEARCH REPORT 3 (Crim. Just. Inst., Apr. 1985)) (80%); id. (citing
Corrections Corp. of Am., Company Report, Apr. 3, 1987) (60%); JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 163 (1989) (citing BUR. OF JUST. STATS., BULLETIN (July 1986)) (60%); Schlosser, supra note 7, at 65 (labor is 60–80% of prison operating costs);
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 475 n.134 (citing other sources suggesting 80–90% (including training),
75%, and 60–70%); see also GA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, FY 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, http://www.
dcor.state.ga.us/pdf/FY04AnnualReport.pdf, at 28 (last visited Oct. 6, 2006) (in Georgia in FY 2004,
“personal services” were $546 million out of total costs of $944 million, which makes 58%); Va.
Dep’t of Corrections, Financial/Operating Overview, http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/resources/
statistics/financial/2004/05expendcat.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2006) (in Virginia in FY 2005, “personal services” were $544 million out of total costs of $859 million, which makes 63%).
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Compare this range with the private sector range of 0–4.32%.
There’s no overlap between these ranges (and not much overlap between
the private range and the outer public range171). Moreover, by my rough
approximation, the public sector’s average benefit from the system exceeds the private sector’s by perhaps an order of magnitude.
C. The Realism of the Model
Thus, because the public sector is the larger actor, the model predicts
that it does all the advocacy—and privatization reduces this amount because it acts like a tax on the public sector’s revenues. And because the
private sector is the smaller actor, it free-rides off the public sector’s contributions. The net result is that total pro-incarceration advocacy decreases as a result of privatization.
This model focused only on the pro-incarceration side’s lobbying,
taking the anti-incarceration side’s as given. But clearly antiincarceration advocacy exists,172 and some of it is as plausibly selfinterested as the prison providers’ pro-incarceration advocacy. For instance, Proposition 66, which would have limited California’s Three
Strikes Law,173 was partly funded by “Sacramento businessman Jerry
Keenan whose son Richard is serving time for manslaughter after crashing his car while driving drunk and killing two passengers.”174 And
Proposition 36, the drug treatment diversion initiative,175 was supported
by dozens of drug treatment providers and 16 medical and public health
organizations, including the California Association of Alcoholism and
Drug Abuse Counselors and the County Alcohol and Drug Program Administrators Association of California.176
So, to be more realistic, we should consider the effect of incarceration on both kinds of advocacy. It turns out that the effect on proincarceration advocacy is the same as in the simple case: Privatization,
under this model, makes it go down. But the decrease in proincarceration advocacy has an indirect effect on anti-incarceration advo-

171

Bear in mind that the low bound of the outer range is derived from a high estimate of private
profitability, a high value for the private share of marginal prisoners, a very low estimate of the
public wage premium, and a low estimate of salaries as a percentage of total cost.
172
See also BERK ET AL., supra note 32, at 200 (ACLU and Friends Committee on Legislation
were major actors in “civil liberties lobby” in 1955–71).
173
See text accompanying note 43 supra.
174
See IGS, supra note 43.
175
See text accompanying note 41 supra.
176
See Nat’l Families in Action, A Guide to Drug-Related State Ballot Initiatives: California
Proposition 36 Proponents, http://www.nationalfamilies.org/guide/california36-endorsements.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
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cacy, which is ambiguous.177 On the one hand, pro-incarceration advocacy decreases the effectiveness of anti-incarceration advocacy by counteracting it. So a decrease in pro-incarceration advocacy makes antiincarceration advocacy more effective, which would tend to increase it.
On the other hand, a decrease in pro-incarceration advocacy also makes
anti-incarceration advocacy less necessary, which would tend to decrease
it. There is no a priori way to know how these conflicting effects would
balance out.
The basic result—that, by fragmenting an industry, one can reduce
that industry’s political advocacy to increase its market—is also consistent with empirical studies on the relationship between industry concentration and lobbying. In general, industry concentration can have two
opposing effects on lobbying. The first effect is the one discussed above:
A concentrated industry can more easily overcome its collective action
problems, so we should expect it to lobby more.178 But much lobbying is
for reforms that would make the market less competitive and allow firms
to charge above-market prices. A more concentrated industry can more
easily cooperate in the product market, so they can raise prices above
market levels all by themselves by directly using anticompetitive methods. So a more concentrated industry would have less need to lobby.179
Thus, one study found a positive effect of concentration on industry
contributions,180 while another found that the percentage of firms in an
industry that had political action committees rises and then falls as concentration goes up.181 This model is only about advocacy for increased
incarceration—that is, for reforms that increase the size of the industry—
not about advocacy for reforms that would squelch competition in the
prison industry. So only the first of these forces comes into play here.
One may wonder about the realism of any simple, highly stylized
model. How believable is it that the private sector engages in zero advo-

177
See Appendix A.1.b infra. If one is only against self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy,
this is an improvement, since pro-incarceration advocacy has declined. If one is against any selfinterested advocacy, then whether privatization has improved matters also depends on what happens
to anti-incarceration advocacy, to the extent this comes from self-interested providers of “antiincarceration services,” like boot camps, halfway houses, and drug treatment centers. See text accompanying notes 242–244 infra.
178
But see Paul Pecorino, Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs,
Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 652, 657–58 (1998) (the assumption that a more concentrated industry can more easily overcome its collective action problems may
not always be true).
179
See Kevin B. Grier et al., The Industrial Organization of Corporate Political Participation,
57 S. ECON. J. 727, 729–30 (1991).
180
See Kevin B. Grier et al., The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978–1986, 88
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 911, 918 & tbl.3, 919 (1994).
181
See Grier et al., supra note 179, at 735 tbl.III, 735–36 (finding that an industry concentration level of 43.85 maximizes the percentage of firms with PACs).
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cacy? Whatever the merits of such skepticism generally, in this case the
simple model may be close to the truth.
As noted above,182 there is little hard evidence that private firms advocate stricter criminal law at all. Perhaps they do so secretly, in which
case this simple model may be entirely unrealistic. Or perhaps this simple model is basically right, and the private firms are actually spending
their money on a form of advocacy where the public good aspect isn’t
important—pro-privatization advocacy.
Pro-privatization advocacy is an area where, obviously, the private
sector can’t free-ride off the public sector, since the public sector is their
enemy on that issue. If the private firms cooperate with each other, they
reap all the benefits of their pro-privatization advocacy; and even if they
don’t cooperate with each other, an individual firm’s pro-privatization
contribution may benefit it directly to the extent that it (improperly) increases the likelihood that that firm will obtain a particular contract.
In real life, of course, money may be multi-purpose. I have treated
“mute” campaign expenditures as though they were for some purpose—
either privatization or incarceration—that was known to the donor but
unknown to us. In fact they could be for both—to implement the donor’s
agenda in a general way. But the model is general enough to accommodate this framework. During campaign time, money may indeed be general. It buys generalized “access” to the candidate, which can be used at
any time after the candidate prevails, if he prevails. But how do donors
use their access? At some point, they must call in a favor, and favors
cost something in terms of “political capital,” and political capital is
scarce. Calling in one favor makes it more difficult to call in some other
favor. At the point where donors have to determine what to ask for, we
are back in the previous model.183
The “access” framework has thus only postponed the applicability of
the model until after the election. One would still predict, under this
model, that the smaller donors would prefer to spend their capital supporting something with more of a private-good component, like privatization, and leave the pro-incarceration advocacy to the largest actor.
And this may in fact be what happens.

182

See text accompanying notes 87–121 supra.
The same goes for participation in ALEC. One pays to be on the Task Force, but when the
time comes to influence the content of model legislation, one of two things might happen. The legislation might have the desired form anyway—in which case one’s participation would have no effect.
(This is fairly likely in a conservative group like ALEC.) Or it wouldn’t have the desired form—in
which case, even if one were participating in the process, which CCA denies, see text accompanying
note 112, one would need to spend some political capital to bring the change about. It is reasonable
to think that a firm would rather spend its political capital on advocating privatization, which has
less of a public-good component.
183
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In any event, what is important here is not whether the model is realistic in a literal sense. Advocacy needn’t be an entirely public good, and
the actors in the industry needn’t totally free-ride. The point is merely
that these assumptions are plausible, perhaps even likely. We know that
advocacy has some public-good aspects, and we know that free riding
happens to some extent in the world. If people act enough like this
model, total pro-incarceration advocacy will still decline.
The existence of this plausible scenario is a sufficient rebuttal to the
simple anti-privatization claim that privatization does increase proincarceration advocacy. (The “anything goes” models presented later
on,184 in which the effect of privatization on advocacy is ambiguous, further rebut the claim.) This possible scenario also points up a potential
irony in the position of some incarceration opponents who, so as to avoid
“reinforc[ing] the incarceration boom by introducing the profit motive
into incarceration,”185 would make common cause with public prison
guard unions, who concededly are active lobbyists for incarceration.186
D. Why Focus on Public Sector Unions and Private Firms?
This and the next few sections elaborate on some curlicues of the
theory. They are important, but the reader who is only interested in the
broad view may skip this and the following section and go to the next
Part.
One might ask, at this point, why I have focused primarily on two
apparently asymmetrical groups: The firms in the private sector and the
employees in the public sector. What about the employees of those
firms, or the employers of those public guards?
In principle, it’s unclear a priori who would want to lobby; a caseby-case analysis of the incentives of the various parties is necessary. In
this case, my choice of actors was inspired by the state of the evidence
and the debate: Public prison guard unions, especially in California, are
known to engage in pro-incarceration advocacy; and private prison firms
are alleged to do so. But let us think about this theoretically anyway.
1. Employee Advocacy
First, the workers. If workers are acting independently, the collective action problem is especially acute. No single worker has enough of
a stake in the system to benefit from spending resources on advocacy to
184
185
186

See text accompanying notes 242–255, 292–293 infra.
See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 21.
See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 21.
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help his industry. We should only expect workers to be a significant political force if they can enforce some sort of collective action. Industrial
organization theorists and game theorists surmise that businesses, when
they are in it for the long haul,187 cooperate by threatening to punish anyone who deviates from the desired cooperative action. (I explain this at
greater length below in the section on cooperation.188) Workers can do
the same thing through a system of social ostracism or informal sanctions
for non-cooperative behavior,189 or by rewarding cooperative behavior
with non-public benefits.190 But they can more easily enforce cooperative behavior by requiring membership in or contribution to a union,
which would lobby out of union dues.191
This is a sufficient explanation for why private prison guards, who
aren’t unionized in most states,192 haven’t been observed lobbying.193
Note, though, that when a strong union does exist, it is not surprising to
see it lobbying for the welfare of its industry; this is probably what happened when the United Mine Workers of America joined the coalition
challenging EPA’s ozone and particulate matter standards in Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’ns.194
187

What, in the biz, is called an “infinitely repeated game.”
See text accompanying notes 215–235 infra.
See, e.g., NEWSIES (Walt Disney Pictures et al. 1992) (combination of shame and violence);
MATEWAN (Cinecom Entertainment Group et al. 1987); ÉMILE ZOLA, GERMINAL, pt.5, chh.3–4, at
317–336 (Garnier-Flammarion 1968) (1885); E.P. THOMPSON, Rough Music, in CUSTOMS IN COMMON 467, 519–21 (1991).
190
See OLSON, supra note 28, at 72–73 (unions offer selective incentives like insurance, seniority privileges, or preferential treatment in handling grievances).
191
See OLSON, supra note 28, at 71 (“Compulsory membership and picket lines are . . . of the
essence of unionism.”); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 511 (1991) (“Michigan’s
Public Employment Relations Act . . . which applies to faculty members of a public educational
institution in Michigan, permits a union and a government employer to enter into an ‘agency-shop’
arrangement under which employees within the bargaining unit who decline to become members of
the union are compelled to pay a ‘service fee’ to the union.”); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 211 (1977) (similar); CAL. GOV’T CODE §3502.5 (authorizing agency shop agreements);
Memo. of Understanding, Bargaining Unit 6, Agreement Between State of California and California
Correctional Peace Officers Association, effective 7/1/99 through 7/2/01, §3.02, http://www.dpa.ca.
gov/collbarg/contract/Unit06contract99.htm (establishing agency shop); see also Robert G. Gregory
& Jeff Borland, Recent Developments in Public Sector Labor Markets, in 3C HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 3573, 3586–87 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (discussing why unionization may be more widespread in the public than in the private sector).
192
See SHICHOR, supra note 20, at 198; Dolovich, supra note 17, at 501.
193
There are two related effects at work here. Non-unionized workers probably (1) find it hard
to organize for lobbying purposes and (2) find it hard to organize for wage purposes (which means
they’re probably making market wages). If they could organize, they would be able to lobby effectively, and moreover, their wages would be higher, which would make them want to lobby. Mere
effectiveness at lobbying doesn’t create the will to lobby: You need to have some benefit to lobby
for. If a worker could (if unemployed) quickly find another job paying the same, he wouldn’t care as
much about lobbying for job security as a worker who (because he is making above-market wages)
would have a hard time finding another job as good.
194
See Pet. for a Writ of Cert., Browner v. Am. Trucking Assn’s, 519 U.S. 457 (2000), at ii,
2000 WL 33979605; see also Br. of the Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths,
Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO, & the Elec. Reliability Coordinating Council as Amici Curiae in
(continued next page)
188
189
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As I have explained above,195 I follow a good chunk of the economic
literature on unions in assuming that unions represent their members and
seek to maximize total union rents—the difference between union and
non-union wages, times the size of the public sector. The prediction that
such unions would seek to increase the size of their sector is straightforward: A larger sector may mean a more powerful union and therefore
potentially higher wages, benefits, or job security down the road (and
perhaps—to introduce agency costs for a moment—perks for union officials196).
On the other hand, what if the extra prisoners make workers worse
off because they’re not accompanied by compensating wage increases or
more staff? This could be why some unions argue against incarceration,197 but it doesn’t appear to be a significant concern.
Nationwide, entry-level corrections officers’ real wages held roughly
constant over 2001–04.198 This entry-level data may not tell us the whole
story about the full range of corrections officers’ wages, but the idea that
corrections officers’ unions are strong enough in many states to get compensating wage hikes for their members is also plausible from anecdotal
evidence199 and imperfect statistics.200
Support of Resp., Envt’l Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 05-848, 2006 WL 2689786 (U.S. filed
Sept. 15, 2006).
195
See text accompanying notes 161–163 supra.
196
See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 161, at 380–81 (“Some commentators criticize union leaders
for organizing new workers rather than attending to the needs of current members. Prestige accrues
to the fastest growing or largest unions, not always the most effective.” (footnote omitted)).
197
See text accompanying notes 62–65 supra.
198
The American Correctional Association’s Corrections Compendium surveys corrections officers’ salaries every few years. Entry-level corrections officers’ yearly salaries went up, on average, by 6% to 8% from 2001 to 2004, which—given a roughly 6.7% increase in the consumer price
index over that same period—translates into between a 1% drop and a 1% rise. (The range given
contains both the average and the median over states.) The salary numbers are taken from Staff
Hiring and Retention, CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, Mar. 2001, at 6, 8–11; Wages and Benefits—
Table 1: Salary Ranges and Options, CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, Jan. 2003, at 10–15; Correctional Officers—Table 2: Wages, CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, July/Aug. 2004, at 16–17. The
averages and medians were only calculated over states that reported salaries for both 2001 and 2004.
To make the salary figures comparable, I assumed 40 hours per week, 26 biweekly periods per year,
and 12 months per year. Where a range was given, I took the lower number in the range.
199
See, e.g., WYNNE, supra note 33, at 201–07 (prison guards’ effective use of strikes and
other job actions, such as “sick-outs, lock-ins, slowdowns, and speed-ups” to achieve their goals);
Falk, supra note 54, at 32 (California prison guards’ union used its clout to prevent all budget cuts,
“except in prison education and vocational training programs”); Prison Guard Clout Endures, supra
note 167, at 10 (“State agencies and employees are sharing the pain of Gov. Gray Davis’ attempt to
reduce a numbing $17-billion deficit. No, wait. That doesn’t include prison guards. In his new
budget Davis not only spares them from belt-tightening, he hikes their pay 33.76% over the next five
years. This shower of riches came four years after the guards union helped raise $2.3 million for
Davis’ first gubernatorial campaign . . . .”).
200
For instance, in Ohio, the inmate population has increased from 33,353 in 1991 to 44,270
from FY 1991 to FY 2005. See Ohio Dep’t of Rehabilitation & Correction, Fiscal Year Intake and
Population on July 1 (1972–2005), available at http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/Reports/reports18.
asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) (explaining a slight change in definitions in 1994). Meanwhile, staff(continued next page)
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As for corrections officer-to-inmate ratios, these did increase nationwide over 1996–2004, but only slightly,201 and in certain states the
ratios went down. In California, for instance, the ratio went down by
26%,202 so California guards don’t seem to have been hurt by increased
incarceration. The ratios went down by 22% in Delaware, 23% in New
Jersey, and 13% in New York.
2. Employer Advocacy
Now, let’s consider the employers. Some firms also run alternatives
to incarceration,203 so it is not obvious that they would advocate an increased emphasis on imprisonment.204 Still, they may benefit from the
other elements I have included in the term “incarceration”: increased illegalization, increased law enforcement, and longer sentences (once the
imprisonment decision has already been made).
Could increased incarceration, which also increases costs, harm private prison firms? Perhaps, but private firms have a built-in protection
against too much deterioration in their position: They don’t have to bid
ing levels increased from over 8739 in FY 1991 to 16,186 in FY 2001, and then dropped somewhat
to 14,282 in FY 2005, and the average annual wage at the DRC (this is more than just prison guards)
increased from $38,944 in FY 1994 to $60,482 in FY 2005. See OHIO DEP’T OF REHABILITATION &
CORRECTION, FISCAL YEAR 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 27, 29; OHIO DEP’T OF REHABILITATION &
CORRECTION, BRIDGING THE GAP: REHABILITATION TO REALITY, FISCAL YEAR 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 34. The Ohio annual reports are available at http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/Reports/reports2.
asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
201
These numbers, and the numbers reported in the next sentence, are taken from the charts in
front of AM. CORRECTIONAL ASS’N, 2005 DIRECTORY (67th ed.), and its predecessor volumes.
Nationwide, the average increase in the corrections officer-to-inmate ratio was 18%, and the median
over reporting states was 10%.
202
The range for California is actually 1996–2003; California didn’t report its number of corrections officers in 2004.
203
See, e.g., Cornell Cos., Inc., Adult Services: Community-Based Corrections Services, http://
www.cornellcompanies.com/page.cfm?ctid=1#community (last visited Oct. 20, 2006); GEO Group,
Inc., Fort Worth Community Corrections Facility, http://www.thegeogroupinc.com/northamerica.asp
?fid=100 (last visited Nov. 6, 2006); YEARBOOK: ADULT CORRECTIONS, supra note 166, at 91–92
(listing privately run community correctional facilities in Arizona, D.C., Florida, Maine, and North
Carolina); AN OVERVIEW OF THE COLORADO ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, http://www.state.
co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/lcsstaff/2001/research/01CriminalCorrections.htm, ch. 11, at 137 (Colo. Legis.
Council, Research Pub. No. 487) (26 of 32 community correctional facilities privately operated);
Private Options, in BEYOND BARS: CORRECTIONAL REFORMS TO LOWER PRISON COSTS AND REDUCE CRIME, http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/144/Private.html (Little Hoover Comm’n, Report No.
144, Jan. 1998) (listing privately run community correctional facilities in California).
204
See also LOGAN, supra note 23, at 160–61 (“Because commercial enterprises survive and
prosper by accurately anticipating and responding to shifts in demand, we should not assume that
correctional corporations will always be motivated to lobby for expansion of high-security facilities.
Such corporations can be expected to diversify both within and outside of corrections. . . . Right
now, there is a genuine unmet demand for imprisonment. However, if the demand for alternatives to
prison increases, commercial companies should be able to respond rapidly to such a shift. One INS
detention contractor, for example, also provides (and aggressively markets) electronic monitoring
services as an alternative to jail.”).
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on a contract unless they anticipate making enough profit. Still, the extent of private firms’ benefit from increasing the market depends on how
profitable they are. In the extreme textbook perfect competition case, all
firms make zero economic profit and are indifferent between expanding
their presence in their industry and any other use of their funds. The less
competitive an industry is, the more profit it makes and the more it
would want to increase the pie.
What about the public employers, the Departments of Corrections?
As noted above,205 with some exceptions,206 Departments of Corrections
generally favor alternatives to incarceration. This makes some sense:
While it is commonly thought that agencies want to aggrandize themselves,207 that intuition is only a special case of a more general belief that
agency officials act in their own self-interest208 and that their self-interest
tends to be aligned with the size and power of their agencies. And increasing prisoners without corresponding budget increases to match the
increasing cost of incarceration (a cost that of course includes corrections
officers’ salaries, as well as health care and other factors) can easily
make prison officials worse off.209
Moreover, DOCs run both prisons and many alternative programs, so
even if more inmates means more power for the DOC, it makes sense
that the DOC would want to handle those inmates in cheaper ways than
incarceration. Thus, it is not surprising to find prison systems arguing
for alternatives to incarceration in a time of tight budgets.

205

See text accompanying notes 68–78 supra.
See text accompanying note 67 supra.
207
See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
36–42 (1971).
208
See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 916, 932–34 (2005) (“empire-building” hypothesis is doubtful, and agency officials’ wellbeing isn’t systematically aligned with their department’s power).
209
We are past the days when county sherrifs were paid according to their jail counts. Wray,
supra note 23, at 6; see also LOGAN, supra note 23, at 217 (“In some counties today, the sheriffs are
allowed to keep for themselves any money not spent on food for prisoners. . . . [A 1945 article by
E.R. Cass described] the exploitation and corruption of jails run for profit on the fee system[, under
which the sheriff’s] ‘chief interest is to increase the population of the jail . . . .’” (quoting E.R. Cass,
Jails for Profit, 50 CORRECTIONS TODAY 84, 86 (1988) (originally published in 1945))); Schlosser,
supra note 7, at 64 (“New York State’s experience with the ‘fee system’ during the nineteenth century suggests that the temptation to [keep an inmate longer than necessary] is hard to resist.”). More
prisoners without more funding can also lead to political grief when combined with early-release
requirements imposed by court orders as a result of overcrowding. Cf. Sue Doyle, Proposal: Inmates to Serve 25% of Sentence, DAILY BREEZE (Torrance, Cal.), Aug. 21, 2006, at A1 (L.A. County
Sheriff had this problem with overcrowded county jails).
206
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E. Who Cooperates with Whom?
1. The Importance of Alternative Assumptions
All this talk of how the 10% firm acts and the profits of “the industry” assumes that the private sector, in deciding how much to spend on
advocacy, acts as a collective bloc and doesn’t cooperate210 with the public sector. This is possible, but it’s not the only possible story. I could
have made either of two other, more extreme assumptions. First, there
could be no cooperation at all—all the firms could be acting independently. Second, there could be total cooperation—all the firms could be
cooperating with each other and with the public sector. This section explores the implications of these alternative assumptions and tentatively
defends my decision to adopt the intermediate assumption of cooperation
within the private sector but not with the public sector; but in the end, the
different assumptions don’t significantly alter the bottom line.
If all firms act independently, the relevant shares are even less than
indicated above. In 1999, CCA had a bit over half the market, Wackenhut (now the GEO Group211) had about a quarter, Management & Training Corp. had about 5–8%, Cornell Corrections Inc. and Correctional
Services Corp. each had about 5–6%, CiviGenics, Inc. had about 2–3%,
and a handful of other firms had under 1%.212
So, while the average private sector share in State X may be 10%,
this number is irrelevant if all firms act independently. The relevant
shares may be, for instance, 6% for CCA, 2% for the GEO Group, 1%
for Management & Training Corp., and 1% for Cornell Corrections . . .
and 90% for the public sector. The assumption of independent firms
would make it even more likely that the public sector is the dominant
sector.
Now consider the opposite assumption—that everyone cooperates.
A single prison industry bloc would choose an optimal total amount to
210
“Cooperation,” I word I use here throughout, is what economists mean when they use the
uglier word “collusion.”
211
See note 102 supra.
212
These numbers are taken from two sources from 1999 (which is why the shares are expressed as ranges). See James R. Macdonald & Jaimi Goodfriend, FASC Industry Outlook: Offender
Management: 1999, http://www.lib.uwo.ca/business/prison1999.pdf, at 10 (First Analysis Securities
Corp., May 27, 1999); Stephen McFarland, Christ McGowan & Tom O’Toole, Prisons, Privatization, and Public Values, http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/PrisonsPrivatization.pdf, at 6
(Dec. 2002) (reprinting a table of market shares from Charles Thomas that is apparently otherwise
unavailable). Cornell has apparently grown since then. See Michael Brush, Company Focus: 3
Prison Stocks Poised to Break Out, http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/P105034.asp (Jan. 5, 2005)
(last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (reporting a 12% market share for Cornell). GEO has grown slightly.
See The GEO Group, Inc., Fast Facts About GEO, http://www.thegeogroupinc.com/facts.asp (last
visited Oct. 5, 2006) (28% share of U.S. market).
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maximize total industry benefit. Because the actors are still formally
separate, they would also choose some way to allocate the contributions
among themselves.
If the private industry had the same benefit per prison as the public
sector, then total cooperation would be indistinguishable from monopoly:
Because total industry benefit would be the same before and after privatization, the strategy that chooses contribution amounts to maximize that
benefit would likewise be the same.
However, as I argued above,213 private firms aren’t terribly profitable, while public sector unions have significant public sector wage premiums to protect. By replacing part of the public sector with a relatively
unprofitable private sector, privatization actually decreases the industry’s
total benefit. Therefore, even under total cooperation, there is less to
maximize; expenditures on pro-incarceration advocacy are thus less productive (just as if there were a tax rate on industry revenues); and so expenditures on advocacy still go down under privatization.214
2. The Empirical Path?
How can we tell which form of cooperation is most likely? Unfortunately, direct observation of the world is of limited use here. For instance, suppose we can’t find any explicit cooperation on advocacy.
This doesn’t matter: The cooperation at issue here may just be tacit. If
cooperation is beneficial, then firms may independently understand the
“game” they’re playing with other firms and figure out their optimal
strategy. The outcome may then appear as if it were the result of explicit
coordination; but in fact, this “cooperative” behavior would have just
213

See text accompanying notes 157–169 supra.
Note an important difference between the total cooperation case and the other two cases (no
cooperation or private-sector cooperation). In the other cases, the “largest” actor does all the advocacy, and “largest” is determined by both per-prison benefits and industry shares. For example, even
if per-prison profits were identical between the public and private sectors, a 10% actor would freeride off a 90% actor because the absolute amount of the benefits differ. (This implies that there is an
“optimal” amount of privatization if you want to minimize pro-incarceration advocacy. In this example, where per-prison profits are identical between sectors, that level is 50%; and even if perprison benefits differed, like if the private benefit were only one-half the public benefit, that optimal
level would be 67%.) But in the total cooperation case, it is only per-prison benefits that matter. For
example, suppose per-prison benefits are the same—say $100—and there are 100 prisons. Then,
under monopoly public provision, total benefit is 100 × $100 = $10,000. Under a 10%–90% split,
total benefit is (10 × $100) + (90 × $100), which is exactly the same. Likewise, under a 20%–80%
split, total benefit is (20 × $100) + (80 × $100)—again exactly the same. On the other hand, if private sector benefits are, say, $50, then a 10%–90% split reduces total benefit to (10 × $50) + (90 ×
$100) = $9500; a 20%–80% split reduces it still further to (20 × $50) + (80 × $100) = $9000; and so
forth. (This has a quite different implication for the “optimal” amount of privatization if you want to
minimize pro-incarceration advocacy: It is either 0% or 100%—all the weight should go on the
sector with the lowest per-prison benefits. Or, if the sectors have equal per-prison benefits, any split
is equivalent.)
214
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resulted from their correct expectations about their rivals’ behavior.215
(Recall the earlier discussion of “shared understandings” about who
would contribute what.216)
Conversely, suppose we observe the existence of the private prison
firms’ trade association, the Association of Private Correctional and
Treatment Organizations.217 This also doesn’t answer the question. It’s
true that trade associations may provide a forum for discussing common
lobbying strategies,218 but talk is cheap: Why should companies give
money to a coordinated advocacy campaign when it’s in their personal
interest to free-ride off each other? The primary question is still whether
cooperation is worthwhile for these prison industry actors. (This is why
many organizations exist but are ineffective.219) The trade association
may make it worthwhile for its member firms by offering “selective incentives” to those who pay sufficient dues to support cooperative levels
of lobbying.220 APCTO, for instance, has different tiers of membership,
and offers full members—who pay between $2000 and $30,000, depending on their revenues—voting rights.221 But APCTO does not seem to
fulfill much of a lobbying or advocacy coordination function, since firms
do all their own lobbying and most of their own advocacy.222
But if observing the presence or absence of explicit cooperation
doesn’t answer the question, what about observing lobbying behavior?
All the major firms do some advocacy;223 doesn’t the previous model
predict that, absent some cooperation, they would all free-ride off of the
215
“Legal scholars have traditionally distinguished between explicit and tacit collusion. The
law punishes the former, so that the act of communication is of central importance. For economists,
however, this distinction has no meaning. In game theory models of collusion, the term ‘agreement’
does not imply a formal communication—all that is needed is for the cartel members to have an
‘understanding’ of how others will react to their behavior. Such shared beliefs—whether acquired
tacitly or not—can support a self-enforcing, collusive equilibrium.” Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish:
A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295, 296–27 (1987) (footnotes
omitted).
216
See text accompanying note 142 supra.
217
See Ass’n of Private Correctional & Treatment Orgs., APCTO, http://www.apcto.org/ (last
visited Sept. 21, 2006).
218
Coordinating industry lobbying strategies doesn’t violate antitrust law. See, e.g., E. R.R.
Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
219
Cf. OLSON, supra note 28, at 36 & n.54 (collective action theory would “tend to explain the
continual complaints that international organizations and alliances are not given adequate (optimal)
amounts of resources”).
220
See OLSON, supra note 28, at 132–39; MOE, supra note 144, at 28–29.
221
APCTO, Become a Member of APCTO, http://apcto.org/membership/join.html (last visited
Oct. 27, 2006).
222
See text accompanying notes 93, 102–104 supra, note 223 infra.
223
See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at 9 (in 1998, CCA, with 56% of the private prison
market, gave $353,106; Cornell Corrections, Inc., with 6% of the market, gave $110,575; Correctional Services Corp., with 5% of the market, gave $34,378; and Wackenhut Corrections Corp., with
22% of the market, gave $33,325); PRICE, supra note 23, at 74 (both CCA and Wackenhut involved
with ALEC).
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public sector, or off of CCA, the largest firm? Alas, no. True, we don’t
observe everyone totally free-riding. But as I noted above,224 they may
all be lobbying for privatization, which has a strong private-good component, since a firm’s contributions may increase the probability that it
gets a project in the future.225
3. The Theoretical Path
To answer the question of how cooperation works (if at all) in proincarceration lobbying, I return to theory. I have already mentioned the
possibility that a trade association could offer selective incentives to
members to overcome the private firms’ collective action problem. If
this happens, that would support the theory that private firms cooperate
with each other but don’t cooperate with the public sector; but as I noted
above, this doesn’t seem to be empirically relevant in the prison case.226
But sticks may be more important than carrots here. Game theorists
have long theorized that, even if the only equilibrium of a game is noncooperative—say, the well known Prisoners’ Dilemma—repetition of the
game can lead to cooperative behavior.227 In particular, when a game is
infinitely repeated (or when the number of periods is unknown), the
players can maintain cooperative behavior by threatening to punish noncooperative players in future periods. This can explain why firms in an
oligopolistic industry may cooperate (i.e., collude) to charge high
prices.228 The industrial organization literature mostly discusses cooperation between actors who sell products in markets, rather than auctions,
which is how private prison firms compete; but there is also a literature
on how cooperation can be maintained in auctions.229
224

See text accompanying note 182 supra.
This wouldn’t happen if auctions were nondiscretionary, for instance if they were required
to accept the lowest bid. But because governments have the flexibility to reject a low bid where a
higher bid proposes more and better services, or where they have their doubts as to the trustworthiness of the bidder, see HARDING, supra note 88, at 75–79, there are enough “soft factors” that a
firm’s contributions may make a difference in whether it wins a bid.
226
See text accompanying notes 217–222 supra.
227
See, e.g., James W. Friedman, A Non-Cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames, 38 REV.
ECON. STUD. 1, 4–8 (1971).
228
Such a strategy can work as long as anyone’s gain from deviating is less than the loss from
the future punishment. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 245–61
(1988) (also discussing other ways of supporting collusion, for instance the presence of price rigidities or the desire to maintain a reputation for friendly behavior). For a discussion of threats other
than the simple (and expensive for the punisher) “trigger” strategy of reverting to competitive behavior forever, see Ayres, supra note 215, at 306–12.
229
See PAUL KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 28–29 & nn.75–77 (2004); Martin Pesendorfer, A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions, 67 REV. ECON. STUD. 381, 384–88
(2000); Jean-Jacques Laffont, Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data,
41 EUR. ECON. REV. 1, 25–26 (1997); Paul Klemperer, Bidding Markets 16–22 & 18 n.61, http://
papers.ssrn.com/soL3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=776524 (June 2005); Andreas Blume & Paul Heid(continued next page)
225
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Cooperation-forcing threats can take many forms. For instance,
firms in an industry can tell each other, “Charge monopoly prices, and
reduce your output to the monopoly level, and I’ll do the same. But if
anyone tries to undercut me, we’ll revert to competitive pricing and output decisions forever, where no one will make a profit.” Or, even without saying it, they can follow this strategy as a matter of shared understandings. This will work if the threatened loss from future competitive
pricing is greater than the one-period benefit from undercutting.230
If some firm is extremely impatient—so it discounts future losses
very heavily and puts a lot of weight on the present—then it may not be
deterred. The same may happen if the punishment stage is far in the future; for instance, if competition only happens once every 10 years, it
will take a lot of future pain to outweigh the benefit of cheating on one’s
partners today. But if competition happens often, people aren’t too impatient, and the potential losses to defectors are large, the threat can be
effective.
This particular threat is painful to everyone in the industry—carrying
through with it means that even the punisher is punished—but its very
painfulness is what makes it effective and decreases the chance that it
will ever be used.231 But there are other threats that are less painful but
might still work in particular circumstances. For instance, the punishment period may last for only a set number of periods. Or the punishment may be limited in scope—“Let’s behave monopolistically, or else
I’ll start advertising at competitive levels.”232 “Or else I’ll cut you out of
the market by executing exclusive dealing contracts with your suppliers.”233 “Or else I’ll start undercutting you in some other market.”234
“Or else I’ll blow up your store.” The number of possible forms of punishment is limited only by firms’ ingenuity—and other firms’ ability to
converge on this shared understanding.

hues, Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions, http://www.pitt.edu/~ablume/images/tacit17.pdf (working paper, Sept. 2002) (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). On specific collusive mechanisms, see Daniel A.
Graham & Robert C. Marshall, Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1217, 1221 (1987); see also R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan,
Bidding Rings, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 579 (1992).
230
See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 400–05 (oligopoly behavior in an infinitely repeated game); TIROLE, supra note 228, at 245–46 (same); see also MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra, at
417–23 (more general “Folk theorem” for infinitely repeated games); TIROLE, supra, at 268–69
(same).
231
Such threats may also be more common in the price collusion case, where successful collusion requires 100% participation, than in the lobbying case, where the public good can be produced
(though not necessary at the optimal level) even if not everyone participates. See OLSON, supra note
28, at 42–43 (distinction between “exclusive” and “inclusive” collective goods).
232
See Ayres, supra note 215, at 306–07.
233
See Ayres, supra note 215, at 308–09.
234
See Ayres, supra note 215, at 311–12.
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Crucially, the punishment doesn’t need to be in the same form as the
defection. So how can prison firms enforce cooperative levels of campaign spending? They could threaten never to cooperate on campaign
spending anymore. This is a plausible threat, but whether it is effective
depends on how often political campaigns come around and how painful
non-cooperation is for the defecting firm. Another possibility—
assuming the firms were cooperating on the underlying prison bids before, for instance by segmenting the market among themselves—is to
threaten never to cooperate on prison bids again. This seems like a much
more painful threat, though as discussed before, it is also painful for the
punishers. Fortunately for private prison firms, there is any number of
intermediate conceivable punishments.
By contrast, public prison guard unions seem to have fewer ways of
punishing private firms. They don’t bid against each other in the underlying auctions, so they can’t threaten to end any cooperative behavior
there. They’re bitter political adversaries in the privatization advocacy
world, so again there seems to be no preexisting cooperation that can be
terminated. They can threaten to not cooperate any more in proincarceration advocacy, but this may not be a highly effective threat.235
For these reasons, I believe that cooperation among private prison
firms is more likely than either, on the one hand, totally non-cooperative
behavior or, on the other hand, totally cooperative behavior between the
public and private sectors. However, because the ultimate results under
any of the assumptions don’t differ that much, which assumption we
choose isn’t terribly important.
F. Allowing Money to Change Candidates’ Positions
So far, I have taken the political agenda as given: I didn’t explain
where the proposed reform came from. Thus, I’ve assumed that money
is important because it buys victory—for instance, by persuading voters
of the benefits of the policy or the merit of the candidate.236 But money
can also affect the agenda—by inducing candidates to change their
views, by inducing the sponsors of voter initiatives to propose a different
initiative than they otherwise would, and so on.
When money can affect the agenda (but the other assumptions are
unchanged), the analysis is essentially the same. Suppose you are considering whether to contribute to place a voter initiative on the ballot.
235
In this model, new contracts come up to bid every period, while lobbying only happens
once, at the beginning of the game; so this model rules out threats based on future lobbying behavior
by construction. But even if I were to include recurring opportunities for lobbying in the model,
they’d probably come up less often than opportunities to bid on contracts.
236
See MUELLER, supra note 138, at 478–79.
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The initiative is supported by some group or other, but for specificity,
let’s say it’s being sponsored by a politician.237 This politician may be
fairly pro-incarceration himself, but he is limited in how strict an initiative he can propose: He won’t prevail unless the median voter, whose
views control the outcome of the election,238 prefers his proposal over the
status quo. However, before the substance of the initiative is set in stone,
you can move him in a more pro-incarceration direction if—by offering
him money to pay for persuasive advertising—you offer him the possibility to also move the median voter.239
A monetary contribution has the following effects:
1. Electoral influence. As before, you benefit because your contribution directly increases the probability that the initiative prevails.
2. The contribution moves the substance of the initiative in a more
pro-incarceration direction. This has two effects, which cut in
opposite directions:
a. Substantive influence. You benefit if it prevails because the
policy is better for you. But:
b. Extremism. The initiative is somewhat less likely to prevail
because it may now be too harsh for the median voter.
As a prison provider thinking about how much to contribute, you follow
the same framework as before: You contribute until the benefit of an
extra dollar is worth $1 to you. The benefit of an extra dollar is more
complicated than it was in the earlier model—in addition to encompassing electoral influence, it now adds the benefit of substantive influence
and subtracts the cost of extremism—but the basic idea is the same.
Now suppose, again, that the industry is split up into a 90% sector
(them) and a 10% sector (you). As before, your competitor’s benefits go
down to 90% of their previous level, so he now wants to contribute until
the benefit of an extra dollar to the industry is worth $1.11.240 As before,
237
See, e.g., Michael Finnegan & Robert Salladay, Voters Reject Schwarzenegger’s Bid to Remake State Government, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at 1 (Gov. Schwarzenegger aggressively (but
unsuccessfully) pushed 4 initiatives “central to his larger vision” for reforming California politics);
Michael Finnegan, Props. 57, 58 Big Items in Homestretch, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, at 1 (Gov.
Schwarzenegger aggressively (and successfully) pushed 2 budget initiatives).
238
See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 138, at 85–86. In assuming a stable identity of the median
voter, I’m abstracting away from voter participation issues. See id. at 232–34 (discussing how voter
indifference and alienation may or may not affect outcomes).
239
See MUELLER, supra note 138, at 479; Richard Ball, Opposition Backlash and Platform
Convergence in a Spatial Voting Model with Campaign Contributions, 98 PUB. CHOICE 269, 273–
74, 279 (1999); Grossman & Helpman, supra note 143, at 273–74, 279.
240
This is not as obvious as it was in the previous models. It turns out that the electoral influence and extremism effects both tend to make the benefit of each additional dollar decrease. But the
substantive influence effect is ambiguous. Thus, the marginal benefit of advocacy expenditures is no
longer guaranteed to be downward-sloping over its whole range, so Figure 3 is not accurate for this
(continued next page)
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your competitor contributes less, because having only 90% of the industry is like facing a 10% tax on revenues. And as before, you free-ride off
of your competitor, because when you take his contribution level into
account, an extra dollar in the pot is no longer worthwhile to you.241
IV. SOME “ANYTHING GOES” MODELS
I have already hinted at a way in which privatization can have an
ambiguous effect. If we take both pro- and anti-incarceration advocacy
into account in the model of the previous Part, privatization decreases
pro-incarceration advocacy but has an ambiguous effect on antiincarceration advocacy. What this means normatively depends on one’s
attitude toward anti-incarceration advocacy. If one opposes proincarceration advocacy because the U.S. already has too much incarceration,242 then there’s nothing wrong, and perhaps everything right, with
advocacy in the other direction.

case. Nonetheless, for reasons explained below, see text accompanying note 291 infra, it turns out
that the largest actor’s contributions still fall.
241
This expanded model is still fairly easy because the opponent of the initiative is the status
quo, which, being the status quo, doesn’t act strategically. Things get more difficult if we instead
make this a race between two candidates. The substantive influence effect—your desire to make the
ultimate policy favor you, whoever wins—could make you contribute to both candidates simultaneously. Moreover, your contributions to one candidate can influence not only that candidate’s position but also that of his opponent. As a result, the marginal benefit of advocacy expenditures becomes quite a bit more complicated. See MUELLER, supra note 138, at 479–80. Nonetheless, the
qualitative result should be the same.
242
See, e.g., SARABI & BENDER, supra note 22, at v.
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On the other hand, if one opposes pro-incarceration advocacy because it is assumed243 to be self-interested, then perhaps antiincarceration advocacy is just as bad if it comes from boot camps, halfway houses, drug treatment providers, and other presumptively selfinterested parties.244
In this Part, I present two other models in which the effect of privatization is ambiguous. In section A, I relax the assumption that money is
fungible. In section B, I relax the assumption that privatization is exogenous. In both models, the effect of privatization cannot be determined a
priori; whether advocacy goes up or down depends on the facts.
A. Relaxing the Assumption of Fungible Money
Recall the main model presented in section III.A, in particular Figures 6 and 7. A monopoly provider would have spent $1 million on advocacy, but under a 90–10 split, the 90% provider is unwilling to spend
beyond the 900,000th dollar and the 10% provider is unwilling to spend
beyond the 300,000th dollar; and so total advocacy falls to $900,000,
with the larger provider spending everything and the smaller one spending nothing.
That model’s results—chiefly the result that the smaller-total-profit
sector totally free-rides off the efforts of the larger-total-profit sector—
were driven by the assumption that the probability of getting the change
in policy only depended on the total amount of money in the pot. All
advocacy was fungible. A dollar from a public actor had the same effect
as a dollar from a private firm. This is not an implausible assumption.
For instance, dollars are fungible in buying advertising, which increases
the probability of a change. A politician may adopt the view of whatever
“policy position” contributed the most to his war chest.

243

But see text accompanying notes 122–131 supra.
In Dolovich’s framework, punishment, which burdens one’s “urgent interests,” can only be
justified when “interests of equal or greater urgency” (such as, presumably, potential victims’ interests in safety) are served, and this balance must be struck “under fair deliberative conditions.”
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 515. Pro-incarceration advocacy violates this condition because it burdens people’s urgent interests (their interest in liberty) merely “in order that others might benefit
financially.” Id. at 515–16. Dolovich doesn’t make this point, but it seems that under her framework, self-interested anti-incarceration advocacy is equally problematic: The interests of potential
victims are sacrificed so that some (drug treatment providers) may benefit financially. Those victims’ interests would have been protected (through incarceration) under fair deliberative conditions,
so by hypothesis, they are of equal or greater urgency than the liberty interests of the people who are
no longer being incarcerated. The level of incarceration is thus unjustly low.
(One might argue that incarceration is currently too high, so self-interested anti-incarceration
advocacy at least pushes the system in the right direction; but Dolovich’s theory does not seem to
allow for using self-interested advocacy instrumentally in that way, nor does her discussion of the
parsimony principle take a position on whether incarceration is too high or too low.)
244
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On the other hand, some alternate assumptions may also be plausible. For example, one group might be attractive only to Democrats,
while another might be attractive only to Republicans.245 More generally, perhaps politicians are just sensitive to the variety of voices in a
coalition, feeling (rightly or wrongly) that having a wide variety of
groups shows that a policy has wide support. Then neither group’s contributions totally “crowd out” the other’s. Your 500,001st dollar still has
less benefit than your 500,000th dollar—there are still decreasing marginal returns—but (unlike in the previous model) it does not have the
same benefit as your first dollar added on to your competitor’s
500,000th.
As before, let us adopt an extreme assumption, though this assumption is the opposite of the previous one: The effectiveness of your dollars is entirely unrelated to how much money your competitor has spent.
This corresponds to the case where (for whatever reason) you are only
effective in lobbying for one sort of beneficial reform—say, Three
Strikes laws—while your competitor is only effective in lobbying for
another—say, decreasing diversion to drug treatment programs. Advocacy is still a public good, as before. But the results are not as stark as in
the previous model.
When you were a monopolist and both reforms—Proposition X and
Proposition Y—were on the agenda, you were willing to spend $1 million on each, for a total of $2 million. You divided your money optimally between them, so a dollar spent on either one returned a benefit of
$1.
Now, having been split up by the Antitrust Division, you have 10%
of the industry, and can only lobby effectively on Proposition X. Because your competitor captures 90% of the benefit of Proposition X if it
passes, you spend money on Proposition X until an extra dollar returns a
benefit of $5. Call this amount $300,000.
Meanwhile, your competitor, with 90% of the industry, is busy lobbying for Proposition Y. Because you capture 10% of that benefit, he
spends money on Proposition Y until an extra dollar returns a benefit of
$1.11. Call this amount $900,000.
The split-up of the industry, and the resulting (partial) free riding, is
responsible for reducing the previous amount of lobbying—$2 million—
down to a total of $1.2 million (just like, in the previous model, the 9010 split was responsible for bringing $1 million of lobbying down to
245
This is a made-up example; it doesn’t apply to prison advocacy, where both the California
prison guards union and private prison firms give to both Republicans and Democrats. See SARABI
& BENDER, supra note 22, at 13; Talvi, supra note 101; CJCJ, supra note 37; Pollak, supra note 58
(the New Jersey State PBA tends to give to incumbents, including Democratic Gov. Florio and Republican Gov. Whitman).

DRAFT—DO NOT CITE

11/9/2006]

PRIVATIZATION & POLITICAL ADVOCACY

61

$900,000). In this example, the larger actor gives more, but that needn’t
be the case, since there’s no reason to believe that both actors are equally
effective in their advocacy. What if either private firms or public unions
are particularly incompetent lobbyists or political strategists? All we can
say is that increasing an actor’s industry share tends to increase his contribution.
In this context, privatization has two effects. First, it increases the
share of the private sector, so private sector advocacy goes up. Second,
it decreases the share of the public sector, so public sector advocacy goes
down. We can’t say anything a priori about whether the first effect outweighs the second. If we know some facts about public- or privatesector advocacy—for instance, if one sector is just completely unpersuasive, while the other sector is slick and sympathetic246—then we can hazard some predictions, but we can’t say anything without such empirical
facts.
As noted above, this was an extreme assumption—and I pulled the
assumption of two separable reforms out of a hat—but there are intermediate assumptions that yield the same result—that privatization makes
private lobbying go up and public lobbying go down. Unless we can be
specific about how different groups’ advocacy has different effects and
how effective the groups are, it is impossible to say whether prison privatization increases or decreases self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy.
B. Strong and Weak Unions and Industries
Let us return to the point I made above that an industry’s effectiveness at advocacy is relevant to its “real” share for purposes of this analysis.247 For instance, if you, with a 10% share, are twice as slick a lobbyist than your competitor—and than the industry before the breakup—
meaning that your marginal dollars produce twice the benefit, you will
act as though your share was 20%.
We can’t say a priori which way this cuts: It’s not clear which sector
is more effective at lobbying in favor of incarceration. The CCPOA, as
we’ve seen,248 is highly effective, but corrections officers’ unions are
much less active outside of California, and perhaps this is because they
are less effective. It’s hard to say how effective private prison firms
would be at lobbying in favor of incarceration, since, as we’ve seen,
there’s little evidence that they do this at all.249

246

See text accompanying note 247 infra.
See text accompanying note 145 supra.
248
See text accompanying notes 34–44 supra.
249
See text accompanying notes 87–121 supra.
247
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But let us suppose that one’s effectiveness at lobbying for incarceration is correlated with one’s effectiveness at lobbying for (or against)
privatization. For simplicity’s sake, let us suppose that they are perfectly
correlated. Consider the states with high levels of privatization. By simple observation, we may conclude that, obviously, those states’ correctional officers’ unions were not effective at opposing privatization; the
industry was just too strong for them. When that relatively “weak” public sector was partly displaced by a relatively “strong” private sector, a
weak pro-incarceration voice was similarly displaced by a strong proincarceration voice. Pro-incarceration advocacy, then, may plausibly
have increased.250
Similarly, consider the states with low levels of privatization, like
California (1.8% private in 2004), or no privatization at all, like New
York or Rhode Island.251 The unions in those states, on this view, must
have been stronger than the industry, or else we would see privatization
there now. If privatization were introduced, total advocacy would go
down; but privatization is unlikely to be introduced there, so we won’t
see that happen.
This is a story where—contrary to my implicit assumption so far—
privatization is endogenous: The states where privatization has gained a
foothold aren’t randomly chosen; rather, privatization emerges where
prison guard unions are weak. Thus, past privatization may have, on
balance, increased pro-incarceration advocacy. Eliminate prison privatization, and you reestablish the rule of the ineffective prison guard unions—to the benefit of those who oppose pro-incarceration advocacy.
It’s a powerful story, but it requires more fleshing out. For one
thing, low-privatization states need not be high-union-strength states.
While antipathy to privatization and the strength of public sector unions
are probably correlated, a very Blue state may plausibly oppose privatization even if, for whatever reason, its unions were weak.
Moreover, it’s not clear that this argument counsels against privatization generally. It may, instead, tell us to oppose privatization where it’s
widespread252 but to endorse it where it’s low or non-existent,253 on the
“balance of power” theory that the private sector should be strengthened
where unions are strong but weakened where unions are weak.
Or, perhaps, the policy recommendation may be indeterminate:
Suppose the equilibrium we observe today already reflects the victory of
the stronger party in each state. Then—under the assumption that the
250

I am grateful to Margo Schlanger and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci for this point.
See PRISONERS IN 2004, supra note 147, at 6 tbl.7.
252
For instance, in the high-privatization states listed in note 150 supra.
253
For instance, in the low-privatization states listed in note 149 supra, or in the noprivatization states listed in PRISONERS IN 2004, supra note 147, at 6 tbl.7.
251
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effectiveness of pro-incarceration advocacy is perfectly correlated with
the effectiveness of pro- or anti-privatization advocacy—proincarceration advocacy is already as high as it can get. Adding a thumb
to the privatization scales in either direction would tend to support the
victory of an otherwise weaker party and would therefore reduce the total
amount of pro-incarceration advocacy.
Most importantly, though, this line of argument depends on the empirical—and contestable—assertion that actors in the prison industry are
similarly effective in the privatization debate as in the incarceration debate.
Perhaps this is true—one’s effectiveness at advocacy probably depends on one’s general characteristics, like goodwill, persuasiveness, and
slickness. But perhaps the correlation is weak. The incarceration debate
is peopled by different interest groups than the privatization debate. For
instance, prosecutors, police officers, victims’ rights groups, and rural
communities are interested in incarceration policy254 but not so much in
privatization policy. Conversely, prison privatization is a matter of interest even to interest groups without a direct interest in prisons, like generalized public employee unions or small-government advocates, who assume (probably sensibly enough) that a victory for privatization anywhere is a victory for the general privatization movement. Moreover, the
appeal of incarceration arguments, which connect to fears of drugs and
crime and concerns over civil liberties, seems to have a very different
source than the appeal of privatization arguments, which relate to taxes,
spending, and the effectiveness of government services.
We are back, then, to a general state-by-state analysis. In the first set
of models—where the effectiveness of advocacy only depended on the
total amount of money in the pot—everything was driven by the “largest” actor, where “largest” also takes effectiveness into account. I have
given arguments above as to why the private sector is currently probably
the smaller actor.255 The “slickness adjustment” described here might
change that in some places, but it is an empirical question. Similarly, in
the terms of the “anything goes” model, privatization will still have the
effect of increasing the private sector’s advocacy but decreasing that of
the public sector. The slickness adjustment may change the de facto
shares of the different sectors, but it doesn’t change the qualitative result.
Anything still goes.

254
255

See note 26 supra.
See text accompanying notes 146–171 supra.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article is not a brief for or against privatization, in prisons or
elsewhere. It takes no position on whether private providers are sufficiently accountable, whether privatization decreases cost or increases
quality,256 whether lower costs (if real) are even desirable,257 whether
privatizing certain functions like imprisonment is invalid because these
functions are inherently public,258 or any of the other arguments in the
literature.259 (Nor do I explore whether the advocacy problem could be
addressed in other ways, for instance by direct controls on advocacy260—
though I have, I suppose, tacitly assumed that such controls will not be
effective.261) This Article’s only goal is to point out the inadequacies in
the current formulation of the political influence argument against privatization.
My opinion, based on the above models, is that privatization will
probably not worsen the political influence problem, and may alleviate it.
The public goods model seems to describe many situations of political
advocacy fairly well. The assumption of the first model—that the probability of getting a policy change only depends on the total amount
spent—likewise seems to describe many situations, like initiative or election campaigns.
There’s always room for more realistic theories—for instance, my
analysis of what motivated the public-sector union was somewhat speculative; in assuming that private prison firms were profit-maximizing, I
suppressed any analysis of agency costs within the firm; and my back-of256

See note 16 supra.
See White, supra note 87, at 145 (“in a society that claims a basis in rule of law norms, it is
probably always a good thing for the state to wage its . . . wars against its citizens . . . in an obvious
and maximally costly way”).
258
See, e.g., John J. DiIulio, What’s Wrong with Private Prisons, PUB. INTEREST, Summer
1988, at 66, 82 (“‘employing the force of the community’ via private penal management undermines
the moral writ of the community itself”).
259
See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 17, at 518–23 (prison officials can affect time served through
disciplinary procedures and recommendations to parole boards).
260
See Rosky, supra note 6, at 955–56 (whether privatization or political influence is easier to
control is an uncertain empirical question).
261
See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (corporations have
First Amendment rights); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), et sua progenies (First Amendment
rights include political advocacy); LOGAN, supra note 23, at 159 (“We cannot prevent ‘lobbying’
(though it may not always be called that) by nonprofit organizations, government agencies, public
employee unions, or commercial companies, any of whose agenda may or may not coincide with the
public interest.”); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, House Passes Limit on Cash for Groups in Campaigns, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006, at A21 (quoting a Republican opponent of a campaign finance bill comparing
campaign finance restrictions to “whack-a-mole”). But see Paul Guppy, Private Prisons and the
Public Interest: Improving Quality and Reducing Cost Through Competition, http://www.
washingtonpolicy.org/ConOutPrivatization/PBGuppyPrisonsPublicInterest.html (Wash. Pol’y Ctr.,
Pol’y Br., Feb. 2003) (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (campaign finance laws are an “obvious,” “simple
and effective way[] to prevent corruption of the law-making process).
257
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the-envelope estimate of the benefit of incarceration to the different sectors was just that—a back-of-the-envelope estimate. Nor have I entertained the possibility that, when privatization is on the agenda, prison
system actors spend more resources fighting over that, which might
crowd out pro-incarceration advocacy.262 So my specific conclusions
here are tentative.
But what is not tentative is that this sort of analysis is necessary if
one is to make the political influence argument properly. General assumptions will not do. As Mancur Olson (somewhat hyperbolically) observed over 40 years ago—in a seminal work, The Logic of Collective
Action, that rewards reading even today—“the customary view that
groups of individuals with common interests tend to further those common interests appears to have little if any merit.”263 Critics of privatization who have charged that privatization has increased (or will increase,
or runs a substantial risk of increasing) pro-incarceration advocacy have
not explained what it is about the lobbying world that would make this
happen.
More important than any specific model in this paper is the negative
point264 that even if the privatization critics are right, it is unclear why
they are right, for their point is not obvious. The proof that their point is
not obvious is that under one set of plausible assumptions about human
behavior and the effectiveness of advocacy, privatization decreases such
advocacy, and under another set of plausible assumptions, privatization
has an ambiguous effect.
There are a few ways for the critics to support their view. There is
the empirical route: If one can observe hard evidence of private sector
pro-incarceration advocacy, and if one can observe that total advocacy,
or the effectiveness of total advocacy, has increased as privatization has
increased, then one can argue strongly for a presumptive causal relation
between privatization and pro-incarceration advocacy.
The better routes—available even without hard evidence—wed the
empirical with the theoretical: One can argue that privatization increases
pro-incarceration advocacy by spelling out a set of assumptions under
which this would happen and then arguing that those assumptions are
more plausible than alternative assumptions. When there is hard empirical evidence, that evidence is itself the best argument for the plausibility
262
There were no resource constraints in the models above—the effectiveness of advocacy
wasn’t assumed to depend on whether there was any other advocacy out there (the public or politicians didn’t have limited attention spans), and prison system actors were assumed to be able to make
any positive-net-expected-value investment (capital markets were liquid).
263
See OLSON, supra note 28, at 2.
264
Cf. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81–86 (3d ed.
1950) (“The Process of Creative Destruction”).
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of the supporting assumptions. When the evidence is of the “maybe,
maybe not” variety, then the argument must proceed more circumstantially.
In any event, because theoretically privatization may have an ambiguous effect on pro-incarceration advocacy—and under some assumptions may decrease it—those whose argument hinges on the view that
privatization will increase it must do the theoretical work, empirical
work, or both to convince the rest of us.
The same sort of analysis that I have conducted here on the prison
industry can also be used to evaluate the claim that, say, defense contractors will exacerbate pro-war lobbying. Since governmental providers of
defense services—i.e., armies—have, on some accounts, been notorious
pro-war lobbyists throughout history,265 such a claim is not credible
unless one can tell a plausible story about why any defense contractor
lobbying won’t crowd out some lobbying by the military itself, and doing
this requires taking a position on what motivates the people at the Pentagon.266 The same goes for private attorneys general, private redevelopment corporations, and the like. The result won’t always be the same,
and the political influence argument may turn out to be correct in some
of these cases.267 But this should be the structure of the argument.
265
See JAMES CARROLL, HOUSE OF WAR: THE PENTAGON AND THE DISASTROUS RISE OF
AMERICAN POWER 499 (2006) (“[A]rguments for preventive war had defined the culture of the
Pentagon since right after World War II, with Leslie Groves being the first to make them. Over the
years, not even the Soviet nuclear arsenal inhibited many senior American military officials from
making the case for first attack—even in the teeth of the Cuban Missile Crisis.”); JAMES F. SCHNABEL, POLICY AND DIRECTION: THE FIRST YEAR 370–74 (U.S. Army in the Korean War, Maurice
Matloff gen. ed., 1972) (Douglas MacArthur made public statements adopting a more hawkish line
with respect to China and Korea than the Truman Administration); SAMUEL E. FINER, THE MAN ON
HORSEBACK: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS 74 (1962) (British military helped push Britain into World War I); id. at 107 (“In 1955, the [Soviet] military opposed Malenkov on two important counts: his apparent intention to turn from heavy industry to consumer goods and his pessimism
about the effects of nuclear war.”). But see CARROLL, supra, at 501–03 (dissenting voices in the
Pentagon); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 69 (1957) (“The military man
normally opposes reckless, aggressive, belligerent action. If war with a particular power is inevitable at a later date with decreased chances of success, the military man may favor ‘preventive war’ in
order to safeguard national security. . . . [But] generally war should not be resorted to except as a
final recourse, and only when the outcome is a virtual certainty. . . . Thus, the military man rarely
favors war. . . . Accordingly, the professional military man contributes a cautious, conservative,
restraining voice to the formulation of state policy.”).
266
See, e.g., SEYMOUR MELMAN, PENTAGON CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR
8 (1970) (“[T]he operation of Vietnam war policies by the federal government [does not benefit an
important segment of U.S. industrial corporations, but] is quite consistent with the maintenance and
extension of decision-power by the new industrial management centered in the Department of Defense—for the management of the Vietnam war has been the occasion of major enlargement of
budgets, facilities, manpower, capital investment and control over an additional million Americans
in the labor force and more than one-half million additional Americans in the armed forces.”).
267
In particular, I suspect that privatization that displaces public provision will likely displace
public lobbying, while privatization that supplements public provision will likely supplement public
lobbying. Private attorneys general seem to fit more easily into the latter case, while private military
contractors or prison firms seem to fit more easily into the former case (despite the possibility that
(continued next page)
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One may object at this point that I have not exonerated private prisons with my economistic legerdemain.268 Rather, I have only shown that
the entire system is corrupt,269 and perhaps I have unwittingly demonstrated that the only way out of this mess is to reject the “interest group
model of politics” entirely as it applies to criminal justice policy.270
Fair enough. If I have been correct in assuming in this Article that
self-interested pro-incarceration lobbying is undesirable, then perhaps the
system is corrupt.271 But how does this observation translate into an argument against prison privatization? It’s not enough to show that private
prisons are part of the problem: Removing one problem isn’t guaranteed
to make things better when there are other problems around. As the
models above have suggested, even if all this political advocacy is illegitimate, the existence of the private sector reduces the activity of the
public sector and may reduce total activity; eliminating the private sector
would thus exacerbate the problems of the public sector.272
Nor is it just economists who oppose making the best the enemy of
the good: As Rawls (no economist he) teaches, the analyst who makes
specific policy recommendations in our fallen world—not in the idealized world of “strict compliance” with the principles of justice that characterizes a “well-ordered society”273—is acting in the realm of “nonideal
reduced costs also increase incarceration, see White, supra note 87, at 137; note 257 supra and accompanying text, that reduced costs increase incarceration).
268
Cf. Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 956 F.2d 321, 324
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (“statistical legerdemain”); id. at 327 (“bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo”); STAR WARS:
EPISODE I—THE PHANTOM MENACE (Lucasfilm Ltd. 1999) (“You think you’re some kind of Jedi,
waving your hand around like that? . . . [M]ind tricks don’t work on me.”).
269
See Dolovich, supra note 17, at 532 (“the problem is more widespread than previously recognized”).
270
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 543.
271
Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, III.i.89, 97–98, 104, in WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: THE COMPLETE WORKS 855, 876 (Alfred Harbage gen. ed., Viking 1969) (“A plague a both
your houses!”); STEPHEN SONDHEIM, SWEENEY TODD: THE DEMON BARBER OF FLEET STREET 94
(1979) (“They all deserve to die!”).
272
Economists know this as the theory of the second best. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 167 (John P. Bonin & Hélène Bonin trans., rev. ed. 1988) (“If n
distortions (where n 2) exist, we cannot claim that the competitive equilibrium with n–1 distortions
is preferable to the competitive equilibrium with n distortions . . . . The results obtained in secondbest analysis may contradict the economist’s intuition developed in the first-best analysis.”); R.G.
Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956–57)
(“in a situation in which there exist many constraints which prevent the fulfillment of the [Paretian]
optimum conditions, the removal of any one constraint may affect welfare or efficiency either by
raising it, by lowering it, or by leaving it unchanged”); see also Barenaked Ladies, Second Best, on
EVERYTHING TO EVERYONE (Reprise 2003); SECOND BEST (Keep Your Head et al. 2004) (starring
Joe Pantoliano); SECOND BEST (Regency Enters. et al. 1994) (starring William Hurt).
273
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 8 (1971); see also Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate
Punishment in Liberal Democracy 307, 324 (2004) (discussing “partial compliance”).
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theory,” which asks how the “long-term goal” dictated by ideal theory
“might be achieved, or worked toward, usually in gradual steps. It looks
for policies and courses of action that are morally permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be effective.”274
Because nonideal theory requires that we ask about the real-world
effectiveness of any reform, merely observing undesirable lobbying by
the private sector will not support an argument against prison privatization unless, say, privatization actually increases “the danger of . . . corrupting influence”275 or “compromise[s] further the possibility of legitimate punishment.”276
If it turns out that privatization actually reduces pro-incarceration
lobbying—if, with privatization, prisoners’ sentences are less influenced
by improper factors than they otherwise would be—it is unclear that
there is any “tension between the state’s use of private prisons and the
demands of” liberal legitimacy.277 If “private prisons are by no means
unique,”278 and if any prison provider, public or private, will lobby for
incarceration, any “tension” has nothing to do with private prisons and
everything to do with the crooked timber of humanity.279
*

*

*

At least with respect to prisons, the surprising moral of this story
should not be that surprising. From their inception, the antitrust laws
were justified in part as a means to reduce the political influence of corporations: William Howard Taft wrote, shortly after their enactment,
that “business methods and plans . . . directed to . . . suppressing competition . . . had resulted in the building of great and powerful corporations
which had, many of them, intervened in politics and through use of cor274
See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 89–90 (1999) (“To this point we have been concerned with ideal theory. . . . Nonideal theory asks how this long-term goal might be achieved, or
worked toward, usually in gradual steps. It looks for policies and courses of action that are morally
permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be effective. So conceived, nonideal theory
presupposes that ideal theory is already on hand. For until the ideal is identified . . . nonideal theory
lacks an objective, an aim, by which its queries can be answered.”); see also RAWLS, supra note 273,
at 245–48 (even “slavery and serfdom . . . are tolerable . . . when they relieve even worse injustices”).
275
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 532.
276
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 542–43.
277
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 529.
278
Dolovich, supra note 17, at 530.
279
Cf. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF
IDEAS xi, 19, 48 (1991); id. at vii & n.2 (“cross-grained” timber in R.G. Collingwood’s 1929 lecture); Isaiah Berlin, Montesquieu, 41 PROC. BR. ACAD. 267, 284 (1955), reprinted in AGAINST THE
CURRENT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 130, 148 (1980); IMMANUEL KANT, Idee zu einer
allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, in WAS IST AUFKLÄRUNG?: AUSGEWÄHLTE
KLEINE SCHRIFTEN 3, 10 (Philosophische Bibliothek Bd. 512, 1999) (1784) (“aus so krummem
Holze, als woraus der Mensch gemacht ist, kann nichts ganz Gerades gezimmert werden”).
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rupt machines and bosses threatened us with a plutocracy.”280 The argument is plausible, and it is likewise plausible that prison privatization, by
fragmenting the prison industry into at least two chunks (and more if private firms don’t cooperate on advocacy), has similarly made the industry
less powerful.
In a roundabout way, then, privatization is a form of antitrust, and
antitrust is a form of campaign finance regulation. It may not be worthwhile to privatize industries—or break up large corporations—merely to
reduce their political advocacy, but at the very least this may count as a
happy, unintended side effect of privatization that, if real, should be
taken into account in future analysis.

280

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 4 (photo. reprint 1993) (1914); see also Arthur P. Dudden, Men Against Monopoly: The Prelude to TrustBusting, 18 J. HIST. IDEAS 587, 590 (1957); Lester M. Salamon & John J. Siegfried, Economic
Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy, 71 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1026, 1039 (1977) (suggesting “an empirical base for the argument that antitrust policy is
necessary to avoid not just undue concentrations of economic power but also threatening concentrations of political power”). But cf. DeNeen L. Brown, Rejected as a Planet, Pluto Has a Space in
People’s Hearts, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2006, at C1.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Note to Law Review editors: I am flexible on inclusion of this section.281
A. A More Technical View
Let us recap the central question: If self-interested pro-incarceration
advocacy is wrong, does privatization lead to more or less of it? The
following models show technically how adding more voices can lead to
less pro-incarceration advocacy. The intuition, again, is mainly that
more competitive industries, or industries with more scattered voices,
may advocate less because advocacy is a public good and more scattered
industries have more trouble overcoming their collective action problem.
The largest actor does all the lobbying, and the smaller actors free-ride.
And because the largest actor, under current conditions, is still the public
sector, privatization reduces the public sector’s advocacy while keeping
the private sector’s advocacy at zero. Another model, also plausible,
shows that privatization has no predictable effect on pro-incarceration
advocacy a priori; thus, showing that it will increase pro-incarceration
advocacy requires a precise explanation of how advocacy by different
sectors works.
1. Privatization May Reduce Pro-Incarceration Advocacy
a. A One-Sided Model
The model has the following assumptions. The prison system,
whose size is normalized to 1, is divided into small, separate projects that
can be run by either the public sector or a private firm. Prisons operate
for infinitely many periods, and because private contracts run out periodically, many projects are put out to bid to the private sector each period. Actors in both the public and private sectors are rational, risk neutral expected utility maximizers whose utility depends only on their financial well-being, as described below. All workers have reservation
wage Wm.
The public sector wage is Wg per unit, which is higher than the equilibrium market wage Wm.282 The public sector runs a proportion ig of the
281

If you are unwilling to print this section, I could release it separately as ALEXANDER VOLOKH, PRIVATIZATION AND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POLITICAL ADVOCACY: TECHNICAL APPENDIX (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Working Paper No. xx, 2007), and simply refer to that working paper in this Article.
282
See text accompanying notes 164–169 supra. I treat Wg as a constant—not dependent on
ig—for simplicity. More properly, it is probable that Wg decreases with privatization, since the
public sector union will then have less bargaining power. I leave the complications this would add
to the analysis for further research, perhaps along the lines of Fraja, supra note 162, at 461–66, who
(continued next page)
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projects. The benefit of prison provision to the public sector employees
is W = Wg–Wm per unit.283 The public sector employees are presumed
to act collectively through their union, membership in which is mandatory.
In the private sector, there is a fixed number of firms n, all equally
efficient and able to produce at unit cost C. Each firm i runs a proportion ii of the system.284 The contract price per unit is P, so the benefit of
prison provision to the private sector is = P–C per unit.285
Wages, prices, and costs in this model should be understood as the
present value of the flow of wages, prices, and costs over the whole
game. As a purely technical matter, they are also normalized to be “per
unit,” meaning (in this system of size 1) that they represent wages,
prices, or costs scaled up to the level of the entire system.
Before prisons operate, actors in the industry can advocate. This is a
one-sided model, where the advocacy of the opposing side is taken as
given. By spending an amount ei on pro-incarceration advocacy, actor i
can affect the probability that the size of the prison system is increased
by a proportion (that is, from 1 to 1+ ). (This assumes that “proincarceration” policy, as I have defined it,286 actually increases the extent
of incarceration, rather than decreasing it through deterrence or, say,
more lenient behavior by other actors not covered in the reform.)
The assumptions I make about the probability of this increase and
about firm shares under privatization are listed in Appendix B1. The
main assumptions are that only the total amount of advocacy matters to
the probability of the policy change; more advocacy increases the probexplicitly considers wage determination in a “mixed duopoly” consisting of a public firm and a
private firm with unions.
283
The foundation for this assumption is either risk neutrality of workers or—more likely—
income redistribution within the union. See Pencavel, supra note 162, at 201–02, and text accompanying notes 161–163 supra.
284
This share or proportion is different from “market share” as it is used in antitrust. For instance, if a single large firm is broken up into two identically sized firms, under my framework each
firm has a 50% share of the industry, because its total benefits are 50% of what they were before. In
antitrust analysis, if the two firms compete for the same market, they each have a 50% market share,
whereas if the two firms don’t compete with each other because they’re limited to separate geographical areas, they each have a 100% share of a smaller market. I am grateful to Steven C. Salop
for this point.
285
I treat P as a constant—not dependent on {ii}—because it’s not clear what effect different
industry shares will have on P. In the first place, as I explain in note 284 supra, these industry
shares are not “market shares”; that is, the companies may not be competing against each other. In
the second place, even if they were competing against each other, it’s not clear whether privatization
would lead to the entry of more firms, the growth of all existing firms, or the consolidation of existing firms into fewer firms. Finally, suppose privatization led to the entry of more firms. Our intuitions suggest that collusion would be more difficult in this case, and so P should drop; but Pecorino
points out that, under standard models, this intuition may not necessarily be true (which might either
rebut our intuitions or indict the standard models). See Pecorino, supra note 178.
286
See text accompanying notes 29–30 supra.
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ability but (after a certain threshold) at a decreasing rate; and I rule out
uninteresting cases where advocacy is so unproductive that some actors
wouldn’t even be willing to spend the first dollar.
Denote all the assumptions listed above as A1.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions A1:
• No collusion. If the public sector and all private firms act
separately: If ig W > maxi{ii} , increasing privatization
decreases pro-incarceration advocacy. Otherwise, increasing
privatization increases pro-incarceration advocacy.
• Private sector collusion. If all private firms collude with
each other: If ig W > im , where im = ii over all private firms, increasing privatization decreases proincarceration advocacy. Otherwise, increasing privatization
decreases pro-incarceration advocacy.
• Full collusion. If the public sector and all private firms collude with each other: If W > , increased privatization decreases pro-incarceration advocacy. If W < , increased
privatization increases pro-incarceration advocacy. If W =
, increased privatization has no effect.
• Sometimes, the local can be the global. In the no-collusion
case when ig W > maxi{ii} ; in the private sector case
when ig W > im ; or in the full collusion case: Decreasing privatization slightly and eliminating it entirely have effects on advocacy that go in the same direction.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
This general result is familiar from the literature on public goods:
Any degree of fragmentation in the industry reduces expenditures on
public goods that benefit the whole industry, because each actor receives
only a portion of the benefit from advocacy attributable to his contribution to the public good.287 As explained above,288 ig W is likely greater
than maxi{ii} and than im (and, for the full-collusion case, W is
likely greater than 289).
b. A Two-Sided Model
Suppose that the assumptions of A1 apply, except the following. The
probability of getting a “tougher” policy change is p(e,y), where e is the
287
288
289

See sources cited supra note 143.
See text accompanying notes 147–151 supra.
See text accompanying notes 157–169 supra.
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expenditure of prison providers and y is the expenditure of antiincarceration forces to prevent the increase . The disutility of these
forces from incarceration is B < 0. Denote these assumptions, and those
listed in Appendix C1, as A2.
Proposition 2. Under assumptions A2 and if all private firms collude
with each other: If ig W > im , increasing privatization decreases pro-incarceration advocacy. Otherwise, increasing privatization increases pro-incarceration advocacy. In either case, increased privatization has an ambiguous effect on antiincarceration advocacy.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
It is easy to show that the results are analogous using the other collusion assumptions from above. If, as argued before, ig W is larger, then,
as in the previous model, the amount of pro-incarceration advocacy goes
down, because em remains zero and eg falls with privatization (because of
the same public goods problem). The “total amount” of advocacy (e+y)
is not meaningful in this model; the more relevant quantity is the probability p(e,y) – p(0,0), which is the total effect of all advocacy. (We can
interpret p(0,0) as the probability that the policy change happens anyway
under “fair deliberative conditions.”290) In any event, the effect of privatization on p(e,y) is indeterminate without further information.
c. Expenditures and Substantive Influence on Policy
Suppose that l is not exogenous but can be influenced by expenditures. Then the probability of success (in a one-sided model) can be expressed not as p(e) but as p(l(e),e), where pl < 0, pe > 0, and l > 0.
The public employees choose eg to maximize:
mg(eg) = ig (1 + p(l(e),e) ) W – eg.
The first-order condition of this problem (omitting the arguments of p
and l for clarity) is:
(pl l + pe) l + p l 1 / ig W (with equality if eg* > 0).291
(Similarly, the first-order condition of the private sector is the same expression, with eg replaced by em and ig W replaced by ii n.) Suppose
that ig W > ii n. For reasons explained in the proof of Proposition 1,
only the public sector gives anything: eg* > 0 and em* = 0. If the lefthand side of the above expression—call it L(e)—is decreasing in e, then
it is clear that decreasing ig will decrease e—that is, privatization will
290
291

See Dolovich, supra note 17, at 515.
This is similar to equation (20.9) in MUELLER, supra note 138, at 480.
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decrease total advocacy. However, it is unclear that L(e) is decreasing in
e:
dL/de = (ple l + pl l + pee) l + (pl l + pe) l + pe l + p l .
Consider the expression (pl l + pe) contained in the second term; pl l is
negative while pe is positive. So just from that term alone, we can see
that L(e) is not necessarily decreasing in e.
Fortunately, the previous comparative static result still goes through,
for reasons stated in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Suppose f is differentiable, argmaxx (f(x) – x) = x* > 0,
f ( ) = 0, and i (0,1). Then argmaxx (if(x) – x) = x < x*.
Proof. See Appendix D.
By Lemma 1, decreasing ig decreases total advocacy. Thus, even in
a model where advocacy not only alters the probability that a proincarceration reform will succeed, but also alters the substantive content
of that reform, privatization still decreases advocacy.
2. Privatization May Have an Indeterminate Effect
Instead of assuming that the probability of getting the change in policy was p(e), where e = ei, let us assume that the probability of the policy change is p(eg) + q(em), where eg and em are the respective contributions of the public and private sectors. The assumptions of this model
(which I label A3) are the same as A1, with q behaving like p. The only
exception is that, so that the probabilities make sense, we also have
p( ) + q( ) 1. As before, p(0) + q(0), the world without selfinterested advocacy, can be interpreted as the probability that the reform
occurs under conditions of “fair deliberation.”292
If the public and private sectors were colluding with each other, they
would, given any total advocacy amount, allocate eg and em optimally,
and would then choose an optimal total advocacy amount.293 But let us
continue supposing that the two sectors are not colluding, and each has a
share ig and im.
Proposition 3. Under assumptions A3 and if all private firms collude
with each other, increasing privatization has an ambiguous effect
on pro-incarceration advocacy.
Proof. See Appendix E.

292
293

See text accompanying note 290 supra.
See Appendix B.2 infra.
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In this model, both sectors can advocate, and no sector totally free
rides off the other, as the smaller sector did in the previous model.
The result of this proposition makes sense: Privatization increases
the advocacy of the private sector but decreases the advocacy of the public sector. Of course, these models are all polar cases; in principle, there
can be other intermediate advocacy effectiveness functions p(eg,em) or
p(eg,em,y) (or, more generally, p(enon-prisons,eg,em,y)). But they do show
that concerns that privatization will increase the amount or effect of advocacy, or even that they run of risk of doing so, are unfounded unless
one is more specific about the effectiveness and interaction of advocacy
by the different sectors.
Obviously, if the effect of privatization is ambiguous in this onesided model, it remains ambiguous if we add anti-incarceration advocacy. Thus, there is no need to look into the two-sided model.
B. Details of Proposition 1
1. Technical Assumptions of A1
I make the following assumptions about the probability of the policy
change:
• the probability p(e) is a continuous and twice differentiable function294 of e = ei, i.e., only the total amount of advocacy matters;295
• p [0,1] (this is part of the definition of a probability);
• p] > 0, i.e., more advocacy increases the probability;
• Decreasing returns to advocacy kick in eventually: p < 0; et
such that p_(e) < 0 e > et;296
•
e such that (p(e )–p(0)) g
W > e , and e such that
(p(e )–p(0)) i*
> e for i* = argmaxi{ i}; i.e., for both the
public sector and the largest private firm, I require that there be
some level of advocacy that makes him better off than no advocacy at all, thus ruling out the uninteresting case where some
sector would be satisfied even if there were no advocacy at all.
I make two assumptions about firm shares under privatization.
First, I assume that individual firm shares are continuous and differentiable functions of ig; this implies that when privatization increases (in
294
The continuity condition merely states that the probability of getting a policy change is a
smooth function of total lobbying effort. Twice differentiability is a purely technical constraint.
295
The assumption that there is only a single form of advocacy and a single type of benefit is
harmless. See Appendix B.2 infra.
296
See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
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other words, when ig falls) by a small amount, the individual ii do not
jump discontinuously.
Second, I interpret privatization as taking certain projects away from
the government and awarding them to the private sector according to
some allocation method. When privatization increases, I assume that
each private firm keeps its original projects, and at least the largest firm
acquires some of the formerly government projects. This implies that as
ig falls, the largest ii increases.297 Similarly, when privatization decreases (ig rises), at least the largest ii falls.
2. The Harmlessness of Homogeneous Advocacy
This appendix shows that it is harmless to assume that there is a single type of advocacy expenditure that goes to obtain a single type of
benefit.
Suppose, instead, there were two types of expenditure, e and i, used
to obtain two types of benefit, X and Y. Instead of merely having a
benefit B(e) = ii p(e) X, one would then have a benefit:
B+(e, i) = ii [p(e) X + q(i) Y],
where both p and q satisfy the technical assumptions of A1, and one
would choose e and i to maximize:
U(e, i) = B+(e, i) – e – i.
But this is equivalent to defining M e + i, and then choosing e and M to
maximize:
V(e, M) = B+(e, M–e) – M.
And this, in turn, is equivalent to the two-step problem of:
• first choosing e* to maximize V(e, M), denoting the solution
e*(M) and the maximized value V*(M)
V(e*(M), M)
B+(e*(M), M–e*(M)) – M B*(M) – M;
• then choosing M to maximize V*(M).
Consider the “new” benefit function B*(M), which is a function of
total advocacy expenditures M. Taking derivatives, we have (by the Envelope Theorem298):
dB*/dM = B+2 (e*(M), M–e*(M)) = ii q (M–e*(M)) Y > 0,
d2B*/dM2 = B+22 (e*(M), M–e*(M)) = ii q (M–e*(M)) Y,
d3B*/dM3 = B+222 (e*(M), M–e*(M)) = ii q (M–e*(M)) Y < 0.

297
If we interpret ii as the probability that a private firm i gets any project, then ii/im is the
conditional probability that it gets the project given that the project goes to the private sector. So, as
ig falls (and thus im rises) by , ii rises to (ii/im) (im+ ) = ii + ii / im i. But I do not need such
a strong assumption.
298
See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 133, at 964–66; VARIAN, supra note 133, at 490–91.
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So the first and third derivatives of B* behave like the first and third derivatives of B. As for the second derivative, we need to check whether it
eventually becomes negative, for which a sufficient condition is that
limM M–e*(M) = , for which in turn a sufficient condition is that
de*(M)/dM < 1.
Note that at the first stage of choosing e* to maximize V(e,M), the
first-order condition was ii [p (e*) X – q (M–e*) Y] = 1, and the secondorder condition was p (e*) X + q (M–e*) Y < 0. Differentiating the
first-order condition with respect to M (and assuming, for simplicity, an
interior solution), we obtain:
[p (e*) X + q (M–e*) Y] de*/dM = q (M–e*) Y,
or:
de*/dM = q (M–e*) Y / [p (e*) X + q (M–e*) Y].
We know from the second-order condition that the denominator of this
expression is negative, and we know by assumption that the first term of
the denominator, p (e*) X, is negative. If q (M–e*) Y < 0, it is easy to
see that de*/dM < 1. If q (M–e*) Y > 0, then the numerator is positive
and the denominator is negative, so again de*/dM < 1.
Therefore, the second derivative of B* likewise acts like the second
derivative of B. So U(e) = B(e) – e can thus be interpreted as though it
were a more generalized value function V*(M) = B*(M) – M, where the
actor chooses a total amount of advocacy and allocates it optimally
among both types of advocacy. This is straightforward to generalize to a
larger number of types of advocacy.
3. Proof
a. No collusion
The public employees choose eg to maximize:
mg(eg) = ig (1 + p(e) ) W – eg.
The first-order condition of this problem is:
p](e*) ig
W o 1 (with equality if eg* > 0),
or:
e* p (p])-1(1 / ig
W) (with equality if eg* > 0).
Consider the function f(e) = [p(e)–p(0)] ig
W – e. It is clear that
f(0) = 0; by assumption, e > 0 such that f(e ) > 0; and it is likewise
clear that f( ) = – . Therefore, f(e) has an interior maximum, and at
that maximum we must have f (e) = p (e) ig
W – 1 = 0. The second
derivative is p (e) ig
W, which is negative e > et; thus, the maximum of f(e) occurs at some e > et. These are the same derivatives as
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those of the public sector’s objective function, so the public sector’s firstorder condition (with equality) also has a solution, which is a maximum.
Each private sector firm i chooses ei to maximize:
mi(ei) = ii (1 + p(e) ) – ei.
The first-order condition of this problem (analogously to the public sector case) is:
p](e*) ii
o 1 (with equality if ei* > 0) i,
or:
e* p (p])-1(1 / im
) (with equality if em* > 0).
By an analogous argument, the first-order condition with equality has a
unique solution greater than et, which is a maximum.
Case 1. If ig W > maxi{ii} , then:
p](e*) ig
W = 1 and
p](e*) ii
< 1 i.
The public sector does all the advocacy, and ei* = 0 i. Denote the
amount of public sector advocacy, as a function of the public sector
share, by:
W).
e*(ig) = (p])–1(1 / ig
Public sector advocacy is increasing in ig, since:
de*/dig = –1 / ig2
W p ((p])–1(1 / ig
W)) > 0.
Thus, increased privatization (i.e., decreasing ig) decreases total advocacy.
Case 2. If ig W < ii for some i: Let I denote the set of i such
that i = argmaxi{ii}. Then all firms i I, as the “largest” actor(s), does
(do) all the advocacy, and eg* = ei* = 0 i I. (If there is more than
one i I, those firms advocate as much as they would if they were a single firm; the division of advocacy among those firms is arbitrary. Case 3
below explains the mechanism.) Denote ii* = max{ii}. Total private
sector advocacy, e*(ii*) = (p])–1(1 / ii*
), is increasing in ii*, by an
analogous argument to Case 1. By assumption, as privatization increases, the largest ii increases, so the private sector’s advocacy increases, and thus total advocacy increases.
Case 3. If ig W = ii = K for some i I, then the first-order conditions of the public sector and of the firms in I hold with equality simultaneously, and p](e*) = 1/ K.
Any division of advocacy expenses between the public sector and the
firms in I can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. Let (eg,e1,…,en) be any
division of advocacy expenses such that, i, ei = 0 if ii < K, and
eg + Iei = (p )–1(1/ K). Then the first-order conditions of the public sector and of the firms in I are satisfied, and all other first-order conditions
hold with strict inequality. Therefore, this division is individually ra-

DRAFT—DO NOT CITE

11/9/2006]

PRIVATIZATION & POLITICAL ADVOCACY

79

tional for each firm, so no firm would benefit from deviating. This division is thus a Nash equilibrium.
If ig decreases, by assumption, all the ii increase. Then we are back
in Case 2, and total advocacy increases. If ig increases, the largest ii
falls; then we are in Case 1, and advocacy also increases.
b. Private sector collusion
As before, the public sector’s first-order condition is:
p](e*) ig
W o 1 (with equality if eg* > 0), or
–1
e* p (p]) (1 / ig
W) (with equality if eg* > 0).
For the same reasons as in subsection a above, the first-order condition
with equality has a unique solution eg* (et,r) for any ii, which is a
maximum.
The private sector chooses em to maximize:
mm(em) = im (1 + p(e) ) – em,
where im = ii over all private firms. The first-order condition of this
problem is:
o 1 (with equality if em* > 0), or
p](e*) im
e* p (p])-1(1 / im
) (with equality if em* > 0).
For the same reasons as above, the first-order condition with equality has
a unique solution em* (et,r) for any ii, which is a maximum.
Case 1. If ig W > im , as before, we have:
p](e*) ig
W = 1 and
p](e*) im
< 1.
The public sector does all the advocacy, and em* = 0. The amount of
public sector advocacy, (p])–1(1 / ig
W), is increasing in ig; thus, increased privatization decreases total advocacy.
Case 2. If ig W < im , then the private sector, as the “larger” sector, does all the advocacy, and eg* = 0. The private sector’s advocacy,
(p])–1(1 / im
), is increasing in im; thus, increased privatization increases advocacy.
Case 3. If ig W = im = K, then both first-order conditions hold
with equality simultaneously, p](e*) = 1/K, and again any division of advocacy expenses between the public and private sectors can be sustained
as a Nash equilibrium. If im increases, then we are back in Case 2; the
private sector takes over all the advocacy, which increases, and the public sector falls to 0, so the total amount of advocacy increases.

DRAFT—DO NOT CITE

80

VOLOKH

[11/9/2006

c. Full collusion
The colluding public and private sectors choose e (and divide that
contribution among themselves in some way) to maximize:
(e) = (1 + p(e) ) ( g W + m ) – e.
This has an interior maximum, by a reasoning analogous to that given
above. The first-order condition is:
p (e*) = 1 / ( g W + m ).
Differentiating, we obtain:
p (e*) de*/d m = – ( – W) / ( g W + m )2,
or:
de*/d m = – ( – W) / p (e*) ( g W + m )2,
which is negative if < W, positive if > W, and 0 if = W.
d. Sometimes, the local can be the global
The previous sections of the proof all proceeded by showing that, in
each case, increasing m (or, equivalently, decreasing g) would have a
particular effect because de*( m)/d m (or de*( g)/d g) was either positive, negative, or zero. But in all the cases above, de*( m)/d m has the
same sign for all values of m. Thus, suppose one of the results above
was that privatization decreases advocacy, or de*( m)/d m < 0; thus, the
function e*( m) is decreasing in m. This means that e* is decreasing at
a particular value of m (this is a local effect, or what happens if you increase privatization by a small amount), or e*( m–h) > e*( m) for a small
value of h. But, because de*( m)/d m < 0
m, this also means that
e*(0) > e*( m)
:
m
e*(0) = e*( m) – 0 m [de*( m)/d m] d m > e*( m).
So the effect of decreasing privatization by a small amount goes in the
same direction (but, naturally, may have a different magnitude) as the
effect of eliminating privatization entirely, as long as we remain in the
same case. This happens in Case 1 of the no-collusion case, Case 1 of
the private sector collusion case, and the full collusion case.
C. Details of Proposition 2
1. Technical Assumptions of A2
The assumptions about p are the same as in A1, except as amended
by the following:
• p is a continuous and twice differentiable function of e = ei and
y, i.e., only the total amount of advocacy by each side matters;

DRAFT—DO NOT CITE

11/9/2006]

PRIVATIZATION & POLITICAL ADVOCACY

81

•

p1 > 0 and p2 < 0, i.e., more advocacy by the pro-incarceration
side increases the probability and more advocacy by the antiincarceration side decreases it, other things being equal;
• Decreasing returns to each type of advocacy kick in eventually:
p111 < 0; p222 > 0; y, et(y) such that p11(e) < 0 e > et(y); and
e, yt(e) such that p22(e,y) > 0 y > yt(e);
•
y, e such that (p(e ,y)–p(0,y)) g
W > e , and e such
that (p(e )–p(0)) m
> e . Similarly,
e, y such that
(p(e,y )–p(e,0)) B > y ; i.e., for the public sector, private sector,
and anti-incarceration forces, I require that there be some level of
advocacy that makes them better off than no advocacy at all, thus
ruling out the uninteresting case where some actor would be satisfied even if there were no advocacy at all.
The private and public sectors’ objective functions remain the same,
with p(e) replaced by p(e,y). The objective of the anti-incarceration
forces (assumed to be a unitary black box), taking advocacy into account,
is my(y) = (1 + p(e,y) ) B – y.
2. Proof
The private sector chooses em to maximize mm(em), and the public
sector chooses eg to maximize:
mg(eg) = ig (1 + p(e,y) ) W – eg.
The anti-incarceration forces choose y to minimize:
my(y) = (1 + p(e,y) ) B – y.
The first-order conditions are:
im p1(e*,y*)
1,
ig p1(e*,y*)
W 1, and
–p2(e*,y*) B 1.
For the same reasons as above, it’s likely that one of em or eg is zero (and
that variable’s first-order condition holds with inequality). Because of
the technical assumptions, the other two first-order conditions hold with
equality and imply single unique maxima. (By a reasoning analogous to
that in Proposition 1, e* > et(y*) and y* > yt(e*), and since p11 < 0 and
p22 > 0 for those values, the second-order conditions are satisfied.)
For simplicity, consider the case that ig W > im . Differentiating
the first-order conditions, we obtain:
deg/dim = –p1 p22 / (1–im) (–p11p22 + p12p21) < 0, and
dy/dim = p1 p21 / (1–im) (–p11p22 + p12p21).
The sign of dy/dim depends on that of p21, that is, on the interaction between the effectiveness of pro- and anti-incarceration advocacy. Thus,
total pro-incarceration advocacy declines with increased privatization
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(since eg declines and em is zero), while the effect of increased privatization on anti-incarceration advocacy is ambiguous.
It is straightforward to show that if ig W
im , total proincarceration advocacy increases with increased privatization, while the
effect of increased privatization on anti-incarceration advocacy is ambiguous.
D. Proof of Lemma 1
Because argmaxx (f(x) – x) = x* > 0 and f is differentiable, we know
that f (x*) = 1 and f (x) < 0. Moreover (assuming for simplicity that x*
is a unique maximum), x x*, f(x*) – x* > f(x) – x.
Now suppose that argmaxx (if(x) – x) = x > x* (and suppose this is
a unique maximum). Then we have f (x ) = 1/i and f (x ) < 0. But, because f ( ) = 0, x** > x such that f (x**) = 1. (This is the “next” x
such that f = 1 “after” x .) Because x* was a maximum for f(x) – x, we
know that f(x**) – x** < f(x*) – x*.
Now define x as the “previous” x such that f = 1/i “before” x*:
x = max{x | f(x) = 1/i, x < x*}, or (if there is no such x) x = 0. Because
x was a maximum for if(x) – x, we know that if(x ) – x > if(x ) – x ,
which implies that f(x ) – x /i > f(x ) – x /i.
Because f(x**) – x** < f(x*) – x*, we have x*x** (f (x) – 1) dx < 0.
And, since f(x ) – x /i > f(x ) – x /i, we have x x (f (x) – 1/i) dx > 0.
Therefore, if we subtract these two integrals from each other, we must
have:
x**
(f (x) – 1) dx – x x (f (x) – 1/i) dx < 0.
x*
But if we actually evaluate that difference, we get:
x**
(f (x) – 1) dx – x x (f (x) – 1/i) dx =
x*
= x*x** [(f (x) – 1/i) + (1/i – 1)] dx – x x (f (x) – 1/i) dx =
= – x x* (f (x) – 1/i)dx + x*x (1/i – 1)dx + x x** (f (x) – 1)dx.
By construction of x and x*, f (x) [1,1/i] when x [x ,x*], so the first
term above is the negative of a negative expression, i.e., positive. The
second term is clearly positive because 1/i > 1. The third term is positive because, again by construction of x and x**, f (x) [1,1/i] when
x [x ,x**]. Thus, x*x** (f (x) – 1) dx – x x (f (x) – 1/i) dx > 0, which
contradicts the result that x*x** (f (x) – 1) dx – x x (f (x) – 1/i) dx < 0.
By contradiction, we must have argmaxx (if(x) – x) = x < x*.
E. Details of Proposition 3
The public sector chooses eg to maximize:
mg(eg) = ig (1 + (p(eg)+q(em)) ) W – eg,
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so it sets:
p (eg*) 1 / ig
W (with equality if eg* > 0).
This first-order condition and the next one have unique solutions for any
ii for analogous reasons to those stated above. Similarly, the private sector chooses em to maximize:
mm(em) = im (1 + (p(eg)+q(em)) ) – em,
so it sets:
q (em*) 1 / im
(with equality if em* > 0).
The assumptions here guarantee an interior solution. However, if the
relevant assumption is weakened and we have ig
W < 1 / p (et) or
im
< 1 / p (et) for some parameter values, one or both of the firstorder conditions cannot be solved with equality, in which case it would
not be profitable for the relevant sector or sectors to advocate at all.
(This could also explain why the private sector might not advocate—
im is not high, and neither is .)
The total effect of advocacy, at the optimum, is:
E = p(eg*) + q(em*),
which we can express in terms of im:
E(im) = p(eg*(im)) + q(em*(im)).
(For convenience, I’ll drop the im argument.) To gauge the effect of increased privatization, we examine:
dE/dim = p (eg*) deg*/dim + q (em*) dem*/dim
= p (eg*) / p (eg*) ig2
W – q (em*) / q (em*) im2
3 2
2
= 1 / p (eg*) ig
W – 1 / q (em*) im3 2 2.
This expression is of indeterminate sign. (Again, if the relevant assumption is weakened, see above, then there might be a corner solution; in that
case, it is clear that moving a little bit in the direction of that sector will
not increase that sector’s investment, while it will decrease the investment of the other sector, so the total effect of pro-incarceration advocacy
will drop. But for a big enough discrete movement in im—for instance,
an increase from an im < 1 /
p (et) to im = 1 /
p (et)—then there
will be a discrete jump in advocacy—in this example, from em = 0 to em
= et.) Intuition: The first term, which is negative, represents the decrease
in the advocacy effectiveness of the public sector when privatization increases, since the public sector gets less of the benefit of its advocacy.
The second term, which is positive, represents the increase in the advocacy effectiveness of the private sector when privatization increases (for
analogous reasons).
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